Opinion
C.A. No. 95C-09-228 RRC
Submitted: September 30, 1999
Decided: December 17, 1999
On Plaintiffs' "Motion for Judgment Not Withstanding the Verdict, or in the Alternative, for a New Trial." DENIED.
On Defendants' Motion for Costs and Expert Witness Fees. DENIED.
Matthew M. Bartkowski, Esquire; Kimmel, Carter, Roman Peltz, P.A., Attorney for Plaintiffs
Michael I. Silverman, Esquire; Barbara J. Gadbois, Esquire; Silverman McDonald, Attorney for Defendants
Dear Counsel:
Pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rules 50 and 59, Plaintiffs' have filed this "Motion for Judgment Not Withstanding the Verdict, or in the Alternative, for a New Trial," claiming that (1) the jury's finding that Defendant was not negligent was not supported by the evidence, (2) the trial Court erred by not instructing the jury of a pre-trial ruling on a Motion for Summary Judgment that held that Plaintiff Wanda Smith was not negligent, and (3) the trial Court erred by not granting Plaintiffs' Motion for a Directed Verdict that Plaintiff Jennifer Smith sustained an injury as a result of the accident. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs' Motion for Judgment Not Withstanding the Verdict, or in the Alternative, for a New Trial is DENIED.
Super. Ct. Civ. R. 50(a)(1) provides, in pertinent part, that "[i]f during a trial by a jury a party has been fully heard on an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue, the Court may determine the issue against the party and may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against the party with respect to a claim or defense that cannot under the controlling law be maintained or defeated without a favorable finding on that issue."
Super. Ct. Civ. R. 59(a) provides, in pertinent part, that "[a] new trial may be granted as to all or any of the parties on all or part of the issues in an action in which there has been a trial for any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore been granted in the Superior Court."
Pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule 54, Defendants' have filed this Motion for Costs and Expert Witness Fees, claiming that the jury verdict in favor of Defendants entitle Defendants to $5,682.50, the amount of expert witness fees incurred. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' Motion for Costs and Expert Witness Fees is DENIED.
Super. Ct. Civ. R. 54(d) provides, in pertinent part, that "[e]xcept when express provision therefor is made either in statute or in these Rules or in the Rules of the Supreme Court, costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the Court otherwise directs."
Summary of Facts and Procedural History
Plaintiffs' claims stem from a November 29, 1993 automobile accident that occurred in a Wawa parking lot when Defendant backed out of a parking space and struck Plaintiffs car. A jury trial was held on September 7 through September 10, 1999. Prior to trial, Plaintiff Wanda Smith was added as a counterclaim-defendant to the case. Plaintiff/Counterclaim-Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment which was granted by this court on March 20, 1998. The Court ordered in the ruling that "there is no negligence on the part of [Counterclaim-Defendant], period. Negligence and [Defendant] is another issue not before me. . . [b]ut based upon this, there was no negligence on the part of [Counterclaim-Defendant], and I am going to grant summary judgment on that issue." At the close of trial the jury returned a verdict finding that the Defendant was not negligent in causing the accident. It is from that verdict that Plaintiffs have filed this "Motion for Judgment Not Withstanding the Verdict, or in the Alternative, for a New Trial." Defendants' have also filed this Motion for Costs and Expert Witness Fees.
Smith v. Pullan, C.A. No. 95C-09-228, Bifferato, R.J. (Mar. 20, 1998) (Bench Ruling) at 13.
Id.
Standard of Review
1. When considering a motion for a new trial, the jury's verdict is presumed to be correct. When considering a motion for a new trial, the Court must determine whether it is against the great weight of the evidence. A jury's verdict should not be disturbed unless it is manifest that it was the result of passion, prejudice, partiality or corruption, or that it was clearly in disregard of the evidence or applicable rules of law.
Lacey v. Beck, Del. Super., 161 A.2d 579, 580 (1960).
James v. Glazer, Del. Supr., 570 A.2d 1150, 1156 (1990).
Storey v. Camper, Del. Supr., 401 A.2d 458, 465 (1979).
2. Determining when costs are awarded is a matter of judicial discretion. There may be circumstances under which costs do not go to a party to whom a final judgment is awarded. An award of court costs as a matter of judicial discretion is intended to reimburse the prevailing party for expenses unnecessarily incurred in the assertion of its rights in court.
Donovan v. Delaware Water and Air Resources Comm., Del. Supr., 358 A.2d 717, 725 (1976).
Id. at 723.
Discussion
I. Plaintiffs' "Motion for Judgment Not Withstanding the Verdict, or in the Alternative, for a New Trial."Plaintiffs' "Motion for Judgment Not Withstanding the Verdict, or in the Alternative, for a New Trial" is based on (1) the jury's finding that Defendant was not negligent was not supported by the evidence, (2) the trial Court erred by not instructing the jury on this Court's pre-trial ruling on a Motion for Summary Judgment that had held that Plaintiff Wanda Smith was not negligent, and (3) the trial Court erred by not granting Plaintiffs' Motion for a Directed Verdict that Plaintiff Jennifer Smith sustained an injury as a result of the accident.
A. The Jury Verdict for the Defendant was not against the great weight of the evidence.
Plaintiffs' first contention is that the jury's finding that Defendant was not negligent is not supported by the record. Plaintiffs argue that the evidence presented at trial established that Plaintiff was stopped at the time of the accident. Plaintiffs further argue that there was no allegation presented at trial that
any person or entity has any involvement in causing the accident other than [Defendant] and [Plaintiff]. [Plaintiff] was already deemed not negligent for causing the accident. Based upon [Defendant's] own testimony, [Defendant] was negligent in causing the accident.
Plaintiffs' Motion for Judgment Not Withstanding the Verdict, or in the Alternative, for a New Trial at ¶ 9 (this Court notes that there are two paragraphs numbered 9).
Plaintiffs in effect appear to argue that since there was an accident and that this Court had ruled that Plaintiff was not negligent, the Defendant must be negligent.
Defendants contend that Plaintiffs' argument "flies in the face of the fact that the law in Delaware is that negligence is never presumed merely because an accident occurred." Furthermore, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs had to prove to the jury by a preponderance of the evidence that the accident occurred because of the negligence of the Defendant.
Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Judgment Not Withstanding the Verdict, or in the Alternative, for a New Trial at ¶ 5.
Delaware Courts have recognized that negligence is never presumed. It must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence before a plaintiff is entitled to recover. There is no presumption that a defendant was negligent from the mere fact that an accident occurred. This Court finds that jury's verdict for the Defendant was not against the great weight of the evidence and this claim is denied.
Wilson v. Derrickson, Del Supr., 175 A.2d 400, 402 (1961).
B. The trial Court did not err by not instructing the jury on the pretrial ruling that Plaintiff was not negligent.
Plaintiffs' second contention is that the trial Court erred by not instructing the jury on this Court's pre-trial ruling that Plaintiff was not negligent. Plaintiffs argue that the evidence was presented to this Court in their Motion for Summary Judgment and that the Court's ruling that "there is no negligence on the part of [Plaintiff]" is based on the conclusion that Plaintiff was allegedly stopped at the time of the accident. Plaintiffs contend that the ruling should have been told to the jury.
Smith v. Pullan, C.A. No. 95C-09-228, Bifferato, R.J. (Mar. 20, 1998) (Bench Ruling) at 13.
In response, Defendants rely on the jury instructions given by the trial Court. Specifically, the trial Court instructed the jury that
Negligence is the lack of ordinary care; that is, the absence of the kind of care a reasonably prudent and careful person would exercise in similar circumstances.
[I]f you find that [Defendant] failed to exercise a proper degree of control over the vehicle she was driving under the rule that I have just stated to you, and if that failure was a proximate cause of the accident, then your verdict should be for the plaintiffs and against the defendant.
No presumption that [Defendant] was negligent arises from the mere fact that an accident occurred.
[T]he party's negligence must be shown by a preponderance of the evidence to be a proximate cause of the accident and injury.
If you find that [Plaintiffs] are entitled to recover for damages proximately caused by the accident, you should consider compensation to which she or they are entitled.
Jury Instructions at p. 6.
Id. at p. 9.
Id. at p. 10.
Id. at p. 11.
Id. at p. 11.
This Court was not required to have instructed the jury on the pre-trial ruling at the Motion for Summary Judgment. This Court is satisfied that the issue of Defendant's negligence was adequately submitted to the jury based on the jury instructions. This claim is denied.
C. This Court does not reach the issue of whether the Plaintiff sustained an injury as a result of the accident.
Plaintiffs' third contention is that the trial Court erred by not granting Plaintiffs' Motion for a Directed Verdict that Plaintiff Jennifer Smith sustained an injury as a result of the accident. The basis for Plaintiffs' motion is the contention that the only medical testimony presented at trial indicated that Plaintiff had sustained an objective injury as a result of the accident. Defendants argue that this point is moot considering the jury did not find the Defendant negligent.
This Court need not reach the issue of whether the Plaintiff sustained an injury as a result of the accident. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the Defendant and it is not necessary for this Court determine whether the Plaintiff was in fact injured. This claim is not reached.
* * *
This Court finds that the jury verdict was not against the great weight of the evidence. Furthermore this Court finds that the trial Court did not err by not instructing the jury on this Court's pre-trial ruling at the Motion for Summary Judgment. In addition, this Court finds that the trial Court did not err by not granting Plaintiffs' Motion for a Directed Verdict. Plaintiffs' "Motion for a Judgment Not Withstanding the Verdict, or in the Alternative, for a New Trial" is DENIED.
II. Defendants' Motion for Costs and Expert Witness Fees
Determining when costs are awarded is a matter of judicial discretion. There may be circumstances under which costs do not go to a party to whom a final judgment is awarded? An award of court costs as a matter of judicial discretion is intended to reimburse the prevailing party for expenses unnecessarily incurred in the assertion of its rights in court.
Donovan v. Delaware Water and Air Resources Comm., Del. Supr., 358 A.2d 717, 725 (1976).
Id. at 723.
This Court finds that this is not a circumstance under which the costs should be assessed against the Plaintiff. It appears to this Court that Plaintiff was willing to accept the Defendants' offer of judgment during the trial but Defendants withdrew the offer. Additionally, the trial Court restricted the testimony of the expert witnesses to a very short amount of time addressing a limited issue. Moreover, the expert witnesses were not a necessary factor for the jury in making its determination since the verdict was for the Defendant. Defendants' Motion for Costs and Expert Witness Fees is DENIED.
Conclusion
Plaintiffs' "Motion for Judgment Not Withstanding the Verdict, or in the Alternative, for a New trial" is DENIED because the verdict was not against the great weight of the evidence, the trial Court did not err by not instructing the jury on this Court's pre-trial ruling, and the trial Court did not err by not granting Plaintiffs' Motion for a Directed Verdict. Defendants' Motion for Costs and Expert Witness Fees is DENIED because this is not a situation where the prevailing party should be awarded costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.