Smith v. State

7 Citing cases

  1. People v. Gistover

    189 Mich. App. 44 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991)   Cited 24 times
    Recognizing the general acceptance of electrophoresis

    See Stoughton, supra, p 229. Those states include California ( People v Morris, 199 Cal.App.3d 377, 383-390; 245 Cal.Rptr. 52 [1988]; People v Reilly, 196 Cal.App.3d 1127; 242 Cal.Rptr. 496 [1987]); Massachusetts ( Commonwealth v Gomes, 403 Mass. 258, 272; 526 N.E.2d 1270 [1988]); Nevada ( Santillanes v State, 104 Nev. 699, 703-705; 765 P.2d 1147 [1988]); South Dakota ( State v Adams, 418 N.W.2d 618, 621 [SD, 1988]); Oklahoma ( Plunkett v State, 719 P.2d 834, 839-840 [Okla, 1986], cert den 479 U.S. 1019 [1986]); Kansas ( State v Washington, 229 Kan. 47, 54-56; 622 P.2d 986 [1981]); Illinois ( People v Henne, 165 Ill. App.3d 315, 327-328; 116 Ill Dec 296; 518 N.E.2d 1276 [1988]; People v Partee, 157 Ill. App.3d 231, 260-263; 110 Ill Dec 845; 511 N.E.2d 1165 [1987], cert den 484 U.S. 1072 [1988]); Florida ( Correll v State, 523 So.2d 562, 567 [Fla, 1988], cert den 488 U.S. 871 [1988]); Maryland ( Smith v State, 62 Md. App. 627; 490 A.2d 1307 [1985]); New York ( People v McCain, 134 A.D.2d 287; 520 N.Y.S.2d 613 [1987]); Arizona ( State v Beaty, 158 Ariz. 232; 762 P.2d 519 [1988], cert den 491 U.S. 910 [1989]); Georgia ( Graham v State, 168 Ga. App. 23; 308 S.E.2d 413 [1983]); Virginia ( O'Dell v Commonwealth, 234 Va. 672; 364 S.E.2d 491 [1988], cert den 488 U.S. 871 [1988]); New Mexico ( State v Chavez, 100 N.M. 730; 676 P.2d 257 [1983]); and Pennsylvania ( Commonwealth v Middleton, 379 Pa. Super. 502; 550 A.2d 561 [1988]). In People v Young (After Remand), 425 Mich. 470; 391 N.W.2d 270 (1986), a sharply divided Michigan Supreme Court held that the prosecution in that case failed to establish that the results of electrophoretic testing of evidentiary bloodstains had achieved general scientific acceptance for reliability among impartial and disinterested experts in the scientific community because there was disagreement within that community on three issues: the length of time that genetic markers, particul

  2. Commonwealth v. Gomes

    403 Mass. 258 (Mass. 1988)   Cited 31 times
    Holding that defendant failed to show that lack of photographs of test plates used to analyze blood stains prejudiced his case

    People v. Crosby, 116 A.D.2d 834 (N Y 1986). Plunkett v. State, 719 P.2d 834, 841 (Okla.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1019 (1986). Smith v. State, 62 Md. App. 627 (1985). Graham v. State, 168 Ga. App. 23 (1983).

  3. State v. Clowney

    589 A.2d 86 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991)   Cited 4 times
    Speeding stop, warning ticket issued and license returned, advised he was free to leave, then consent to search sought and received

    A consent form is not required to demonstrate that consent to search a vehicle was given voluntarily. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041 (consent to search vehicle voluntary in absence of consent form); accord, Smith v. State, 62 Md. App. 627, 490 A.2d 1307 (1985) (same). Consent forms do appear with some regularity, however, especially in cases that have upheld third party consent to search premises against a challenge on the basis of voluntariness.

  4. Gamble v. State

    78 Md. App. 112 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989)   Cited 5 times
    In Gamble, police superiors warrantlessly searched a police cruiser that had been made available to the defendant police officer for his personal as well as his official use.

    That privacy expectation was waived, however, when Gamble consented to the search of the trunk of the automobile. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); Smith v. State, 62 Md. App. 627, 490 A.2d 1307 (1985). Implicit within the consent to search the trunk of the vehicle is the consent to search any and all unlocked or unsealed packages, bags, or containers found within the trunk.

  5. Com. v. Middleton

    379 Pa. Super. 502 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988)   Cited 14 times
    In Middleton, the court found that the lower court had correctly ruled the testimony as to the electrophoresis admissible.

    First, the extended interrogation of the Commonwealth's expert established that electrophoretic analysis of dried blood has "gained general acceptance" in the national community of forensic serologists. Second, appellate courts throughout the country have found electrophoretic testing of dried blood samples to be admissible under the standards enunciated in Frye v. United States, supra, namely: Illinois ( People v. Partee, 157 Ill.App.3d 231, 110 Ill.Dec. 845, 865, 511 N.E.2d 1165, 1185 (1987)); Virginia ( O'Dell v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 672, 364 S.E.2d 491, 504-505 (1988)); California ( People v. Morris, 199 Cal.App.3d 377, 245 Cal.Rptr. 52, 57 (1988)); Kansas ( State v. Washington, 229 Kansas 47, 622 P.2d 986 (1981)); Maryland ( Smith v. State, 62 Md. App. 627, 490 A.2d 1307 (1985)); Maine ( State v. Rolls, 389 A.2d 824 (1978)); New Mexico ( State v. Chavez, 100 N.M. 730, 676 P.2d 257 (1983)); and Georgia ( Graham v. State, 168 Ga. App. 23, 308 S.E.2d 413 (1983)). See also: Note, The Admissibility of ElectrophoreticMethods of Genetic Marker Bloodstain Typing Under the FryeStandard, 11 Oklahoma City Law.Rev. 773 (1986); Sensabaugh, G.F., "Uses of Polymorphic Red Cell Enzymes in Forensic Science," 10 Clinics in Hematology 185 (1981).

  6. Millwood v. State

    72 Md. App. 82 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987)   Cited 10 times

    Such a series of events hardly smacks of the level of coercion present in Whitman. Cf. Smith v. State, 62 Md. App. 627, 490 A.2d 1307, cert. denied, 304 Md. 96, 497 A.2d 819 (1985); Borgen v. State, supra; Humphrey v. State, supra. Accordingly, our independent review of the totality of the circumstances surrounding Millwood's consent leads us to conclude that that consent was voluntarily given.

  7. People v. Crosby

    116 A.D.2d 731 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986)   Cited 10 times

    This testimony was not contradicted. We note that the reliability of electrophoresis has been recognized by at least one nisi prius court in this State (see, People v Borcsok, 114 Misc.2d 810) as well as by appellate courts in several other jurisdictions (e.g., State v Washington, 229 Kan. 47, 622 P.2d 986; Smith v State, 62 Md. App. 627, 490 A.2d 1307; State v Rolls, 389 A.2d 824 [Me]; State v Chavez, 100 N.M. 730, 676 P.2d 257; Graham v State, 168 Ga. App. 23, 308 S.E.2d 413). Defendant also argues that a new trial is warranted because of error in the court's charge to the jury.