Id. at 558. See id.; State v. Watson, 239 Ga. App. 482, 484 (2) ( 520 SE2d 911) (1999); Smith v. State, 215 Ga. App. 673, 675 (2) ( 452 SE2d 526) (1994). See Phillips v. State, 272 Ga. 840, 842 ( 537 SE2d 63) (2000) ("doctrine of collateral estoppel does not bar a prosecution unless the issues of fact central to that prosecution were necessarily determined in the former trial") (citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original); Dawson v. State, 260 Ga. App. 824, 825 (1) ( 581 SE2d 371) (2003) (where the facts central to proving the charged crime were not determined in the former case, the state was not barred from prosecuting the defendant).
Pope, P.J., and Miller, J., concur. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, supra; see also Smith v. State, 215 Ga. App. 673, 674 (2), 675 ( 452 S.E.2d 526).Jenkins v. State, 240 Ga. App. 102, 103 (1), supra.
The jury in this case was authorized to infer from the evidence the presence of a weapon, as well as a reasonable apprehension by the cashier that the weapon might be used. See Moody v. State, 258 Ga. 818, 819-820(1) ( 375 S.E.2d 30) (1989); Smith v. State, 215 Ga. App. 673, 674-675(2) ( 452 S.E.2d 526) (1994). The evidence was sufficient for a jury to find Harris guilty of armed robbery beyond a reasonable doubt.
The language in this regard which defendant[, in the case sub judice,] complains of was approved in Blige v. State, 205 Ga. App. 133, 134 (1) ( 421 S.E.2d 547)." Smith v. State, 215 Ga. App. 673, 676 (5), 677 ( 452 S.E.2d 526). Judgment affirmed. Blackburn and Eldridge, JJ., concur.
This evidence supports the corresponding convictions for aggravated assault with intent to rape and robbery by intimidation. See Smith v. State, 215 Ga. App. 673, 675 (2) ( 452 S.E.2d 526) (1994) (weapon requirement established by defendant's statement that he had a gun, by his threats, and by victim's fear of being killed); Henderson v. State, 204 Ga. App. 884 (1) ( 420 S.E.2d 813) (1992) (finding evidence sufficient to sustain conviction for aggravated assault with intent to rape). The third victim testified that she awoke on the night of December 30 to a knock on her door.