Opinion
6:24-CV-687 (GTS/MJK)
06-20-2024
WAYNE R. SMITH, Plaintiff, v. ONEIDA COUNTY SHERIFF DEPARTMENT, et al., Defendants.
WAYNE R. SMITH, Plaintiff, pro se
WAYNE R. SMITH, Plaintiff, pro se
TO THE HONORABLE GLENN T. SUDDABY, United States District Court Judge:
ORDER AND REPORT-RECOMMENDATION
MITCHELL J. KATZ, U.S. Magistrate Judge
Plaintiff commenced this action on May 20, 2024 by filing a complaint (Dkt. No. 1) together with a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Dkt. No. 2). On June 7, 2024, plaintiff filed an amended complaint (“Amended Complaint”) (Dkt. No. 4) together with an amended motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“Amended IFP Application”) (Dkt. No. 5). The Clerk has sent to the court for review the Amended Complaint brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as well as the Amended IFP Application.
I. Amended IFP Application
Plaintiff's Amended IFP Application declares that he is unable to pay the filing fee. (Dkt. No. 5). After reviewing plaintiff's application, this court finds that he is financially eligible for IFP status.
However, in addition to determining whether plaintiff meets the financial criteria to proceed IFP, the court must also consider the sufficiency of the allegations set forth in the Amended Complaint in light of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which provides that the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that the action is (i) frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii).
In determining whether an action is frivolous, the court must consider whether the Amended Complaint lacks an arguable basis in law or in fact. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Dismissal of frivolous actions is appropriate to prevent abuses of court process as well as to discourage the waste of judicial resources. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327; see also Harkins v. Eldredge, 505 F.2d 802, 804 (8th Cir. 1974). Although the court has a duty to show liberality toward pro se litigants and must use extreme caution in ordering sua sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint before the adverse party has been served and has had an opportunity to respond, the court still has a responsibility to determine that a claim is not frivolous before permitting a plaintiff to proceed. See Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh St. Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 363 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding that a district court may dismiss a frivolous complaint sua sponte even when plaintiff has paid the filing fee).
To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is “plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555).
In addition, Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2) requires that a pleading contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Although Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, it does “demand[] more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Houston v. Collerman, No. 9:16-CV-1009 (BKS/ATB), 2016 WL 6267968, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2016) (quoting Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678). A pleading that contains allegations that “‘are so vague as to fail to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them' is subject to dismissal.” Id. (citing Sheehy v. Brown, 335 Fed.Appx. 102, 104 (2d Cir. 2009)).
II. Amended Complaint
The Amended Complaint alleges violations of plaintiff's constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Dkt. No. 4).
Plaintiff alleges that he was assaulted at his residence on November 5, 2023 by a process server. (Amended Complaint at 4). Specifically, plaintiff alleges that he instructed a process server to leave his property after the process server identified himself as a law enforcement officer, but the process server refused. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that he did not see a badge or uniform identifying the process server as a police officer. (Id.). Plaintiff further alleges that he informed the process server that he had a “guard dog.” (Id.). The process server proceeded to pull out a large can of mace as plaintiff “was getting ‘Henry,' [plaintiff's] German Shep[p]ard[.]” (Id.).
The page references to the Amended Complaint are consistent with those assigned by CM/ECF.
Plaintiff alleges that he then proceeded to the front door with Henry on a leash. (Id.). When plaintiff opened the door, the process server sprayed plaintiff and his dog with mace and continued to do so, even after the door was shut. (Id.). Thereafter, plaintiff called 911 and two Oneida County Sheriff Deputies responded. (Id. at 5). Plaintiff recognized the female officer as Deputy Connelly but was unable to identify the male officer, whom plaintiff refers to in the Amended Complaint as Deputy John Doe. (Id.). After listening to plaintiff and the process server explain their respective “side[s],” the defendant deputies arrested plaintiff for menacing and harassment. (Id.). Plaintiff was issued an appearance ticket to appear in Westmoreland Town Court. (Id.). Plaintiff further alleges that Deputies Connelly and Doe “refused to consider the camera footage available to them . . . at the scene.” (Id.). According to plaintiff, the Oneida County District Attorney's Office dismissed the charges against him after reviewing the security camera footage of the incident. (Id.).
In his request for relief, plaintiff seeks $10,000,000 in damages for the “gross violation of [his] constitutional rights.” (Id. at 6).
III. Oneida County Sheriff Department
The Oneida County Sheriff's Department is not a proper party to this action. “A police department cannot sue or be sued because it does not exist separate and apart from the municipality and does not have its own legal identity.” Baker v. Willett, 42 F.Supp.2d 192, 198 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (dismissing claims against county sheriff's department) (citations omitted); see also Jackson v. Cnty. of Nassau, No. 07-CV-245, 2010 WL 335581, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2010) (“Under New York law, departments which are merely administrative arms of a municipality do not have a legal identity separate and apart from the municipality and cannot sue or be sued.”); La Grande v. Town of Bethlehem Police Dep't, No. 08-CV-0738 (LEK/DRH), 2009 WL 2868231, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2009) (“Since the Bethlehem Police Department cannot be sued pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, [the plaintiff's] [c]omplaint is dismissed as against the Town of Bethlehem Police Department.”); Jenkins v. Liadka, No. 10-CV-1223 (GTS/DEP), 2012 WL 4052286, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2012) (“Because the Syracuse Police Department is merely an administrative arm of the City of Syracuse, it is not a proper defendant.”).
Even if plaintiff had sued the appropriate municipal entity - i.e. Oneida County -his allegations do not sufficiently allege Monell liability. When a plaintiff sues a municipality under § 1983, it is insufficient for the plaintiff to allege that one of the municipality's employees or agents engaged in some wrongdoing. The plaintiff must demonstrate that the municipality itself caused the violation of the plaintiff's rights. See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (“A municipality or other local government may be liable under this section [1983] if the governmental body itself ‘subjects' a person to a deprivation of rights or ‘causes' a person ‘to be subjected' to such deprivation.”) (quoting Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978)); see also Cash v. Cnty. of Erie, 654 F.3d 324, 333 (2d Cir. 2011). Specifically, to state a § 1983 claim against a municipality, the plaintiff must allege facts showing (1) the existence of a municipal policy, custom, or practice, and (2) that the policy, custom, or practice caused the violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Jones v. Town of East Haven, 691 F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir. 2012); Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997) (internal citations omitted).
For the foregoing reasons, the court recommends dismissing plaintiff's Amended Complaint as asserted against the Oneida County Sherriff's Department with prejudice. The court further recommends declining to interpret plaintiff's allegations to plausibly allege Monell liability against Oneida County, as plaintiff does not refer to any policy, custom, or practice by a municipality that caused a violation of his constitutional rights. However, in deference to plaintiff's pro se status, the court recommends that plaintiff be provided with an opportunity to amend his Amended Complaint to the extent he can, in good faith, assert a Monell claim against Oneida County, including allegations suggesting that a county policy, custom, or practice caused any alleged constitutional violations.
IV. Oneida County Sheriff Maciol
It has long been established that “personal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983[,]” and supervisory officials may not be held liable merely because they held a position of authority. Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1994) (citations omitted); see also Black v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 72, 74 (2d Cir. 1996); Grullon v. City of New Haven, 720 F.3d 133, 138-39 (2d Cir. 2013). In Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865 (2d Cir. 1995), the Second Circuit articulated standards for courts to use when determining personal involvement or supervisory liability.
These factors were:
(1) the defendant participated directly in the alleged constitutional violation;
(2) the defendant, after being informed of the violation through a report or appeal, failed to remedy the wrong;
(3) the defendant created a policy or custom under which unconstitutional practices occurred, or allowed the continuance of such a policy or custom;
(4) the defendant was grossly negligent in supervising subordinates who committed the wrongful acts; or
(5) the defendant exhibited deliberate indifference to the rights of inmates by failing to act on information indicating that unconstitutional acts were occurring.Colon, 58 F.3d at 873.
However, after the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the factors articulated in Colon were called into question. District courts, including the Northern District of New York noted the possibility that the Colon factors were no longer viable. Eventually, the Second Circuit revised its standard for determining personal involvement or supervisory liability, finding that the Colon factors are no longer controlling and articulating the proper standard for the courts in this circuit to utilize. Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d 609, 618 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676).
See e.g. Vance v. State of New York, No. 9:19-CV-748 (BKS/ATB), 2020 WL 7481585, at *3 & n.3 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2020) (discussing cases), report-recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 7480955 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2020).
Joining other circuits, the Second Circuit held that, after Iqbal, there is no “special” rule for supervisory liability. Id.
Instead, a plaintiff must plead and prove ‘that each Government official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.' Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 . . . ‘The factors necessary to establish a [§ 1983] violation will vary with the constitutional provision at issue' because the elements of different constitutional violations vary. Id. The violation must be established against the supervisory official directly.Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676). The supervisor must have committed the violation him or herself, not by the supervision of others who committed the violation. Id. Likewise, the supervisor must personally display the requisite state of mind, depending on the violation at issue. Id.
Here, other than being listed as a named defendant, the Amended Complaint is devoid of any allegations against or that otherwise reference Robert Maciol. The fact that Robert Maciol is the Oneida County Sheriff, without more, does not mean that he was personally involved with the alleged violation/deprivation of plaintiff's constitutional rights by his subordinates. The court therefore recommends that the Amended Complaint be dismissed against Robert Maciol without prejudice.
V. Fourth Amendment Rights/False Arrest/Imprisonment
A. Legal Standards
These three claims as asserted in the Amended Complaint are duplicative of one another. A section 1983 claim for false arrest or false imprisonment “rest[s] on the Fourth Amendment right of an individual to be free from unreasonable seizures, including arrest without probable cause.” Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 852 (2d Cir. 1996). “False arrest is simply false imprisonment accomplished by means of an unlawful arrest.” Jenkins v. City of N.Y., 478 F.3d 76, 88 n.10 (2d Cir. 2007). Such claims are one and the same because “[f]alse arrest and false imprisonment overlap; the former is a species of the latter.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388, 127 S.Ct. 1091, 166 L.Ed.2d 973 (2007). The elements of a Fourth Amendment false arrest/imprisonment claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are the same as those for a false arrest claim under New York law. Kraft v. City of New York, 696 F.Supp.2d 403, 418 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). The New York State standard for false arrest requires that: “‘(1) the defendants intended to confine the plaintiff, (2) the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement, (3) the plaintiff did not consent to the confinement, and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged.'” Sethi v. Nassau County, No. 11-CV-6380, 2014 WL 2526620, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. June 3, 2014) (quoting Jocks v. Tavernier, 316 F.3d 128, 134-35 (2d Cir. 2003)). An arrest is privileged if it is based on probable cause. Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 84 (2d Cir. 2007) (“The existence of probable cause to arrest constitutes justification and is a complete defense to an action for false arrest.”) (citations and quotations omitted).
B. Analysis
Plaintiff has pled sufficient facts in the Amended Complaint to survive initial review as against defendant Deputies Connelly and Doe for false arrest/imprisonment. The Amended Complaint alleges the circumstances leading to plaintiff's arrest, the charges ultimately brought against him because of the arrest, and arguably the status of the underlying criminal proceedings.
In making this determination this court makes no finding as to whether any claims would survive a properly supported motion to dismiss or one for summary judgment.
In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) the United States Supreme Court held that a section 1983 action seeking damages is not cognizable if a decision in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily invalidate a criminal conviction unless the conviction or sentence had been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or called into question by a federal habeas court. 512 U.S. at 486-87. Although the Amended Complaint alleges that the Oneida County District Attorney's office dismissed the menacing and harassment charges, plaintiff lists the Oneida County Jail as his current address. At this juncture, the court is recommending that plaintiff's false arrest claims survive initial review based on plaintiff's representation that the underlying charges relevant to this action have already been resolved in his favor. If it is later determined that plaintiff's charges are still pending to some extent, it is possible that plaintiff's false arrest claims may be barred by Heck.
Because the Amended Complaint asserts claims against an individual whose name is not known to plaintiff, service of process cannot be effectuated on Deputy John Doe until he has been identified by name. If the district court accepts this recommendation, and plaintiff wishes to pursue his claims against defendant Deputy John Doe, he must take reasonable steps to ascertain his identity through discovery. Upon learning the identity of the unnamed defendant, plaintiff must amend the operative complaint to properly name that individual as a party. If plaintiff fails to ascertain the identity of the Deputy John Doe to permit timely service of process, all claims against that individual will be dismissed.
Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a party be served within 90 days of issuance of the summons, absent a court order extending that period. Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m). The Court's local rules shorten the time for service from 90 days under Rule 4(m) to 60 days. N.D.N.Y. L.R.4.1(b).
VI. Opportunity to Amend
A. Legal Standards
Generally, before the court dismisses a pro se complaint or any part of the complaint sua sponte, the court should afford the plaintiff the opportunity to amend at least once; however, leave to re-plead may be denied where any amendment would be futile. See Ruffolo v. Oppenheimer & Co., 987 F.2d 129, 131 (2d Cir. 1993). Futility is present when the problem with plaintiff's causes of action is substantive such that better pleading will not cure it. See Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).
B. Application
The court recommends that the claims against the Oneida County Sheriff's Department be dismissed with prejudice. However, in deference to plaintiff's pro se status, the court recommends that plaintiff be provided with an opportunity to amend to clarify what, if any, claims he maintains against the County of Oneida, including facts suggesting that a county policy, custom, or practice caused the alleged constitutional violations.
The court further recommends dismissing the Amended Complaint as against Robert Maciol. To the extent defendant Maciol was personally involved in the alleged violation of plaintiff's constitutional rights, plaintiff should be granted leave to amend his complaint to state facts and circumstances in support of his claim against this individual defendant.
WHEREFORE, based on the findings above, it is
ORDERED, that plaintiff's amended motion to proceed IFP (Dkt. No. 5) be GRANTED, and it is
Although his IFP Application has been granted, plaintiff will still be required to pay fees that he may incur in this action, including copying and/or witness fees.
RECOMMENDED, that the district court DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED COMPLAINT IN ITS ENTIRETY, WITH PREJUDICE, only as to defendant Oneida County Sheriff's Department, and it is
RECOMMENDED, that the district court DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED COMPLAINT IN ITS ENTIRETY, WITHOUT PREJUDICE, as to defendant Robert Maciol, and it is
RECOMMENDED, that plaintiff's claims for false arrest/imprisonment proceed as against defendants Connelly and Doe, and it is
RECOMMENDED, that if the District Judge adopts this Order and ReportRecommendation, plaintiff be given thirty (30) days from the date of the District Judge's order, within which to submit a proposed second amended complaint to the court for its consideration, and that plaintiff be advised that any amended pleading must be a COMPLETE PLEADING, WHICH WILL SUPERCEDE THE AMENDED COMPLAINT, and that plaintiff must include all the remaining facts and causes of action in the second amended complaint. No facts or claims from the original complaint may be incorporated by reference, and it is
RECOMMENDED, that if the District Court adopts this Order and ReportRecommendation, and plaintiff files a proposed second amended complaint, the proposed pleading be returned to me for review, and it is
RECOMMENDED, that if the District Court adopts this Order and ReportRecommendation, and plaintiff does not elect to further amend his Amended Complaint, the case be returned to me for any orders relating to service of the Amended Complaint on the remaining defendants, and it is
ORDERED, that while plaintiff may file objections to this Order and ReportRecommendation, before plaintiff submits any amended pleading, he should wait for the District Court to rule on the above Orders and Recommendations, and it is
ORDERED, that the Clerk of the Court serve a copy of this ReportRecommendation on plaintiff by regular mail.
The Clerk shall also provide plaintiff with copies of all unreported decisions cited herein in accordance with Lebron v. Sanders, 557 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Rule 72.1(c), the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec'y of Health and Hum. Servs., 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), 6(e), 72.