Opinion
Case No. 5D19-389
04-24-2020
Elaine L. Thompson, Brandon, for Appellant. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Bonnie Jean Parrish, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
Elaine L. Thompson, Brandon, for Appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Bonnie Jean Parrish, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
COHEN, J.
James C. Smith appeals his conviction of robbery with a firearm and sentence of life in prison. Smith raises two issues on appeal: that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated when the trial court held a competency hearing in his absence and that the trial court erred in failing to grant a mistrial based on the State's closing argument. While we do not condone the State's diction during its closing argument, we do not believe that the trial court erred in denying Smith's motion for mistrial. However, we find Smith's absence at the competency hearing to be more problematic.
At the start of trial, Smith refused to come to court. After he was finally brought in, Smith elected not to be present for jury selection and informed the trial court that God and the Devil had been talking to him.
The trial court granted Smith's request for a competency evaluation, stating, "That's not a problem. I had other defendants try this before their trials also. [Smith] has exhibited absolutely no incompetence during the proceedings he's been in front of. He's been able to discuss things with me and you." The trial court indicated that it would proceed with jury selection that afternoon, as scheduled, and that Smith would be evaluated that evening; it would hold a competency hearing the following day, and if Smith was found to be incompetent, it would stop the trial proceedings.
Coincidentally, Dr. Jeffrey Danziger, a forensic psychiatrist, was near the courthouse and was able to conduct a competency evaluation on Smith over the lunch recess. Following the recess, the trial court intended to hold an expedited competency hearing, given Dr. Danziger's presence. The clerk called all of Smith's cases on the record, and the trial court asked Smith's counsel whether Smith was refusing to come to court. Smith's counsel responded, "He's not refusing, but I think he's just going with what he stated earlier which is that he had no desire to be present." The trial court also asked Smith's counsel whether Smith was required to be present during the competency hearing, and counsel informed the trial court that he was not sure. Smith was in a holding cell adjacent to the courtroom but was not advised of his right to be present at the competency hearing or asked whether he wished to attend. The competency hearing was held in Smith's absence, and Smith's counsel did not object.
Smith had a series of pending cases.
Dr. Danziger opined that Smith was competent to proceed and was feigning mental illness. Following the testimony, Smith was brought back into the courtroom. In Smith's presence, the trial court adopted Dr. Danziger's findings as to all of Smith's pending cases. It also noted that based on its interactions with Smith, it never thought that Smith "evidenced any lack of understanding of what the procedures have been." The trial court added that Smith had not previously suggested that he was incompetent, despite his multiple opportunities to raise the issue, and that Smith had twice stated he would enter a plea, only to change his mind when he arrived at court.
On appeal, Smith argues that the trial court reversibly erred by holding the competency hearing outside of his presence. A defendant has the "constitutional right to be present at every stage of the trial where his absence might frustrate the fairness of the proceedings." Sturgis v. Goldsmith, 796 F.2d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted). A pre-trial competency hearing is one such stage. Id. (explaining that due process affords defendant right to be present at competency hearing); see also United States v. Barfield, 969 F.2d 1554, 1556 (4th Cir. 1992) (same). Here, there is no question that Smith was denied his constitutional right to due process of law when the trial court failed to afford him an opportunity to be present at his competency hearing.
We reject the State's argument that this issue was not properly preserved for appeal. Additionally, we reject the argument that Smith waived his right to be present at the competency hearing by waiving his presence before the hearing and for voir dire. See Turner v. State, 530 So. 2d 45, 49 (Fla. 1987) ("A defendant's waiver of the right to be present at essential stages of trial must be knowing, intelligent and voluntary. ... A defendant cannot knowingly and intelligently waive a right of which he is unaware.").
Likewise, even if this Court interpreted Smith's counsel's statement that Smith was "going with what he stated earlier" as an attempted waiver of Smith's presence, the statement did not do so because upon Smith's reappearance, the trial court did not inform Smith that he had a right to be present at the competency hearing. Compare State v. Melendez, 244 So. 2d 137, 139 (Fla. 1971) (explaining that constructive notice may be imputed to defendant if counsel waives objection to defendant's absence and defendant subsequently reappears at trial, acquiesces in or ratifies counsel's actions), with Turner, 530 So. 2d at 49.
Smith suggests that the remedy for this violation is the granting of a new trial. However, such a violation is subject to a harmless error analysis and will only cause reversal if "fundamental fairness has been thwarted." Smithers v. State, 826 So. 2d 916, 927 (Fla. 2002) (quoting Kearse v. State, 770 So. 2d 1119, 1124 (Fla. 2000) ). Based on our thorough review of the transcript of Smith's competency hearing, as well as the fact that the trial court observed Smith's demeanor and interacted with Smith on multiple occasions, including on the morning of the hearing, we conclude that the error in this case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
AFFIRMED.
ORFINGER and EISNAUGLE, JJ., concur.