Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:02-CV-004-C
August 6, 2003
ORDER
Plaintiff, Gregory Dwayne Smith, acting pro se, filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Sergeant Juan Rivera and CO IV Guillermo Hernandez of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division ("TDCJ-ID") John Wallace Unit were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical condition in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that on October 4, 2001, Defendants Rivera and Hernandez ordered him to carry 150 pounds of his personal property for over 80 yards, in violation of his medical restrictions, which ordered that he lift no more than 20 pounds at a time because of his recent surgery to repair a hernia. Plaintiff requested relief only in the form of monetary damages.
Plaintiff was granted permission to proceed in forma pauperis by Order dated January 11, 2002, and on January 14, 2002, the complaint was transferred to the United States Magistrate Judge for judicial screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and 1915A. The Magistrate Judge did not conduct a Spears evidentiary hearing but ordered Plaintiff to answer a questionnaire and TDCJ-ID to file authenticated copies of Plaintiff's prison medical, disciplinary, classification, and grievance records. See Martinez v. Aron, 570 F.3d 317 (10th Cir. 1978) (approving the use of relevant prison records to evaluate § 1983 complaints by prison inmates). Pursuant to the Magistrate Judge's order, TDCJ-ID filed authenticated copies of the prison records on February 19, 2002, and Plaintiff filed his answers to the questionnaire on April 2, 2002.
Plaintiff declined to consent to have the Magistrate Judge conduct all proceedings in this case and by Order dated September 5, 2002, the complaint was transferred back to the docket of this Court. Defendants Rivera and Hernandez filed an Answer on November 8, 2002, which generally denied Plaintiff's allegations, raised the defenses of limitations, qualified immunity, and sovereign immunity, and argued that the complaint failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted.
Neither party having requested a trial by jury, the complaint was set for a bench trial on September 2, 2003. After discovery was completed, however, Defendants Rivera and Hernandez filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and Brief in support thereof on July 1, 2003. In their motion, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that they acted with deliberate indifference and Plaintiff has not overcome Defendants' entitlement to the defenses of official and qualified immunity. Defendants have submitted as summary judgment evidence a copy of Plaintiff's answers to the Magistrate Judge's questionnaire, a copy of Plaintiff's prison medical records, and sworn affidavits from Defendants Rivera and Hernandez. Plaintiff has not responded to the motion for summary judgment.
A motion for summary judgment permits a court to resolve a lawsuit without conducting a trial if the court determines (1) there is no genuine dispute as to any material facts and (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986). The Fifth Circuit has summarized the summary judgment standard in Burge v. Parish of St. Tammany, 187 F.3d 452 (5th Cir. 1999):
The party seeking summary judgment has the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those parts of the record that it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. If the moving party carries its initial burden, the burden then falls upon the nonmoving party to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. This showing requires more than some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. While the party opposing the motion may use proof filed by the movant to satisfy its burden, only evidence — not argument, not facts in the complaint — will satisfy the burden.Id. at 465 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
The moving party satisfies the requirement to demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact by either (1) submitting evidentiary documents that negate the existence of some material element of the non-moving party's claim, or (2) merely pointing out the absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's claim, if the non-moving party will bear the burden of proof on that claim at trial. King v. Dogan, 31 F.3d 344, 346 (5th Cir. 1994). Although the evidence and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom must be considered in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, he "may not rest on the mere allegations or denials of [his] pleadings, but must respond by setting forth specific facts indicating a genuine issue for trial." Goodson v. City of Corpus Christi, 202 F.3d 730, 735 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Rushing v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 185 F.3d 496, 505 (5th Cir. 1999)).
The Fifth Circuit, however, has suggested that a more lenient summary judgment standard may be applicable to cases set for a bench trial. Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Mayeux, 301 F.3d 359, 362 n. 1 (5th Cir. 2002); United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Planters Bank Trust Co., 77 F.3d 863, 866 (5th Cir. 1996); In the Matter of Placid Oil Company, 932 F.2d 394, 398 (5th Cir. 1991). "Under the suggested more lenient standard, the district judge could grant summary judgment based on inferences drawn from incontrovertibly proven facts, so long as there is no issue of witness credibility." Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Mayeux, 301 F.3d at 362 n. 1. See United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Planters Bank Trust Co., 77 F.3d at 866 (finding that "even at the summary judgment stage a judge in a bench trial has the limited discretion to decide that the same evidence, presented to him or her as trier of fact in a plenary trial, could not possibly lead to a different result").
A district court does not have to limit the basis for summary judgment to the facts listed in a motion for summary judgment but may grant summary judgment on facts not briefed by the moving party if the non-moving party has notice of the issue. Turco v. Hoechst Celanese Chem. Group, Inc., 101 F.3d 1090, 1093 (5th Cir. 1996).
"[Section] 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights; it merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere." Olabisiomotosho v. City of Houston, 185 F.3d 521, 525 n. 3 (5th Cir. 1999). To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that an individual acting "under color of law" caused the deprivation of a right secured by the United States Constitution. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Scott v. Moore, 85 F.3d 230, 232 (5th Cir. 1996). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Rivera and Hernandez violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment by ordering him to carry his personal property despite their awareness of his medical restriction against carrying more than 20 pounds at a time and his recent hernia surgery.
Defendants first argue that they are entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. "The Eleventh Amendment bars claims against a state brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983" unless the state has expressly consented to the suit. Aguilar v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, 160 F.3d 1052, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998). "Section 1983 does not waive the states' sovereign immunity, . . . and Texas has not consented to this suit." Id. To the extent that Plaintiff is suing Defendants Rivera and Hernandez in their official capacities as employees of the TDCJ-ID, his claims are considered to be suits against TDCJ-ID. "As an instrumentality of the state, the TDCJ-ID is immune from a suit for money damages under the Eleventh Amendment." Talib v. Gilley, 138 F.3d 211, 213 (5th Cir. 1998). See Harris v. Angelina County, Tex., 31 F.3d 331, 337-38 n. 7 (5th Cir. 1994) ("Under the current state of the law, the TDCJ is deemed an instrumentality of the state operating as its alter ego in carrying out a public function of the state, and is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment.").
Although the Supreme Court carved out a limited exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity in Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), "[t]o meet the Ex Parte Young exception, a plaintiff's suit alleging a violation of federal law must be brought against individual persons in their official capacities as agents of the state, and the relief sought must be declaratory or injunctive in nature and prospective in effect." Aguilar v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, 160 F.3d at 1054. Plaintiff has requested only monetary damages.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendants' request for summary judgment on Plaintiff's claims for monetary damages against Defendants Rivera and Hernandez in their official capacities should be granted.
Defendants next argue that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for which relief may be granted because he has failed to demonstrate that either defendant acted with deliberate indifference to his health in violation of the Eighth Amendment. "The Eighth Amendment imposes on prison officials a duty to provide humane conditions of confinement and to take reasonable steps to ensure the [health and] safety of those confined." Lawson v. Dallas County, 112 F. Supp.2d 616, 634 (N.D. Tex. 2000) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 831, 833 (1994)). It is clear that a prisoner compelled to perform physical work which is beyond his strength, endangers his life, or causes undue pain, may be able to state a claim for cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Jackson v. Cain, 864 F.2d 1235, 1246 (5th Cir. 1989) (citing Ray v. Mabry, 556 F.2d 881 (8th Cir. 1977)). To establish such a violation, however, the prisoner must show that he was "incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm" to his health or safety and the prison official acted with a "sufficiently culpable state of mind," that is, with deliberate indifference. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 834.
"Deliberate indifference is an extremely high standard to meet." Domino v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 2001). "[A] prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 837. "Under exceptional circumstances, a prison official's knowledge of a substantial risk of harm may be inferred by the obviousness of a substantial risk." Bradley v. Puckett, 157 F.3d 1022, 1025 (5th Cir. 1998). "[A]n official's failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not, while no cause for commendation, cannot under [the Supreme Court] cases be condemned as the infliction of punishment" in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 838. Moreover, a prison official "who actually knew of a substantial risk to [an inmate's] health or safety may be found free from liability if [he] responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted." Id. at 844.
The undisputed summary judgment evidence shows that on October 4, 2001, following a shakedown at the TDCJ-ID Wallace Unit, Plaintiff was ordered to move to a different cell. As Defendant Hernandez was escorting Plaintiff to his new cell assignment, he observed Plaintiff dragging his personal property across the prison recreation yard. Defendant Hernandez then ordered Plaintiff to pick up his property and carry it across the yard. Defendant Rivera, who was working on the recreation yard, went over to assist Defendant Hernandez because he was Hernandez's supervisor. Plaintiff then advised both Defendant Hernandez and Defendant Rivera that he had a medical restriction against lifting items that weighed more than 20 pounds because of recent surgery to repair a hernia, and because his personal property weighed 150 pounds, well more than the 20 pounds listed in the restriction, he should not carry his property.
In his complaint, Plaintiff alleged that Defendants Hernandez and Rivera ordered him to carry his property across the recreation yard despite the lifting restriction, but in his responses to the Magistrate Judge's questionnaire, Plaintiff conceded that he refused to leave his property on the recreation yard "because [he] didn't want to lose it." When asked if he was advised that he could leave his property on the recreation yard and it would be brought to him later, Plaintiff insisted that he was told to carry his property or lose it.
Defendant Hernandez stated in his sworn affidavit that after Plaintiff advised him of his lifting restriction, he
ordered Mr. Smith to leave his belongings in the recreation yard and that the property would be picked up by the property officer who would return it to him. Mr. Smith refused, several times, to leave his property in the recreation yard, stating that "he would rather carry it than leave it behind."
Defendant Rivera stated in his sworn affidavit that he observed Defendant Hernandez advise Plaintiff to leave his property on the recreation yard and it would be returned later by the property officer, but that Plaintiff refused to leave his property and insisted on carrying it.
As previously noted, Plaintiff did not respond to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and he has offered no evidence beyond the allegations in his pleadings to support his claim that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference. See Byers v. Dallas Morning News, Inc., 209 F.3d 419, 424 (5th Cir. 2000) ("After the non-movant has been given the opportunity to raise a genuine factual issue, if no reasonable juror could find for the non-movant, summary judgment [should] be granted."). When a defendant public official has moved for summary judgment, a prisoner plaintiff must respond by identifying affirmative evidence from which a jury could find that the plaintiff has carried his burden of proving a culpable state of mind. Gerhart v. Hayes, 217 F.3d 320, 322 (5th Cir. 2000). When a complaint is scheduled for a nonjury or bench trial, a district judge should "`draw his inferences without resort to the expense of a trial' [i]f a trial on the merits will not enhance the court's ability to draw inferences and conclusions." In the Matter of Placid Oil Company, 932 F.2d at 398 (quoting Nunez v. Superior Oil Co., 572 F.2d 1119, 1124 (5th Cir. 1978)).
Because Plaintiff has failed to identify affirmative evidence from which a trier of fact could find that he has demonstrated that Defendants Hernandez and Rivera acted with deliberate indifference, Defendants' motion for summary judgment should be granted.
It is, therefore, ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and Plaintiff's civil rights complaint is dismissed with prejudice.
Judgement shall be entered accordingly.
All relief not expressly granted is denied and all pending motions are hereby denied.