Specific considerations of financial reality, such as those expressed above, have not always been at the heart of a holding that a chancellor may properly consider the husband's expected inheritance in setting his obligation to pay alimony and child support. In the case of Smith v. Smith, Okla. 1957, 311 P.2d 229, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma had before it a situation wherein the husband had inherited realty, but where no final decree had yet been entered in the probate proceedings. The court held it proper for the chancellor to consider the husband's inheritance, such consideration being within the realm of the chancellor's discretion in divorce cases. It was the feeling of the court that "[T]he [trial] court was authorized to take into consideration, among other things, the separate property of defendant [husband] inherited from his father.
* * *'" See also: Smith v. Smith (Okla. 1957), 311 P.2d 229; Kessinger v. Kessinger, 360 Mich. 528, 104 N.W.2d 192 (1960). In addition, I find the trial court's decision to saddle plaintiff husband with the obligation of all the pre-existing tax liabilities to be inequitable.
In determining the amount of alimony to be allowed in a divorce action the court is authorized to take into consideration, among other things, the separate inherited property of the parties. Smyth v. Smyth, 198 Okla. 478, 179 P.2d 920, and Smith v. Smith, Okla., 311 P.2d 229. In these cases alimony was allowed and based in large part upon the amount of property inherited by the husband.
This contention is without merit, since statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment which describe medical history or the general cause of an ailment is exempt from the hearsay rule. See Smith v. Smith, Okla., 311 P.2d 229 (1957); Wigmore on Evidence §§ 1718 and 1719 (Chadbourn Rev. 1976); McCormick on Evidence § 292 (2d ed. 1972). Defendant alleges in the fourth assignment of error that the trial court erred in not submitting his requested instruction to the effect that a prosecutrix's testimony must be corroborated, if her testimony is found by the jury to be inherently improbable.
The plaintiff husband does not contend that this amount could not be considered by the trial court in dividing the property. And see Smith v. Smith, 311 P.2d 229 (Okla 1957). However, the plaintiff asserts that assets coming originally from his parents should all be granted to him.
And see, Missouri c. Ry. Co. v. Rose, 49 S.W. 133 (Tex.Civ.App.); Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Smith, 79 Tex. 468 ( 14 S.W. 993, 23 ASR 356, 13 LRA 215); Ferne v. Chadderton, 375 Pa. 302 ( 100 A.2d 854). In an Oklahoma divorce case, the statement of the plaintiff wife to her physician that the defendant husband "stomped her" was admitted to show the case history, nature of the injuries and the need for future medical attention. Smith v. Smith, 311 P.2d 229 (Okla.). There are a number of cases which present factual situations similar to that found in Flemming v. St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co., 91 Ga. App. 582, supra, in which testimony as to the decedent's statements was held admissible. Wilhelmi v. American Ry. Express Co., 6 N. J. Mis. R 674 (142 A 555) (physician); Greenfarb v. Arre, 62 N. J. Super. 420 ( 163 A.2d 173) (physician, wife and others); Hillman v. Utah Power c Co., 56 Idaho 67 ( 51 P.2d 703) (physician and nurse); Youngblood v. Colfax Motor Co., 12 La. App. 415 (125 S 883) (physician); Columbia Steel Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 92 Utah 72 ( 66 P.2d 124) (wife); Valentine v. Weaver, 191 Ky. 37 ( 228 S.W. 1036) (physician); F. Eggers Veneer Seating Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 168 Wis. 377 ( 170 N.W. 280) (physician); Bohan v. Lord Keenan, Inc., 98 N.H. 144 ( 95 A.2d 786) (physician and wife); Wright v. Kerrigan, [1911] 2 Ir. R. 303 (7 Irish Law Rep. 360) (physician, wife and others); Lloyd v. Powell Duffryn Steam Coal Co., [1914] A. C. 7