Smith v. State

117 Citing cases

  1. State v. Burns

    306 Ga. 117 (Ga. 2019)   Cited 29 times
    Holding that Benton contained a similar constitutional holding to Smith

    Benham, Justice. In Smith v. State , 259 Ga. 135 (1), 377 S.E.2d 158 (1989), this Court held that, once certain procedural requirements are satisfied, a defendant in a sexual offense prosecution may adduce evidence at trial that the complaining witness has made prior false accusations of sexual misconduct and, further, that such evidence is admissible both to attack the credibility of the victim and as substantive evidence tending to prove that the conduct underlying the charges did not occur. In its decision below, the Court of Appeals followed Smith to reverse the trial court, which had excluded such evidence from being presented during trial under OCGA § 24-4-403.

  2. Vallejo v. State

    362 Ga. App. 33 (Ga. Ct. App. 2021)   Cited 6 times
    In Vallejo v. State, 362 Ga.App. 33 (865 S.E.2d 640) (2021), a whole court opinion with a split decision, we ultimately held that Burns did not overrule the threshold determination set forth in Smith.

    See also OCGA § 24-4-412 (a). In Parks , 350 Ga. App. at 811-812 (2), 830 S.E.2d 284, we relied on Smith v. State , 259 Ga. 135, 137 (1), 377 S.E.2d 158 (1989), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Burns , 306 Ga. 117, 119-124 (2), 829 S.E.2d 367 (2019), in which the Supreme Court of Georgia held that Georgia's Rape Shield Statute, as it then existed under the old Evidence Code, did not prohibit evidence of prior false allegations made by a victim. In Smith , the Supreme Court also held that "the evidentiary rule preventing evidence of specific acts of untruthfulness must yield to the defendant's [constitutional] right of confrontation and right to present a full defense."

  3. Burns v. State

    345 Ga. App. 822 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018)   Cited 2 times
    Holding that the defendant’s assertion that the prior accusation evidence was also admissible under Rule 608 (b) "aligns with the constitutional concerns … as set forth in Smith"

    During the hearing on the motion, defense counsel agreed that evidence of the victim's past sexual behavior was inadmissible but indicated that he intended to introduce evidence that the stepdaughter had admittedly falsely accused another person of sexual misconduct. Citing Smith v. State , 259 Ga. 135, 377 S.E.2d 158 (1989), defense counsel argued that such evidence did not implicate the Rape Shield Statute and was admissible as pertaining to the stepdaughter's credibility and to Burns's right to confront her as a witness called against him. After the hearing, the trial court concluded that the prior accusation is inadmissible under OCGA § 24-4-403.

  4. State v. Parks

    350 Ga. App. 799 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019)   Cited 16 times
    In Parks, 350 Ga. App. at 811-812 (2), 830 S.E.2d 284, we relied on Smith v. State, 259 Ga. 135, 137 (1), 377 S.E.2d 158 (1989), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Burns, 306 Ga. 117, 119-124 (2), 829 S.E.2d 367 (2019), in which the Supreme Court of Georgia held that Georgia's Rape Shield Statute, as it then existed under the old Evidence Code, did not prohibit evidence of prior false allegations made by a victim.

    However, it does not prohibit testimony regarding previous false allegations by the complaining witness. Smith v. State , 259 Ga. 135, 137 (1), 377 S.E.2d 158 (1989) (holding that Georgia's Rape Shield statute, as it then existed under the old Evidence Code, did not prohibit testimony of prior false allegations made by a victim), overruled in part by State v. Burns , ––– Ga. –––– (2), 829 S.E.2d 367, 2019 WL 2414701 (Case No. S18G1354, decided June 10, 2019) (overruling the constitutional holding in Smith , but holding that the "evidentiary holding in Smith is consistent with the decades-old plain language of the Rape Shield statute and remains good law in the era of the new Evidence Code"); see also Morgan v. State , 337 Ga. App. 29, 31 (1), 785 S.E.2d 667 (2016) (recognizing that the new version of the Rape Shield statute does not prohibit false-allegation evidence), disapproved of by Burns , ––– Ga. –––– at (2) (n.3), 829 S.E.2d 367 (disapproving Morgan to the extent it relied on or cited the constitutional holding in Smith ). Nevertheless, "before such evidence can be admitted, the trial court must make a threshold d

  5. Morgan v. State

    337 Ga. App. 29 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016)   Cited 5 times
    In Morgan, on the other hand, this Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence under Smith after finding that the prior allegations were true.

    The reason for this exception to the Rape Shield Statute is that the “evidence does not involve the victim's past sexual conduct but rather the victim's propensity to make false statements regarding sexual misconduct.” Smith v. State, 259 Ga. 135, 137(1), 377 S.E.2d 158 (1989). However, “before such evidence can be admitted, the trial court must make a threshold determination outside the presence of the jury that a reasonable probability of falsity exists.”

  6. Chambers v. State

    205 Ga. App. 78 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992)   Cited 11 times
    In Chambers, we held that the requirements of Smith v. State, 259 Ga. 135 (1) (377 S.E.2d 158) (1989) were satisfied by the admitted videotape interview of the victim containing her prior accusation and retraction and that Smith did not require the admission of the very same duplicate testimony sought to be admitted by defendant in this case.

    The testimony which was presented was essentially a repetition of the victim's earlier videotaped admission of her false accusation. Pretermitting the question of whether Chambers perfected the record for our review with respect to the expected testimony of three of the witnesses, see Thompson v. State, 187 Ga. App. 152 ( 369 S.E.2d 523) (1988), we find that the requirements of Smith v. State, 259 Ga. 135 (1) ( 377 S.E.2d 158) (1989), were satisfied by the admitted videotape of the prior accusation and retraction. Although Smith held that the rape shield protection of OCGA § 24-2-3 does not prohibit testimony of previous false allegations by the victim after a determination by the court of the falsity of such allegations, we do not read Smith as mandating the admission of this duplicate testimony.

  7. Gallegos-Munoz v. State

    906 S.E.2d 711 (Ga. 2024)   Cited 1 times

    An alleged victim’s accusations against the defendant and against the other person or persons may have occurred in any chronological order.See State v. Burns, 306 Ga. 117, 119 (1), 829 S.E.2d 367 (2019) (In Smith v. State, 259 Ga. 135, 137 (1), 377 S.E.2d 158 (1989), "we announced that evidence of a prior false allegation was admissible during trial following a threshold determination made by the trial court outside the presence of the jury that a reasonable probability of falsity exists." (citation and punctuation omitted)).

  8. Wand v. State

    230 Ga. App. 460 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998)   Cited 17 times
    In Wand, supra, the appellant argued that the trial court improperly disallowed cross-examination of the victim's mother about her prior, allegedly false, allegations of sexual abuse of the victim.

    Marion, 206 Ga. App. at 159 (1); Chastain, 257 Ga. at 55.Smith v. State, 259 Ga. 135, 137 (1) ( 377 S.E.2d 158) (1989); see Dupree v. State, 206 Ga. App. 4, 5 (2) ( 424 S.E.2d 316 (1992). But the common law rule of relevancy generally applies to show false accusations made by the victim, not the victim's mother.

  9. Frye v. State

    811 S.E.2d 460 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018)   Cited 1 times

    Morgan v. State , 337 Ga. App. 29, 31 (1), 785 S.E.2d 667 (2016) (Peterson, J.), cert. denied (Ga. Nov. 7, 2016); see also Sutton v. State , 336 Ga. App. 884, 885 (1), 785 S.E.2d 421 (2016) (Peterson, J.) (discussing former OCGA § 24-2-3 and the applicability of this exception). 259 Ga. 135, 377 S.E.2d 158 (1989). Id. at 137 (1), 377 S.E.2d 158 ; accord Morgan , 337 Ga. App. at 31 (1), 785 S.E.2d 667 ; see also Benton v. State , 265 Ga. 648, 649 (5) n.5, 461 S.E.2d 202 (1995) (citing to former OCGA § 24-2-3 and Smith , 259 Ga. 135, 377 S.E.2d 158, to note that "[t]he rape-shield law ... does not necessarily prohibit" testimony regarding "prior accusations of sexual misconduct directed against persons other than the defendant").

  10. Sims v. State

    260 Ga. 782 (Ga. 1991)   Cited 19 times

    The only evidence offered by this witness involved a recitation of what the victim said and demonstrated to the witness. The opinion of the witness was impermissibly based on the credibility of the victim, see Smith v. State, 259 Ga. 135 (2) ( 377 S.E.2d 158) (1989), and was not based on her specialized experience or knowledge as an expert in the field of child sexual abuse. The inference to be drawn from this particular evidence was not beyond the ken of the jurors. We cannot say that the jurors lacked the requisite skill, knowledge or experience to determine whether the victim had been molested based on the testimony of the victim's statements and her demonstration of what had been done to her.