Opinion
24A-CR-1017
11-08-2024
Katina Smith, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Steven J. Halbert ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General John R. Oosterhoff Deputy Attorney General
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court The Honorable Danielle P. Gaughan, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 49D17-2401-CM-1259
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Steven J. Halbert
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General John R. Oosterhoff Deputy Attorney General
MEMORANDUM DECISION
CRONE, SENIOR JUDGE.
Case Summary
[¶1] Katina Smith was convicted of two counts of class A misdemeanor domestic battery. On appeal, Smith challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to negate her self-defense claim as to one of the counts. Finding the evidence sufficient, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] The facts most favorable to Smith's conviction are as follows. H.S. and R.S. have guardianship over P.S., Smith's son. Smith has visitation. H.S. is Smith's mother, and R.S. is H.S.'s husband. Because he has limited use of his legs due to a prior injury, R.S. uses a walker and a wheeled chair to navigate within the home he shares with H.S.
[¶3] On January 12, 2024, Smith called H.S. and told her that she would be coming to the house of R.S. and H.S. to pick up P.S. for visitation. This was the "first time" that Smith had been to their house. Tr. Vol. 2 at 60. Upon Smith's arrival, R.S. opened the door, and Smith "charged in," "lunged at" R.S., and started hitting R.S. Id. at 18-19, 29. Smith was in a "rage," screaming as she attacked, scratched, and pushed R.S., who fell backwards. Id. at 29, 31. An altercation ensued during which Smith bit R.S., R.S. grabbed Smith, and H.S. tried to intervene. Id. at 29-30. Smith attacked H.S., hitting her "upside the head" and causing H.S. to suffer scratches to her neck and arm and a knot on her head. Id. at 19. H.S. pulled Smith's hair. Id. at 26. R.S. was able to hold down Smith as H.S. called 911. Id. at 20, 30. The scuffle left Smith with an injured lip. Id. at 48, 61. Police responded and investigated.
[¶4] The State charged Smith with two counts of class A misdemeanor domestic battery, with the first count referencing H.S. and the second referencing R.S. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 19. After a March 2024 bench trial during which Smith claimed self-defense, she was found guilty as charged. The trial court's sentencing order included the following comments: "Counts 1 and 2 to run concurrent/Defendant sentenced to 180 days with credit for 3+3=6, 174 suspended. Defendant sentenced to 174 days probation. Defendant is to have no contact with victims." Appealed Order at 1. Smith appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[¶5] Smith challenges the sufficiency of the evidence negating her self-defense claim as to the domestic battery of H.S. The standard on appellate review of a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence to rebut a claim of self-defense is the same as the standard for any sufficiency of the evidence claim. Wallace v. State, 725 N.E.2d 837, 840 (Ind. 2000).
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence needed to support a criminal conviction, we neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility. We consider only the evidence supporting the judgment and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn from such evidence. We will affirm if there is substantial evidence of probative value such that a reasonable trier of fact could have concluded the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.Bailey v. State, 907 N.E.2d 1003, 1005 (Ind. 2009) (internal citations omitted).
[¶6] To convict Smith of domestic battery, as charged, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she knowingly or intentionally touched a family or household member in a rude, insolent, or angry manner. Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.3(a)(1). A person engages in conduct knowingly if, when she engages in the conduct, she is aware of a high probability that she is doing so. Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(b). A person engages in conduct intentionally if, when she engages in the conduct, it is her conscious objective to do so. Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(a).
[¶7] A valid claim of self-defense is legal justification for an otherwise criminal act. Birdsong v. State, 685 N.E.2d 42, 45 (Ind. 1997). Indeed, "people have a right to defend themselves and third parties from physical harm and crime." Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(a). "A person is justified in using reasonable force against any other person to protect the person or a third person from what the person reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful force." Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(c). However,
a person is not justified in using force if: ... the person has entered into combat with another person or is the initial aggressor, unless the person withdraws from the encounter and communicates to the other person the intent to do so and the other person nevertheless continues or threatens to continue unlawful action.Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(g)(3).
[¶8] A claim of self-defense is established by showing three facts: (1) the defendant was in a place where she had a right to be; (2) she did not provoke, instigate, or participate willingly in the violence; and (3) she had a reasonable fear of death or serious bodily harm. Wilson v. State, 770 N.E.2d 799, 800 (Ind. 2002). "But when a case does not involve deadly force, a defendant claiming self-defense must only show" that she was protecting herself from what she reasonably believed to be the imminent use of unlawful force. Dixson v. State, 22 N.E.3d 836, 839 (Ind.Ct.App. 2014), trans. denied (2015); Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(c). Smith maintains that she had a right to be in the home to pick up P.S., that she did not initiate any contact or aggression toward H.S., and that she was justified in fearing bodily harm from H.S. Appellant's Br. at 6, 8.
[¶9] When a claim of self-defense is raised and finds support in the evidence, the State bears the burden of disproving at least one of the three elements beyond a reasonable doubt to rebut the defendant's claim. Wilson, 770 N.E.2d at 800. The State may meet this burden by rebutting the defense directly, by affirmatively showing the defendant did not act in self-defense, or by simply relying upon the sufficiency of its evidence in chief. Quinn v. State, 126 N.E.3d 924, 927 (Ind.Ct.App. 2019). Whether the State has met its burden is a question of fact for the factfinder. Id.
[¶10] Even assuming that Smith was entitled to visitation rights with her son that day, such rights do not include automatic entry into a guardian's home. Here, the evidence supporting the judgment established that Smith arrived at the house of P.S.'s guardians, charged through the door, lunged at R.S., hit R.S., scratched him, pushed him to the ground, and bit him. Further, Smith's actions toward R.S. prompted H.S. to try to prevent her mobility-impaired husband from suffering further injury. Smith hit H.S. and pulled her hair. H.S. pulled Smith's hair, but only in response to Smith's actions. Tr. Vol. 2 at 25-26. Smith offered a different account of the altercation, challenging H.S.'s involvement and asserting that R.S. "pulled [Smith] in [the house] and started beating [her] up" to "get [Smith] away from [P.S.]" Appellant's Br. at 6; Tr. Vol. 2 at 60. The trial court heard testimony from H.S., R.S., Smith, and responding police officers and also viewed exhibits. There was no evidence supporting Smith's version other than her own testimony, which the trial court was not required to find credible.
[¶11] In sum, the State provided sufficient evidence that Smith knowingly or intentionally touched her mother, H.S., in a rude, insolent, or angry manner, thereby supporting that domestic battery conviction. Moreover, the evidence most favorable to the conviction does not support Smith's self-defense claim. Smith's argument to the contrary merely requests that we reweigh the evidence and/or judge witness credibility, which we may not do. See Bailey, 907 N.E.2d at 1005. Accordingly, we affirm.
[¶12] Affirmed.
Altice, C.J., and Vaidik, J., concur.