Opinion
24A-CR-1278
12-23-2024
Anthony Cartiez Smith, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT A. Robert Masters Deputy Public Defender, St. Joseph County Nemeth, Feeney, Masters & Campiti P.C. South Bend, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Daylon L. Welliver Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the St. Joseph Superior Court Trial Court Cause Nos. 71D02-2203-F5-46, 71D02-2307-F5-273 The Honorable David L. Francisco, Judge
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT A. Robert Masters Deputy Public Defender, St. Joseph County Nemeth, Feeney, Masters & Campiti P.C. South Bend, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Daylon L. Welliver Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Foley, Judge
[¶1] Following a jury trial, Anthony Cartiez Smith ("Smith") was convicted of Level 5 felony unlawful carrying of a handgun. Smith now appeals, claiming the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Smith's recorded statements to law enforcement because the State did not satisfy the corpus delicti rule. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] On July 26, 2023, South Bend police officers stopped a speeding Chrysler 300. Smith was seated in the front passenger seat, with his uncle driving and his mother seated in the rear passenger seat behind Smith. After detecting the odor of marijuana, officers searched the vehicle. On the rear floorboard behind Smith's seat, beneath his mother's backpack, officers discovered a handgun that had scratch marks where the serial number should have been located. Officers transported Smith to the police station and interviewed him. After receiving Miranda warnings, Smith told officers he purchased the handgun for $400. State's Ex. 3A at 0:25-0:53, 4:48-4:54, 5:02-5:11; State's Ex. 3B at 0:01-0:04. Smith said that he was the only person who handled the handgun, which he placed in the rear floorboard area. State's Ex. 3A at 6:25-6:29, 7:30-7:40.
[¶3] The State charged Smith with Level 5 felony unlawful carrying of a handgun, a status offense requiring proof of a prior eligible felony conviction. Before trial, Smith stipulated that he had a prior felony conviction within fifteen years that prohibited him from possessing firearms. Tr. Vol. II pp. 23-27. A jury trial was held on March 11, 2024. At trial, the State sought to admit its Exhibits 3A and 3B, which were Smith's recorded statements to law enforcement. Smith objected, characterizing his recorded statements as a confession and arguing that the confession was inadmissible because the State had not established the corpus delicti. Id. at 38-41. The trial court overruled the objection. Id. at 4142. The jury found Smith guilty, and the court sentenced Smith to three years executed, with two of those years suspended to probation. Smith now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[¶4] Smith contends the trial court abused its discretion by admitting his statements to the police because the State failed to satisfy the corpus delicti rule. This rule provides that a defendant's out-of-court confession is inadmissible unless the State presents independent evidence establishing that the specific crime charged was committed by someone. Shinnock v. State, 76 N.E.3d 841, 843 (Ind. 2017).
[¶5] On appeal, Smith suggests that his statements to the police were admissible only if the State presented independent evidence that Smith possessed the handgun found in the vehicle. Smith ultimately argues that, under Henderson v. State, 715 N.E.2d 833 (Ind. 1999)-a case involving a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction, not the evidentiary standard associated with the corpus delicti rule-his mere presence as a front-seat passenger cannot establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed the weapon in the backseat. Smith's argument regarding the element of possession misapprehends both the purpose and the requirements of the corpus delicti rule.
[¶6] Under the corpus delicti rule, a confession is admissible only if the State made a threshold showing that someone committed the crime charged. Shinnock, 76 N.E.3d at 843. This rule exists to prevent convictions based solely upon confessions to crimes that never occurred. See id. Importantly, the quantum of independent evidence necessary to satisfy the corpus delicti rule need not constitute proof beyond a reasonable doubt or even establish a prima facie case against the defendant. Id. ("It is not necessary to make out a prima facie case as to each element of the offense charged[.]"). Rather, for the defendant's confession to be admissible under the rule, the independent evidence need only "provide an inference that the crime charged was committed" by someone. Id.
[¶7] Here, the State charged Smith with Level 5 felony unlawful carrying of a handgun. This offense is defined in Indiana Code section 35-47-2-1.5(b), which states in pertinent part that a person "may not knowingly or intentionally carry a handgun" if, within the last fifteen years, he was "convicted of a federal or state offense punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one (1) year."
[¶8] The record discloses ample independent evidence supporting an inference that someone committed the crime charged. First, Smith stipulated that he had a prior felony conviction within the statutory period that would disqualify him from lawfully possessing any handgun. Second, officers discovered a handgun with an obliterated serial number in the vehicle with Smith. The discovery of this weapon-which was itself contraband due to the obliterated serial number, see Ind. Code § 35-47-2-18-combined with Smith's stipulation, ultimately supported an inference that someone was unlawfully carrying the handgun.
[¶9] Smith's reliance on Henderson is inapposite because that case addressed the sufficiency of evidence required to support a conviction, not the minimal showing required to admit a confession. The corpus delicti rule requires only enough independent evidence to support an inference that someone committed the charged crime-a much lower bar than proving beyond reasonable doubt that a specific defendant committed the crime. Shinnock, 76 N.E.3d at 843.
[¶10] Here, the corpus delicti rule was satisfied because of Smith's independent stipulation regarding his felony status and the independent evidence that an illicit handgun was found in the vehicle. We therefore conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Smith's statements to the police.
Smith characterizes his statements as a "confession," but the statements might more precisely be termed "admissions" because they did not establish all elements of the charged offense. See, e.g., Green v. State, 304 N.E.2d 845, 848 (Ind.Ct.App. 1973) (noting that inculpatory statements constitute a confession only if the statements embrace all elements of the offense). However, because Indiana caselaw has not definitively adopted this distinction in the corpus delicti context, and because the statements were properly admitted under either characterization, we need not resolve that question here. Compare, e.g., Shinnock v. State, 76 N.E.3d 841, 843 (Ind. 2017) (focusing on whether a person was convicted of a crime "based solely on a nonjudicial confession of guilt") with Walker v. State, 233 N.E.2d 483, 488 (Ind. 1968) ("Extra judicial admissions of a defendant will not be admitted in evidence and a conviction will not be upheld until and unless the corpus delicti has been established by clear, probative proof independent of the admissions.").
[¶11] Affirmed.
Bailey, J. and Bradford, J., concur.