However, Dyer did not make any contemporaneous objection at trial to the testimony; therefore, he has waived consideration of his present objection. Smith v. State, 276 Ga. 97, 99(4), 575 S.E.2d 450 (2003). And, contrary to his urging, the evidentiary issue is not properly reviewed for plain error.

given the role crack cocaine played in the events leading up to the murder of the victim and the reasonable inference the jury could have drawn from the evidence that Benford's motive in murdering the victim was to obtain the victim's drugs or money to purchase the drug from others, we find no error in the trial court's admission of testimony that Benford possessed crack cocaine when arrested.Benford, 272 Ga. at 350, 528 S.E.2d 795. Accord Smith v. State, 276 Ga. 97(5), 575 S.E.2d 450 (2003) (holding that the trial court did not err in admitting evidence that the defendant possessed marijuana when he was arrested, saying it was relevant to the murder-related charges because a dispute over marijuana led to the shooting of the victim). Similarly, here, given the role that crack cocaine played in the death of the victim, the trial court would not have been required to grant a motion to sever, and Appellant's counsel cannot be said to have performed deficiently in failing to file such a motion.

First, regardless of the intended purpose for the introduction of the evidence by the defense, the substance taken from the purse was never tested to determine its identity, nor was it present at trial for evaluation by the jury. Compare Smith v. State, 276 Ga. 97, 99 (6) ( 575 SE2d 450) (2003). Thus, the claim that it was methamphetamine was merely speculative, as was the assertion that it was probative because its presence in the victim's purse indicated that she was on methamphetamine at the time of the fatal shooting.

The trial court properly admitted the evidence and allowed the jury to assess its weight. See generally Smith v. State, 276 Ga. 97 (6) ( 575 SE2d 450) (2003). 6. We find no error in the amended verdict form. Although the insertion of language to avoid inconsistent verdicts was not required, see King v. Waters, 278 Ga. 122 (1) ( 598 SE2d 476) (2004), such language was legally correct and did not improperly influence the jury.

OCGA § 24-9-67. See Smith v. State, 276 Ga. 97, 98-99 ( 575 SE2d 450) (2003). See Stewart v. State, 246 Ga. 70, 75 ( 268 SE2d 906) (1980); In the Interest of C.W.D., 232 Ga. App. 200, 207-208 ( 501 SE2d 232) (1998).

Such evidence could explain why Hood shot at Brown and the Lees, even though they were unarmed, and thus was relevant and material to the charges against him. See Smith v. State, 276 Ga. 97, 99 (5) ( 575 SE2d 450) (2003). The fact that the jury accepted Hood's defense of justification and acquitted him of the murder charge does not affect this analysis.

Officers told Finney that, as an adult, he had no right to have his mother present, then discussed with him his right to an attorney. See Smith v. State, 276 Ga. 97, 98 (2) ( 575 SE2d 450) (2003) (adult accused has no right to presence of parent during questioning). Finney raised precisely this same argument about the same statement in his previous appeal. As was fully explained in this Court's earlier opinion, Finney's statement was voluntary.

Stringer v. Commonwealth, 956 S.W.2d 883, 889-90 (Ky. 1997) ("Presumably, jurors do not need assistance in the form of an expert's opinion that the defendant is guilty or not guilty."). See, e.g., Bell v. State, 435 So.2d 772, 775-76 (Ala.Crim.App. 1983) (holding that it was not plain error to permit state forensic pathologist to characterize child's death as "homicidal murder" and not error of any kind to permit same witness to characterize death as "homicide"); Smith v. State, 276 Ga. 97, 575 S.E.2d 450, 452-53 (2003) (medical examiner properly permitted to express opinion that manner of death was homicide based on observations made during autopsy as well as facts obtained from other witnesses); Medlock v. State, 263 Ga. 246, 430 S.E.2d 754, 756 (1993) (medical examiner properly permitted to express opinion that manner of death was "homicide," though it would have been error if witness had expressed opinion as to whether homicide was intentional or accidental); People v. Perry, 229 Ill.App.3d 29, 170 Ill.Dec. 823, 593 N.E.2d 712, 715-16 (1992) (expert's opinion that manner of death was "homicide" not prejudicial where only issue was whether mother intentionally smothered child or accidentally rolled over on top of child while sleeping); Booker v. State, 270 Ind. 498, 386 N.E.2d 1198, 1202 (1979) (once trial court made preliminary finding that purse-snatching incident would have been a stressful event for the elderly female victim, doctor could properly express opinion that stress engendered by the

State v. Moore, 2015 WI 54, 363 Wis.2d 376, 864 N.W.2d 827 (2015); People v. Edwards, 2015 IL App (3d) 130190, 32 N.E.3d 116, 392111. Dec 116, leave to appeal filed, No. 119332 (111. 2015); State v. Moses, 390 S.C. 502, 702 S.E.2d 395 (Ct. App. 2010); Smith v. State, 276 Ga. 97, 575 S.E.2d 450 (2003). The record does not show that law enforcement told Ray Betancourth, during the October 9 interview, that he was free to leave.

Although not directly on point, the following decisions hold that a child's statement without a parent present constituted a voluntary statement. State v. Moore, 2015 WI 54, 363 Wis.2d 376, 864 N.W.2d 827; People v. Edwards, 2015 IL App. (3d) 130190, 32 N.E.3d 116, 392 Ill. Dec 116, leave to appeal filed, No. 119332 (Ill. 2015); State v. Moses, 390 S.C. 502, 702 S.E.2d 395 (Ct. App. 2010); Smith v. State, 276 Ga. 97, 575 S.E.2d 450 (2003). The record does not show that law enforcement told Ray Betancourth, during the October 9 interview, that he was free to leave.