Opinion
No. 501, 1998.
August 31, 1999.
Appeal from the Superior Court, New Castle County, CrA IN87-06-0720-0722.
AFFIRMED
Unpublished Opinion is below.
WILLIAM T. SMITH, III, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE OF DELAWARE, Plaintiff Below, Appellee. No. 501, 1998. Supreme Court of Delaware. Submitted: July 30, 1999. Decided: August 31, 1999.
Appeal from Superior Court of the State of Delaware, in and for New Castle County, Cr. A. Nos. IN87-06-0720 thru 0722.
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH and HOLLAND, Justices.
ORDER
This 31st day of August 1999, it appears to the Court that:
1) The defendant-appellant, William T. Smith, III ("Smith"), has appealed from the Superior Court's denial of his pro se Motion for Correction of Sentence, which he filed pursuant to Superior Court Rule 35(a).
2) Smith was indicted in 1987 and charged with Trafficking in Cocaine, Possession with Intent to Deliver Cocaine, and Conspiracy in the Second Degree. A jury trial was held in New Castle County Superior Court in October 1988. Smith was found guilty of all charges. Smith was sentenced as follows: on the Trafficking in Cocaine conviction, to a mandatory three-year term of incarceration at Level V pursuant to 16 Del. C. § 4753A; on the Possession with Intent to Deliver Cocaine conviction, to 30 years at Level V, the first 15 years being mandatory pursuant to 16 Del. C. § 4763, suspended after 25 years for the balance of five years at Level II probation; and on the Conspiracy in the Second Degree conviction to seven years at Level V, suspended for seven years at Level II probation. Smith's judgments of conviction were affirmed on direct appeal to this Court.
3) On September 25, 1992, Smith moved pro se for postconviction relief pursuant to Delaware Superior Court Criminal Rule 61. The Superior Court denied Smith's motion. This Court affirmed that judgment on appeal.
On March 13, 1995, Smith again filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief in the Superior Court. Smith's second Rule 61 motion was denied. This Court affirmed that judgment.
4) Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(a) permits the Superior Court to correct an illegal sentence "at any time." "`A proceeding under Rule 35 presupposes a valid conviction.'" "The `narrow function of Rule 35 is to permit correction at any time of an illegal sentence, not to re-examine errors occurring at the trial or other proceedings prior to imposition of the sentence.'" Relief under Rule 35(a) is available `when the sentence imposed exceeds the statutorily-authorized limits, [or] violates the Double Jeopardy Clause. . . .'"
5) Smith's first argument in his Rule 35(a) motion and on appeal is that the Superior Court did not have jurisdiction to try him. According to Smith, because he was incarcerated and never had physical possession of any drugs, these were "non-existent crimes." This same contention was previously adjudicated by the Superior Court in Smith's second Rule 61 post-conviction motion and affirmed by this Court. Smith cannot relitigate issues that were previously decided in denying his prior Rule 61 motion for postconviction relief by subsequently raising the same claim in a Rule 35 motion for postconviction relief. This Court's prior decision on any adjudicated issue involving Smith's claims became the law of the case in all subsequent stages of his continuing criminal proceedings.
6) Smith's second argument is that the Superior Court applied an improper standard of proof at trial. According to Smith, the Superior Court erred when it found that his conduct was a substantial cause of the trafficking and possession with intent to deliver, and not "the" cause of the two offenses. This argument would require an examination of alleged errors occurring at trial prior to the imposition of the sentence. Similarly, Smith has also raised claims that relate to the Superior Court's rulings denying defense motions to suppress evidence. Those types of relief cannot be granted to Smith under Rule 35(a). The function of Rule 35 is to permit correction of an illegal sentence, not to re-examine alleged errors that occurred at or prior to trial.
7) Finally, Smith argues that he should not have received an enhanced penalty, pursuant to 16 Del. C. § 4763(a)(3), because the offenses of trafficking and possession with intent to deliver were "non-existent." This Court concluded that Smith's "non-existent" claim was without merit in affirming the prior judgments of the Superior Court. Therefore, Smith is now barred from relitigating that issue. Alternatively, since this claim was not fairly presented to the Superior Court in Smith's Rule 35(a) motion, it will not be addressed on appeal.
Smith v. State, Del. Supr., No. 84, 1989, Moore, J. (Sept. 26, 1989) (ORDER).
State v. Smith, Del. Super., Gebelein, J. (Dec 18, 1992) (mem. op.).
Smith v. State, Del. Supr., No. 33, 1993, Walsh, J. (Mar. 18, 1993) (ORDER).
Smith v. State, Del. Supr., No. 246, 1995, Holland, J. (Sept. 13, 1995) (ORDER).
The Superior Court may also correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner under the Rule 35 within ninety days of sentencing. See Locklear v. State, Del. Supr., No. 124, 1994, order at para. 3, Walsh, J. (May 24, 1994) (ORDER).
Brittingham v. State, Del. Supr., 705 A.2d 577, 578 (1998).
Id.
Id.
Brittingham v. State, 705 A.2d at 759. See Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1), (3), (4); Bailey v. State, Del. Supr., 521 A.2d 1069, 1095 (1987).
See Brittingham v. State, 705 A.2d at 579.
Brittingham v. State, 705 A.2d at 578.
See Brittingham v. State, 705 A.2d at 579 (citing Hill v. State, 368 U.S. at 430).
See Del. Supr. Ct. R. 8.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Randy J. Holland, Justice