[12] "Embodied in the constitutional right to the courts under [the United States Constitution and] Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XII of the Georgia Constitution of 1983 is the right of the criminal defendant to be present at any stage of a criminal proceeding that is critical to its outcome if the defendant’s presence would contribute to the fairness of the procedure."(Punctuation omitted.) Smith v. State, 319 Ga. App. 590, 596 (6), 737 S.E.2d 700 (2013), quoting Huff v. State, 274 Ga. 110, 111 (2), 549 S.E.2d 370 (2001). See also United States v. Gagnon, 470 U. S. 522, 526, 105 S.Ct. 1482, 84 L.Ed.2d 486 (1985)
Pruitt has cited no authority, and we have found none, that stands for the proposition that Pruitt had the right to be present at a bench conference where the State elected not to prosecute one of the counts against him. See Smith v. State , 319 Ga. App. 590, 596 (6), 737 S.E.2d 700 (2013) (Defendant’s presence at the bench was not necessary to "defend against the charges," and did not cause him "to lose or waive any right or defense.") The second conference from which Pruitt contends he was improperly excluded was a discussion about the trial court’s calendar pertaining to the next case to be tried.
"Given the evidence of [Jones's] education, training, and experience [at the time she testified in 2016], we cannot say that the trial court abused [his] discretion in qualifying [Jones] as an expert witness." Smith v. State , 319 Ga. App. 590, 594 (4), 737 S.E.2d 700 (2013).Kruel argues that the trial court should have looked to Jones's level of experience in 2012, when she conducted the forensic interviews in this case, rather than 2016, when she gave her expert opinion, to determine whether Jones was qualified to give expert testimony.
Conducting such bench conferences in Bagwell's absence did not violate his constitutional right to be present. See Heywood, supra at 774(3), 743 S.E.2d 12 ; Smith v. State, 319 Ga.App. 590, 596(6), 737 S.E.2d 700 (2013) (rejecting the defendant's claim that his right to be present was violated where the challenged sidebars involved only “housekeeping matters”). A third bench conference was not transcribed. And as Bagwell acknowledges in his appellate brief, “[t]his means we have no clear understanding as to what specifically was discussed and how it may have impacted Appellant's rights.”
A new trial was not warranted on this basis, however, where the defendant acquiesced in the limited trial proceedings that occurred in his absence.). Furthermore, Lopez has not shown what subjects were discussed at the bench conferences that occurred outside of his presence; therefore, he has not shown any meaningful relationship between his presence or absence at the conferences and his opportunity to defend against the charges against him. Heywood v. State, 292 Ga. 771, 774(3), 743 S.E.2d 12 (2013) (A defendant's absence from a bench conference involving a logistical or procedural matter or an evidentiary objection or other question of law, where the defendant's presence would be useless, does not bear a reasonably substantial relation to the defendant's opportunity to defend against the charges against him or her and, therefore, does not implicate the defendant's constitutional right to be present at proceedings.); Smith v. State, 319 Ga.App. 590, 596–597(6), 737 S.E.2d 700 (2013) (accord). The trial court did not err in denying Lopez's motion for a new trial on this basis.
A new trial was not warranted on this basis, however, where the defendant acquiesced in the limited trial proceedings that occurred in his absence.). Furthermore, Lopez has not shown what subjects were discussed at the bench conferences that occurred outside of his presence; therefore, he has not shown any meaningful relationship between his presence or absence at the conferences and his opportunity to defend against the charges against him. Heywood v. State, 292 Ga. 771, 774 (3) (743 SE2d 12) (2013) (A defendant's absence from a bench conference involving a logistical or procedural matter or an evidentiary objection or other question of law, where the defendant's presence would be useless, does not bear a reasonably substantial relation to the defendant's opportunity to defend against the charges against him or her and, therefore, does not implicate the defendant's constitutional right to be present at proceedings.); Smith v. State, 319 Ga. App. 590, 596-597 (6) (737 SE2d 700) (2013) (accord). The trial court did not err in denying Lopez's motion for a new trial on this basis.
(Citation omitted.) Smith v. State, 319 Ga.App. 590, 591(1), 737 S.E.2d 700 (2013). Furthermore, Faison's detailed account of what Jackson had told him was corroborated by the testimony of other witnesses at trial.
Brown v. State, 319 Ga.App. 680, 682(1), 738 S.E.2d 132 (2013). See also Smith v. State, 319 Ga.App. 590, 592(1)(a), 737 S.E.2d 700 (2013) (“the jury could infer from the victim's testimony and her young age that she did not willingly consent but was intimidated into complying with [the defendant's] demands out of fear”).2. Next, Wynn challenges his conviction of incest, arguing that there was insufficient evidence of consanguinity.
Thus, a defendant's absence from such bench conferences does not violate his right to be present. See, e.g., Brewner v. State , 302 Ga. 6, 11-12 (II), 804 S.E.2d 94 (2017) ("[B]ench conferences pertaining to purely legal issues, such as the admissibility of evidence ..., ordinarily do not implicate the right to be present."); Heywood , 292 Ga. at 774 (3), 743 S.E.2d 12 (rejecting the defendant's right to be present claim where bench conferences involved only objections and trial procedure or logistical matters); Parks v. State , 275 Ga. 320, 324-325 (3), 565 S.E.2d 447 (2002) (defendant's absence from conferences that discussed legal matters, such as objections and the admission of exhibits, did not violate his right to be present); Smith v. State , 319 Ga. App. 590, 596, 737 S.E.2d 700 (2013) (no violation of constitutional right to be present where the challenged sidebars involved only "housekeeping matters or the merits of evidentiary objections"). None of the bench conferences about which Nesby complains were transcribed, and Nesby has failed to present evidence that any of the bench conferences about which he complains were the sort that implicated his right to be present.
To the extent appellant may be complaining about this colloquy (in addition to what was discussed at the bench conference), we would find no error because it concerned only a housekeeping matter and appellant's presence would not have been useful. See Parks v. State, 275 Ga. 320, 322–325, 565 S.E.2d 447 (2002) (“right to be present exists where there is a reasonably substantial relation to the fullness of opportunity to defend against the charge and to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by the defendant's absence”); Smith v. State, 319 Ga.App. 590, 596, 737 S.E.2d 700 (2013) (defendant's presence during housekeeping or legal discussions would not have been useful to the resolution of any matter). Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.