Smith v. Prichard

5 Citing cases

  1. Patton v. Gleaves

    334 S.W.2d 946 (Tenn. 1960)   Cited 1 times

    The authorities cited by both parties herein are largely based upon whom the Government can or cannot pay money of the kind to. None of the authorities are in point at all as to the effect of "Record of Emergency Data" other than indicating what we have just said, that this "Record of Emergency Data" is merely a guide to the governmental department as to whom the money and things shall be paid or delivered. Both sides apparently rely upon Smith v. Prichard, 22 Tenn. App. 321, 122 S.W.2d 829. This opinion though is not controlling, or necessarily in point, except to show the difference between a will and a deed, or a deed and a contract. Upon proper analysis we are convinced that the discussion therein is authority for what we have said above, that this "Record of Emergency Data" herein does not constitute a contract or an assignment of this salary to the father to the exclusion of the mother.

  2. Howell v. Davis

    268 S.W.2d 85 (Tenn. 1954)   Cited 6 times

    "If the vested right to the present or future enjoyment of some specific thing then owned by the donor, passes to a designated person, the instrument operates in praesenti, and is a deed; and the postponement of the possession and beneficial enjoyment until the death of the donor, does not make it a will." Sizer's Pritchard on Wills, Sec. 18, p. 19; Smith v. Pritchard, 22 Tenn. App. 321, 122 S.W.2d 829; Couch v. Hoover, 18 Tenn. App. 523, 79 S.W.2d 807. We think it proper to add that if the case had been tried and argued before us on the proposition that by the deed of 1941, Mary Howell was estopped to make a subsequent valid conveyance in conflict with the provision of the deed of 1941, we would have reached the same result. Ruffin v. Johnson, 52 Tenn. 604; Poindexter v. Rawlings, 106 Tenn. 97, 59 S.W. 766; Ankenbauer v. Ankenbauer, 6 Tenn. App. 221.

  3. Wright v. Huskey

    592 S.W.2d 899 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980)   Cited 2 times

    The deed conveyed a present or vested remainder estate to be enjoyed after the death of the grantor, and upon delivery it was a conveyance by deed. See also: Smith v. Prichard (1938) 22 Tenn. App. 321, 122 S.W.2d 829; Howell v. Davis (1954) 196 Tenn. 334, 268 S.W.2d 85; Cockrell v. Tuell (1970) 61 Tenn. App. 423, 454 S.W.2d 713. It is important to note that in the Couch, Smith, Howell and Cockrell cases the grantors did not reserve the right to revoke the conveyance during their lifetime.

  4. McCracken v. Manis

    483 S.W.2d 738 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1972)

    It is the insistence of the appellants that the paper writing in question is either a deed purporting to convey a present interest in real estate or it is an executory contract for services to be rendered to the decedent. Appellants cite and rely upon the cases of Howell v. Moore, 14 Tenn. App. 594; Smith v. Prichard, 22 Tenn. App. 321, 122 S.W.2d 829; Nicley v. Nicley, 38 Tenn. App. 472, 276 S.W.2d 497; Howell v. Davis, 196 Tenn. 334, 268 S.W.2d 85; Carmody v. Trustees of Presbyterian Church, 29 Tenn. App. 275, 203 S.W.2d 176; Savage v. Bon Air Coal, Land Lumber Co., 2 Tenn.Ch. App. 594; Evans v. Lauderdale, 78 Tenn. 73. We have considered these cases and are of opinion that they are not controlling of the case at bar.

  5. Cockrell v. Tuell

    61 Tenn. App. 423 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1970)   Cited 6 times

    " This court in Couch v. Hoover, 18 Tenn. App. 523, 528, 530, 79 S.W.2d 807, 810, and again in Smith v. Prichard, 22 Tenn. App. 321, 122 S.W.2d 829, 836, pointed out that: "If the vested right to the present or future enjoyment of some specific thing then owned by the donor, passes to a designated person, the instrument operates in praesenti, and is a deed; and the postponement of the possession and beneficial enjoyment until the death of the donor, does not make it a will.