" House Legislative Analysis, HB 4389, April 11, 1979. Second, in July of 1979, the Court of Appeals decided Smith v Robbins, 91 Mich. App. 284, 288-289; 283 N.W.2d 725 (1979) (BASHARA, J.), in which it was stated: If our paternity statute is interpreted as creating a distinction between support provided for an illegitimate child of an unwed mother and the illegitimate child of a married mother, a clearly irrational classification exists and the statute will be rendered unconstitutional.

However we are persuaded by the holding in Winsett that a forum is available under the Child Custody Act to determine the lineage of a child when the mother was married to another man. In Smith v Robbins, 91 Mich. App. 284; 283 N.W.2d 725 (1979), lv den 408 Mich. 853 (1980), the plaintiff, a married woman, filed a complaint seeking an order of filiation, alleging the defendant to be the father of her child. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that the plaintiff had not stated a claim upon which relief could be granted because the child was born and conceived while plaintiff was married.

See Uniform Act on Paternity, § 1, 9A U.L.A. 626 (1979) (withdrawn 1973, upon promulgation of Uniform Parentage Act); State v. Coliton, 17 N.W.2d 546, 549 (N.D. 1945); Pursley v. Hisch, 85 N.E.2d 270 (Ind.App. 1949); Estey v. Mawdsley, 217 A.2d 493, 494 (Conn. 1966); Martin v. Lane, 291 N.Y.S 2d 135, 138 (1968), affirmed in relevant part, 308 N.Y.S.2d 248 (1970); Smith v. Robbins, 283 N.W.2d 725 (Mich.App. 1979); R. D. S. v. S. L. S., 402 N.E.2d 30, 31, fn. 2 (Ind.App. 1980); In the Matter of the Legitimation of Locklear by Jones, (N.C. 1985) (hereinafter, Locklear). In Locklear, supra, the North Carolina Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a man, Earl Jones, claiming to be the father of a child born to a woman who was married to another man, could file a petition to legitimate the child, when the applicable statute provided that only putative fathers of children born out of wedlock could bring such a proceeding.

This Court has stated, "The announced public policy of this state is to treat children born out of wedlock as no less deserving of support than those born in wedlock." Smith v. Robbins, 91 Mich. App. 284, 289; 283 N.W.2d 725 (1979). We agree with the panel in Crego II that no "substantially related" state interest exists that would sustain the classification contained in MCL 722.713; MSA 25.493.

Petitioner's final argument is that Michigan has found arbitrary classifications of illegitimate children to be unconstitutional. See Smith v. Robbins, 91 Mich. App. 284 (1979). However, petitioner has no authority that indicates that Michigan abolished the concept of legitimacy and has not explained why Michigan's legitimation procedure is an arbitrary classification.

We wish to reiterate that we are not requiring a finding of probable cause. A paternity case is only quasi-criminal, Artibee v Cheboygan Circuit Judge, 397 Mich. 54, 57; 243 N.W.2d 248 (1976), and a defendant is not afforded a full panoply of criminal procedural protections, Smith v Robbins, 91 Mich. App. 284, 292; 283 N.W.2d 725 (1979), lv den 408 Mich. 853 (1980). For instance, the standard of proof in a paternity trial is not proof beyond a reasonable doubt, but rather the lesser burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.

(Emphasis added.) The change may have been prompted by Smith v Robbins, 91 Mich. App. 284; 283 N.W.2d 725 (1979), lv den 408 Mich. 853 (1980), which warned of equal protection problems in the Winsett interpretation of the statute. See also Serafin v Serafin, 401 Mich. 629; 258 N.W.2d 461 (1977), which discarded Lord Mansfield's rule.

Smith v Robbins, 91 Mich.App. 284, 289; 283 N.W.2d 725 (1979).

Crego III, supra at 290-292. In light of "`the announced public policy of this state . . . to treat children born out of wedlock as no less deserving of support than those born in wedlock,'" id. at 294, quoting Smith v Robbins, 91 Mich. App. 284, 289; 283 N.W.2d 725 (1979), the Crego III Court found no difference between the state's interest in settlement and finality in divorce proceedings and those same interests in actions under the Paternity Act that would justify treating children born outside marriage differently than children generally.Crego III, supra at 294-295.

We wish to reiterate that we are not requiring a finding of probable cause. A paternity case is only quasi-criminal, Artibee v Cheboygan Circuit Judge, 397 Mich. 54, 57; 243 N.W.2d 248 (1976), and a defendant is not afforded a full panoply of criminal procedural protections, Smith v Robbins, 91 Mich. App. 284, 292; 283 N.W.2d 725 (1979), lv den 408 Mich. 853 (1980). For instance, the standard of proof in a paternity trial is not proof beyond a reasonable doubt, but rather the lesser burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.