Opinion
22-ALJ-21-0120-AP
09-22-2022
Lacey M. Smith, Appellant, v. South Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles and South Carolina Department of Public Safety, Respondents.
ORDER
DEBORAH BROOKS DURDEN, JUDGE
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This matter is before the Administrative Law Court (ALC or Court) pursuant to a Notice of Appeal filed by counsel for Lacey M. Smith (Appellant). Appellant seeks review of a decision by a hearing officer with the Office of Motor Vehicle Hearings (OMVH), which found in favor of the South Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles (Department). The hearing officer determined that probable cause existed to arrest Appellant for driving under the influence (DUI). Appellant argues that the hearing officer erroneously found she was lawfully arrested for DUI, making the suspension of her driving privileges improper. The Court has jurisdiction to review this matter pursuant to South Carolina Code Section 1-23-660(D) (Supp. 2021).
BACKGROUND
On August 12, 2021, Appellant was stopped by Anderson County Sheriffs Office for erratic driving. The deputy that made the stop requested the assistance of the South Carolina Highway Patrol (SCHP) because he believed the driver was impaired. Trooper Phillip Ravan (Ravan) of SCHP was dispatched to the scene. Ravan approached Appellant and asked her what had happened, to which Appellant responded that "the deputy told her he pulled her over for driving all over the roadway." Raven noticed a strong odor of alcoholic beverage emanating from Appellant's person. Appellant told Ravan she had consumed alcohol earlier in the evening. Ravan requested Appellant submit to standardized field sobriety tests, to which Appellant refused. Ravan determined Appellant was materially and appreciably impaired based on his observations of Appellant's physical state, repeating herself, trouble standing, the odor of alcohol coming from her person, and the observance of empty alcohol bottles in her vehicle and purse. Ravan arrested Appellant for DUI at 10:23 p.m.
Ravan transported Appellant to the Anderson County Detention Center where he read Appellant her implied consent rights and requested a breath sample, which Appellant refused. Ravan found Appellant in violation of S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-2950 (2021) and issued Appellant a Notice of Suspension form pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-2951 (2021). Appellant timely requested an administrative hearing, which was held on October 27, 2021, after notice to the parties. After reviewing the record and considering all the evidence, the OMVH hearing officer issued an order affirming the suspension of Appellant's driver's license or driving privileges. This appeal followed.
ISSUE ON APPEAL
Whether the hearing officer erred in upholding Appellant's suspension for violation of the motor vehicle implied consent law by finding that Appellant was lawfully arrested for DUI.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The ALC hears appeals from the OMVH under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-660(D) and § 1-23-600(E) (Supp. 2021). Consequently, the Court's review is limited to the record. S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(4) (Supp. 2021). The standard used by appellate bodies to review agency decisions is provided by S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(5) (Supp. 2021). See § 1-23-600(D) (directing administrative law judges to conduct appellate review in the same manner prescribed in § 1-23-380(5)). That section states:
For the purposes of the APA, the OMVH functions as an "agency." See S.C. Dept. of Motor Vehicles v. Brown, 406 S.C. 626, 636, 753 S.E.2d 524, 529 (2014) (Beatty, J., dissenting) (quoting S.C. Dept. of Motor Vehicles v. McCarson, 391 S.C. 136, 144, 705 S.E.2d 425, 429 (2011)).
The court may not substitute its judgment for the judgment of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings. The court may reverse or modify the decision [of an agency] if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(b)in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(c)made upon unlawful procedure;
(d)affected by other error of law;
(e)clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or
(f)arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(5).
A decision is supported by "substantial evidence" when the record as a whole allows reasonable minds to reach the same conclusion as the agency. Friends of the Earth v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of S.C., 387 S.C. 360, 366, 692 S.E.2d 910, 913 (2010). The fact that the record, when considered as a whole, presents the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent the agency's findings from being supported by substantial evidence. Waters v. S.C. Land Res. Conservation Comm'n, 321 S.C. 219, 226, 467 S.E.2d 913, 917 (1996). In applying the substantial evidence rule, "a reviewing court will not overturn a finding of fact by an administrative agency 'unless there is no reasonable probability that the facts could be as related by a witness upon whose testimony the finding was based.'" Sea Pines Ass'n for Prot. of Wildlife, Inc. v. S.C. Dep't of Natural Res., 345 S.C. 594, 603-04, 550 S.E.2d 287, 292 (2001) (quoting Lark v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 276 S.C. 130, 136, 276 S.E.2d 304, 307 (1981)).
DISCUSSION
Appellant argues she was not lawfully arrested, making the suspension of her driving privileges based upon her refusal to submit to a breath test improper under the implied consent statute. Specifically, Appellant argues Raven did not have probable cause to arrest her. The Court disagrees.
A person who drives a motor vehicle in this State is considered to have given consent to chemical tests of the person's breath, blood, or urine for the purpose of determining the presence of alcohol, drugs, or the combination of alcohol and drugs, if arrested for an offense arising out of acts alleged to have been committed while the person was driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of alcohol and drugs.S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-2950(A) (2018). "It is unlawful for a person to drive a motor vehicle within this State while under the influence of alcohol to the extent that the person's faculties to drive a motor vehicle are materially and appreciably impaired . . . ." S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-2930(A) (2018). "The fundamental question in determining whether an arrest was lawful is whether there was 'probable cause' to make the arrest." Wortman v. City of Spartanburg, 310 S.C. 1, 4, 425 S.E.2d 18, 20 (1992). "Probable cause is defined as a good faith belief that a person is guilty of a crime when this belief rests upon such grounds as would induce an ordinarily prudent and cautious person, under the circumstances, to believe likewise." Id. "Probable cause for a warrantless arrest exists when the circumstances within the arresting officer's knowledge are sufficient to lead a reasonable person to believe that a crime had been committed by the person being arrested." State v. Baccus, 367 S.C. 41, 49, 625 S.E.2d 216, 220 (2006). "Whether probable cause exists depends upon the totality of the circumstances surrounding the information at the officer's disposal. Id. "Proof of the corpus delicti does not have to be in the form of direct evidence; it may be established by circumstantial evidence when it is the best evidence obtainable." State v. Osborne, 335 S.C. 172, 180, 516 S.E.2d 201, 205 (1999). "The corpus delicti of DUI is: (1) driving a vehicle; (2) within this State; (3) while under the influence of intoxicating liquors, drugs, or any other substance of like character." Id, (quoting State v. Townsend, 321 S.C. 55, 58, 467 S.E.2d 138, 140 (Ct. App. 1996).
In the present case, Appellant argues that Ravan required evidence that Appellant was "materially and appreciably impaired" per S.C. Code Ann. Section 56-5-2930 to have probable cause to arrest her. Appellant argues that Ravan was dispatched to assist Anderson County Sheriff's Office shortly after Appellant was stopped and did not observe her driving. Therefore, Appellant argues Ravan could not reasonably conclude Appellant was intoxicated to the point her driving was "materially and appreciably impaired" because the evidence available to Ravan at that time did not suggest Appellant drove her vehicle poorly. However, Ravan's best evidence obtainable at the time with respect to whether Appellant was impaired was the circumstantial evidence of the incident itself. Ravan personally observed a strong odor of alcohol about Appellant's person, and admission that she recently consumed alcoholic beverages before driving the vehicle.
Ravan personally observed sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable person to suspect that Appellant was intoxicated to the point of impairment. Upon making the arrest for driving under the influence, Appellant refused to submit to a breath test after being informed verbally and in writing of her informed consent rights. Therefore, the hearing officer's decision to uphold the Department's suspension of Appellant's driver's license or driving privileges is supported by substantial evidence. The Court finds that the OMVH hearing officer's conclusion that the trooper lawfully arrested Appellant is supported by substantial evidence and does not otherwise violate Appellant's substantial rights. Therefore, the Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the Department with respect to the weight of the evidence.
Here, Appellant refused the breath test, which required the Department to suspend Appellant's driver's license.
ORDER
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the OMVH's Final Order and Decision is AFFIRMED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Robin E. Coleman, hereby certify that I have this date served this Order upon all parties to this cause by depositing a copy hereof, in the United States mail, postage paid, or by electronic mail to the address provided by the party(ies) and/or their attorney(s).