Opinion
No. 05-10-00267-CR
Opinion Filed June 17, 2011. DO NOT PUBLISH. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 3, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F07-52424-J.
Before Justices MORRIS, MOSELEY, and FITZGERALD.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Marquee Lamond Smith appeals from an adjudication of guilt for the offense of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. In a single issue, Smith argues the record contains no reviewable evidence to support the trial court's findings on the State's motion to adjudicate. The background of the case and the evidence adduced at trial are well known to the parties; thus, we do not recite them here in detail. Because all dispositive issues are settled in law, we issue this memorandum opinion. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(a), 47.4. We affirm the trial court's judgment. Smith pled no contest to the charged offense pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement. The trial court accepted the plea, deferred adjudication, and placed Smith on community supervision for five years. The State filed its first motion to adjudicate alleging several grounds, including that Smith was arrested on July 16, 2008 for solicitation of prostitution. The State later moved to withdraw this motion and the trial court granted the motion. The same day, trial court modified the terms of Smith's community supervision to include ten days in jail. The State filed a second motion to adjudicate in October, 2008. The State later amended the second motion alleging several grounds, including that on July 16, 2008 Smith solicited sex for money from an undercover police officer. Smith pled not true to the allegations. The undercover police officer testified at the hearing on the motion that Smith solicited a sex act from her in exchange for money. Smith did not object to this testimony, but his trial counsel argued in closing that this ground was barred by double jeopardy and collateral estoppel. The trial court found Smith had violated the terms of his community supervision as alleged in the amended motion, adjudicated Smith guilty, and set punishment at twenty years' confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. Appellate review of an order revoking community supervision and adjudicating guilt is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion. See Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). An order revoking community supervision must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence, meaning the greater weight of the credible evidence that would create a reasonable belief that the defendant has violated a condition of probation. Id. at 763-64. A finding of a single violation of community supervision is sufficient to support revocation. See Sanchez v. State, 603 S.W.2d 869, 871 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980). Smith argues that the trial court was barred by collateral estoppel from adjudicating him guilty based on the July 16, 2008 solicitation of prostitution offense. He does not dispute the undercover officer's testimony at the hearing on the motion to adjudicate. He contends only that collateral estoppel barred the trial court from adjudicating him for that violation because the trial court modified his community supervision based on the same violation alleged in the withdrawn first motion to adjudicate. Collateral estoppel means that once an issue of ultimate fact has been determined by a valid and final judgment, it cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit. See State v. Stevens, 235 S.W.3d 736, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Collateral estoppel deals only with specific factual determinations, not legal claims or legal conclusions. Guajardo v. State, 109 S.W.3d 456, 460 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Collateral estoppel does not apply here because no discrete fact was finally determined in Smith's favor in the first motion to adjudicate. Smith did not plead to the motion, the State presented no evidence on the motion, the trial court made no findings of fact regarding the motion, and the State withdraw the motion in exchange for Smith serving ten days in jail. Thus, no ultimate fact was determined on the first motion and collateral estoppel does not apply. Because the solicitation ground is sufficient to support the adjudication, we need not address the other grounds argued in Smith's issue. See Sanchez, 603 S.W.2d at 871. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by adjudicating Smith guilty. We overrule Smith's sole issue. We affirm the trial court's judgment.