Smith v. N.C. Dep't of Safety

6 Citing cases

  1. CMDS Residential, LLC v. Mayor of Balt.

    Civil Action CCB-21-1774 (D. Md. Mar. 18, 2024)

    See Bone, 2021 WL 395547, at *4 (quoting Docket Entry 51 at 16-17). In his analysis, Judge Auld reviewed postGentry case law and held that “[c]ontrary to UNC's contentions, Gentry did not abrogate Baird . . . . and Baird's motivating cause standard ‘continues to be controlling law in this circuit.'” Id. at *10 (quoting Smith v. N.C. Dep't of Safety, No. 18-cv-914, 2019 WL 3798457, *2 n.1 (M.D. N.C. Aug. 13, 2019)) (emphasis added). The City's final case, Brady v. Board of Education of Prince George's County, does not even involve ADA claims, and merely analogizes to ADA law in the context of a RA retaliation claim. 222 F.Supp.3d 459, 474-75 (D. Md. 2016), aff'd, 707 Fed.Appx. 780 (4th Cir. 2018) (unpublished per curiam opinion).

  2. Church Ekklasia Sozo, Inc. v. CVS Health Corp.

    Civil Action 3:20-cv-00382-RJC-DSC (W.D.N.C. Feb. 25, 2022)   Cited 4 times

    Smith v. North Carolina Dept. of Safety, No. 1:18CV914, 2019 WL 3798457, *2 (M.D. N.C. Aug. 13, 2019) (citation omitted). But the two statutes differ “with respect to the third element, causation.

  3. Bone v. Univ. of N.C. Health Care Sys.

    1:18cv994 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 14, 2022)

    Paulone, 787 F.Supp.2d at 373. “While the Fourth Circuit has not specifically addressed the standard required for proving intentional discrimination, the majority of circuits to have decided the issue have adopted a deliberate indifference standard, as have some district courts within the Fourth Circuit.” Smith v. North Carolina Dep't of Safety, No. 1:18CV914, 2019 WL 3798457, at *3 (M.D. N.C. Aug. 13, 2019) (unpublished) (Schroeder, C.J.) (citing Green v. Central Midlands Reg'l Transit Auth., No. 3:17CV2667, 2019 WL 1765867, at *6 n.15, *9-10, *9 n.24 (D.S.C. Apr. 22, 2019) (unpublished), and Godbey v. Iredell Mem'l Hosp. Inc., No. 5:12CV4, 2013 WL 4494708, at *4-6 (W.D. N.C. Aug. 19, 2013) (unpublished)).

  4. Church Ekklasia Sozo, Inc. v. CVS Health Corp.

    3:20-cv-382-MOC-DSC (W.D.N.C. Sep. 27, 2021)

    can be combined for analytical purposes because the analysis is substantially the same.” Smith v. North Carolina Dep't of Safety, No. 1:18CV914, 2019 WL 3798457, at *2 (M.D. N.C. Aug. 13, 2019). The two statutes, however, differ “with respect to the third element, causation. To succeed on a claim under the Rehabilitation Act, the plaintiff must establish that he was excluded ‘solely by reason of' his disability; the ADA requires only that the disability was a “motivating cause” of the exclusion.”

  5. Bone v. Univ. of N.C. Health Care Sys.

    1:18cv994 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 4, 2021)   Cited 7 times

    "While the Fourth Circuit has not specifically addressed the standard required for proving intentional discrimination, the majority of circuits to have decided the issue have adopted a deliberate indifference standard, as have some district courts within the Fourth Circuit." Smith v. N.C. Dep't of Safety, No. 1:18CV914, 2019 WL 3798457, at *3 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 13, 2019) (unpublished) (Schroeder, C.J.) (citing Green v. Central Midlands Reg'l Transit Auth., No. 3:17CV2667, 2019 WL 1765867, at *6 n.15, *9-10, *9 n.24 (D.S.C. Apr. 22, 2019) (unpublished), and Godbey v. Iredell Mem'l Hosp. Inc., No. 5:12CV4, 2013 WL 4494708, at *4-6 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 19, 2013) (unpublished)). In order to prove deliberate indifference, "a plaintiff must show that the defendant knew that harm to a federally protected right was substantially likely and failed to act on that likelihood."

  6. Bone v. Univ. of N.C. Health Care Sys.

    1:18cv994 (M.D.N.C. Sep. 13, 2019)   Cited 2 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Explaining that, under Title II, "compensatory damages are available only upon proof of intentional discrimination or disparate treatment, rather than mere disparate impact," which obliges "a plaintiff [to] show that the defendant knew that harm to a federally protected right was substantially likely and failed to act on that likelihood"

    "While the Fourth Circuit has not specifically addressed the standard required for proving intentional discrimination, the majority of circuits to have decided the issue have adopted a deliberate indifference standard, as have some district courts within the Fourth Circuit." Smith v. N.C. Dep't of Safety, No. 1:18CV914, 2019 WL 3798457, at *3 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 13, 2019) (unpublished) (Schroeder, C.J.) (citing Green v. Central Midlands Reg'l Transit Auth., No. 3:17CV2667, 2019 WL 1765867, at *6 n.15, *9-10, *9 n.24 (D.S.C. Apr. 22, 2019) (unpublished), and Godbey v. Iredell Mem'l Hosp. Inc., No. 5:12CV4, 2013 WL 4494708, at *4-6 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 19, 2013) (unpublished)). In order to prove deliberate indifference, "a plaintiff must show that the defendant knew that harm to a federally protected right was substantially likely and failed to act on that likelihood."