(Punctuation omitted.) Smith v. State, 304 Ga.App. 708, 711(3), 699 S.E.2d 742 (2010), overruled on other grounds by Reed v. State, 291 Ga. 10, 14(3), 727 S.E.2d 112 (2012). Compare with Smith, 304 Ga.App. at 711(3), 699 S.E.2d 742; Artis v. State, 299 Ga.App. 287, 292–293(5), 682 S.E.2d 375 (2009).
[Cit.]”); Goss v. State, 312 Ga.App. 676, 677, 719 S.E.2d 561 (2011) (“ ‘We review the trial court's determination that the similar transaction evidence was admissible under an abuse of discretion standard.’ [Cit.]”); Smith v. State, 304 Ga.App. 708, 709(1), 699 S.E.2d 742 (2010) (“We will uphold a trial court's decision to admit similar transaction evidence unless it is clearly erroneous. [Cit.]”).
(Because Wilson failed to provide the transcript of the Rule 404(b) hearing in the record on appeal, our review is limited to the trial record and the transcript of the hearing on the motion for new trial, at which the Rule 404(b) ruling was discussed. See Smith v. State, 304 Ga.App. 708, 709(1), 699 S.E.2d 742 (2010).)
See Smith v. State, 304 Ga.App. 708, 709 –710(1), 699 S.E.2d 742 (2010) (“We have frequently held that an investigating officer's testimony concerning his personal knowledge of the crimes investigated by him is not hearsay.”) (citations omitted); Terry v. State, 262 Ga.App. 654, 655–656, 586 S.E.2d 357 (2003) (What an investigating officer saw during her investigation of the prior offense and what the defendant told her during that investigation is not hearsay and is admissible at trial.); compare Bowdry v. State, 211 Ga.App. 626, 440 S.E.2d 59 (1994) (law enforcement officer's testimony at trial concerning the similarity of a prior offense is inadmissible hearsay when the officer does not have personal knowledge of the facts of the prior offense.
Moreover, contrary to Robinson's contention otherwise, the State did present nonhearsay evidence as to the specific locations from which the stolen Sealy mattresses were recovered. Notably, two of the investigating officers testified from their own personal knowledge that they recovered stolen Sealy mattresses from both the Park Central and South Stone Mountain warehouses. See Smith v. State, 304 Ga.App. 708, 709–710(1), 699 S.E.2d 742 (2010) (“We have frequently held that an investigating officer's testimony concerning his personal knowledge of the crimes investigated by him is not hearsay.”) (citations omitted). Thus, Robinson's insufficiency arguments regarding Count 18 lack merit.
Ellington, C. J., and Miller, P. J., concur. See Smith v. State, 304 Ga. App. 708, 711 (3) ( 699 SE2d 742) (2010). Compare Turner, 283 Ga. at 21 (2) (where the verdict form returned by the jury noted whether or not the jury was finding that the defendant was justified in his actions).
Because Alvarez failed to include the transcript of the similar transaction hearing in the record on appeal, our review is restricted to the trial record. See Smith v. State, 304 Ga. App. 708, 709 (1) ( 699 SE2d 742) (2010). The trial court acted within its discretion in admitting evidence of the prior rape.
(Punctuation omitted.) Smith v. State , 304 Ga.App. 708, 711, 699 S.E.2d 742 (2010), overruled on other grounds by Reed v. State , 291 Ga. 10, 14, 727 S.E.2d 112 (2012). Compare with Muttalib v. State , 335 Ga.App. 514, 516, 782 S.E.2d 300 (2016) (holding that judge's remarks in the record as to why evidence did not support conviction for one charge made transparent his reasoning, which was inconsistent with his finding of guilt for another charge, thereby warranting reversal of the judgment of conviction as to that second charge).