Smith v. State

2 Citing cases

  1. Tatham v. Bridgestone Americas Holding, Inc.

    473 S.W.3d 734 (Tenn. 2015)

    Since Thurman–Bryant, the Court of Appeals repeatedly has emphasized that such negative inference may be drawn only where "the spoliation occurs in circumstances indicating fraud and a desire to suppress the truth" but not where "the destruction was a matter of routine with no fraudulent intent." McLean, 2005 WL 2493479, at *4 (holding that the trial court erred in drawing a negative inference against the spoliating party where there was no evidence of intentional misconduct); see alsoFuller v. City of Memphis, No. W2011–02300–COA–R3–CV, 2012 WL 3201937, at *5 (Tenn.Ct.App. Aug. 8, 2012) (holding that the trial court did not err in refusing to draw a negative inference where there was no evidence of intentional misconduct); Smartt v. NHC Healthcare/McMinnville, LLC, No. M2007–02026–COA–R3–CV, 2009 WL 482475, at *17–18 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2009) (affirming a jury instruction on the doctrine of spoliation and establishing a negative inference only for intentional misconduct); Smith v. State, No. E2004–0737–COA–R3–CV, 2005 WL 589818, at *9–10 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2005) (no negative inference was appropriate where there was no evidence that the spoliation was due to intentional misconduct); Leatherwood, 121 S.W.3d at 703 (affirming trial court's decision not to apply a negative inference where there was no evidence of intentional misconduct). Although the prerequisite of intentional misconduct originated with the common law doctrine of spoliation and only applied to the specific sanction of a negative inference, several panels of the Court of Appeals also have applied the requirement of intentional misconduct as a prerequisite to the imposition of sanctions other than that of a negative inference, such as dismissal of the spoliating party's cause of action or limiting the introduction of evidence.

  2. Tatham v. Bridgestone Americas Holding, Inc.

    473 S.W.3d 734 (Tenn. 2015)

    Since Thurman–Bryant, the Court of Appeals repeatedly has emphasized that such negative inference may be drawn only where “the spoliation occurs in circumstances indicating fraud and a desire to suppress the truth” but not where “the destruction was a matter of routine with no fraudulent intent.” McLean, 2005 WL 2493479, at *4 (holding that the trial court erred in drawing a negative inference against the spoliating party where there was no evidence of intentional misconduct); see alsoFuller v. City of Memphis, No. W2011–02300–COA–R3–CV, 2012 WL 3201937, at *5 (Tenn.Ct.App. Aug. 8, 2012) (holding that the trial court did not err in refusing to draw a negative inference where there was no evidence of intentional misconduct); Smartt v. NHC Healthcare/McMinnville, LLC, No. M2007–02026–COA–R3–CV, 2009 WL 482475, at *17–18 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2009) (affirming a jury instruction on the doctrine of spoliation and establishing a negative inference only for intentional misconduct); Smith v. State, No. E2004–0737–COA–R3–CV, 2005 WL 589818, at *9–10 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2005) (no negative inference was appropriate where there was no evidence that the spoliation was due to intentional misconduct); Leatherwood, 121 S.W.3d at 703 (affirming trial court's decision not to apply a negative inference where there was no evidence of intentional misconduct). Although the prerequisite of intentional misconduct originated with the common law doctrine of spoliation and only applied to the specific sanction of a negative inference, several panels of the Court of Appeals also have applied the requirement of intentional misconduct as a prerequisite to the imposition of sanctions other than that of a negative inference, such as dismissal of the spoliating party's cause of action or limiting the introduction of evidence.