Opinion
CV-00-1687-ST
December 15, 2000
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
INTRODUCTION
On June 8, 1999, plaintiffs Darrell D. Smith, Patrick M. Smith, John McBride, and John and Jane Doe, filed this action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Smith, et al. v. State of Oregon, Civil No. 99-1490-LFO. In this case, plaintiffs seek declaratory relief that Measure 362-363, approved by the voters of the State of Oregon on November 8, 1999, was not validly adopted and may not properly be made part of the Oregon Constitution. Specifically, plaintiffs seek declarations that Measure 362-363 violates Articles IV, VII, and XVII of the Oregon Constitution. The sole named defendant is the State of Oregon.
According to plaintiffs, that measure proposed "a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT PROVIDING FOR VERDICT BY 3/4 OF JURY IN CIVIL CASES; AUTHORIZ[ED] GRAND JURIES TO BE SUMMONED SEPARATE FROM THE TRIAL JURY; PERMITT[ED] CHANGE OF JUDICIAL SYSTEM BY STATUTE, ETC." Complaint, pp. 3-4.
On August 24, 1999, defendant filed a motion to dismiss this case for insufficient service under FRCP 12(b)(5), to transfer the action to the United States District Court for the District of Oregon for improper venue under FRCP 12(b)(3), to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under FRCP 12(b)(1), and to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim under FRCP 12(b)(6). On August 31, 1999, Clifford Scott Barker and Sarah Jane Price filed a "Joinder in the Action" apparently seeking to join this action as plaintiffs and seeking damages for the costs incurred in defending cases in the Union County Circuit Court for the State of Oregon and in the United States District Court for the State of Oregon.
On December 14, 1999, United States District Court Judge Louis F. Oberdorfer granted defendant's motion to dismiss in part and ordered the action transferred to this court. Judge Oberdorfer did not rule on the remaining issues in defendant's motion to dismiss and did not rule on the pending request for joinder.
On December 12, 2000, plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint (docket #11), which this court has granted in the accompanying Order. For the reasons that follow, both the request for joinder and the motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction should be deemed as filed against the Amended Complaint, should be granted, and this action should be dismissed with prejudice.
MOTION TO JOIN
Under FRCP 20, "[a]ll persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all these persons will arise in the action." Although their "Joinder in the Action" is somewhat vague, Clifford Scott Barker and Sarah Jane Price appear to seek joinder to collect damages for costs incurred defending actions against them which resulted from application of Measure 362-363. Their "Joinder in the Action" (docket #7) should be construed as a motion for joinder and be granted.
MOTION TO DISMISS
I. Legal Standard
A motion to dismiss under FRCP 12(b)(1) confronts the courts subject matter jurisdiction. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and a case is presumed to fall outside a federal courts jurisdiction unless proven otherwise. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Plaintiff bears the burden of proof that jurisdiction exists. Thornhill Pub. Co., Inc. v. General Tel. Electronics Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir 1979) (citation omitted).
[W]here a jurisdictional issue is separable from the merits of a case, the court may determine jurisdiction by the standards of a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. In such a situation, the district court is "free to hear evidence regarding jurisdiction and to rule on that issue prior to trial, resolving factual disputes where necessary."
Roberts v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir 1987), quoting Augustine v. United States, 704 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir 1983) (internal quotation omitted). However, where the question of jurisdiction is dependent on the resolution of factual issues going to the merits, a court may not resolve genuinely disputed facts. Augustine, 704 F.2d at 1077.
II. Eleventh Amendment
The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits suits in federal court against a state, regardless of the nature of the relief sought, unless the state unequivocally consents. Pennhurst State Sch. Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984). This bars suits against states in federal courts not only by actions brought by citizens of another state, but also to those brought by citizens of the state involved. See Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 229 n2 (1989), citing Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) ("[A]n unconsenting State is immune from liability for damages in a suit brought in federal court by one of its own citizens.").
The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens of Subjects of any Foreign State.
The Eleventh Amendment confirms that each state is a sovereign entity and that "`it is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent.'" Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996), quoting Hans, 134 U.S. at 13. Accordingly, the Supreme Court has long held that "[t]his express constitutional limitation denies to the federal courts authority to entertain a suit brought by private parties against a state without its consent." Ford Motor Co. v. Dept. of Treasury of Ind., 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945) (citations omitted). The Eleventh Amendment bars suits for damages in federal court against a state or its agencies or its officials. Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 100 (citations omitted) It precludes suits in law or in equity. Patsy v. Board of Regents of Fla., 457 U.S. 496, 530 (1982) (citations omitted). Recent decisions by the Supreme Court have demonstrated the continuing vitality of the Eleventh Amendment bar. See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (Age Discrimination in Employment Act does not validly abrogate a State's sovereign immunity); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (barring individual suit against a State to enforce rights under the Fair Labor Standards Act).
Oregon has not consented to suit by explicitly waiving its Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Rounds v. Oregon State Bd. of Higher Ed., 166 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir 1999); Quillin v. Oregon, 127 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir 1997). In their Complaint, plaintiffs name the State of Oregon as the only defendant. Although plaintiffs seek declaratory relief, the Eleventh Amendment clearly bars all claims against a State unless the State unequivocally consents. Plaintiffs have provided this court with no citation to any authority indicating that the State of Oregon has consented to suits of this nature. Therefore, the Eleventh Amendment bars plaintiffs' claims.
For this reason, defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction should be granted, and this action dismissed with prejudice.
RECOMMENDATIONS
For the reasons set forth above, the "Joinder in the Action" (docket #7) filed by Clifford Scott Barker and Sarah-Jane Price should be construed as a motion for joinder and be granted. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (docket #3) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction (part of docket #3) should be GRANTED. All other pending motions should be DENIED, and this case should be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
SCHEDULING ORDER
Objections to these Findings and Recommendations, if any, are due January 5, 2001. If no objections are filed, then the Findings and Recommendations will be referred to a district court judge and go under advisement on that date.
If objections are filed, the response is due no later than January 25, 2001. When the response is due or filed, whichever date is earlier, the Findings and Recommendations will be referred to a district court judge and go under advisement.