Opinion
KNLCV135014645S
11-28-2017
Joshua SMITH v. Warden MURPHY et al.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
Handy, J.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The plaintiff, Joshua Smith, a sentenced prisoner, filed this action, requesting damages and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a self-represented party. He had originally sued Warden Peter Murphy, Correction Officer Marco Perez, and Captain Beaudry, all Department of Correction (DOC) employees. The case was dismissed as to Captain Beaudry by virtue of the defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Docket 103), which was granted by the court on October 23, 2014. (Docket 103.01). Thus, Murphy and Perez are the remaining two defendants. In August 2011, the MacDougall-Walker Correctional Institution (MWCI), at which the plaintiff was housed at the time, conducted an investigation regarding the unauthorized conveyance of contraband by a staff member. During this investigation, many prisoners, including the plaintiff, were placed in segregation in the Restrictive Housing Unit (RHU). At the time of that August 5, 2011 placement, the plaintiff’s personal property was placed in storage.
The plaintiff, Joshua Smith, was convicted of Murder in 1994; that conviction was affirmed in 1997, and he is currently serving a forty-five-year sentence.
The plaintiff alleges that the confiscation of his religious oils and the temporary storage of his gold chain and cross violated his first amendment rights and his rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Person Act (RLUIPA). Additionally, he alleges that his sneakers were confiscated, which was a violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment and further constituted both a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and a settlement agreement that had previously been reached in an earlier case. Finally, the plaintiff alleges that his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights were violated by the DOC’s own violation of its administrative directive and the confiscation of his authorized personal property.
The defendants filed this Motion for Summary Judgment contending that there has been no violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights under the First, Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments nor under RLUIPA or the ADA. Further, they claim there has been no breach of the settlement agreement reached between the plaintiff in a prior case concerning his sneakers. Finally, the defendants argue if the court does not enter judgment in favor of them on the plaintiff’s constitutional claims, the court should dismiss all claims for monetary damages as to those constitutional claims as the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. In support of their Motion for Summary Judgment, the defendants provided an affidavit from Marco Perez and three lengthy exhibits: an Administrative Directive regarding Inmate Property (Exhibit 1), the stipulated agreement reached in Smith v. Sieminski relating to the plaintiff’s sneakers (Exhibit 2), and various Inmate Property Status and Receipts with appended incident reports and disciplinary supplemental information. (Exhibit 3.)
The plaintiff filed his opposition to the defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment where he argues that there are material issues of fact relating to whether the seized religious oils were contraband or not, whether the gold chain and cross prevented him from exercising his religious beliefs, and whether the sneakers taken from him were legally in his possession. He alleges that this is an action for damages and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In support of his opposition, the plaintiff has included eighteen exhibits which include, but are not limited to, his own affidavit, that of another inmate, as well as property status forms, and other administrative directives. (Exhibits A-R.)
This court heard argument on the motion on September 20, 2017, and had further discussion with the parties on October 4, 2017. On both occasions, counsel for the defendants appeared in court and the plaintiff appeared by way of video conferencing from the jail.
II. LAW AND DISCUSSION
The primary purpose of a motion for summary judgment is to obtain a judgment in the case where there are no material facts in dispute. " The fundamental purpose of summary judgment is preventing unnecessary trials." Stuart v. Freiberg, 316 Conn. 809, 822, 116 A.3d 1195 (2015). The summary judgment procedure " is designed to eliminate the delay and expense of litigating an issue when there is no real issue to be tried." Wilson v. New Haven, 213 Conn. 277, 279, 567 A.2d 829 (1989). " The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Practice Book § 17-49.
Motions for summary judgment " shall be supported by appropriate documents, including but not limited to affidavits, certified transcripts of testimony under oath, disclosures, written admissions and other supporting documents." Practice Book § 17-45(a). " [T]he party moving for summary judgment ... is required to support its motion with supporting documentation ..." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Romprey v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 310 Conn. 304, 324 n.12, 77 A.3d 726 (2013). When determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the evidence must be weighed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Brooks v. Sweeney, 299 Conn. 196, 210, 9 A.3d 347 (2010); LaFlamme v. Dallessio, 261 Conn. 247, 250, 802 A.2d 63 (2002). " A material fact has been defined adequately and simply as a fact which will make a difference in the result of the case." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Buell Industries, Inc. v. Greater New York Mutual Ins. Co., 259 Conn. 527, 556, 791 A.2d 489 (2002). When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the function of the court is not to decide issues of material fact, but rather to determine whether any such issues exist. Maltas v. Maltas, 298 Conn. 354, 365, 2 A.3d 902 (2010).
A. The Religious Oils
The plaintiff claims that his right to freedom of religion under both the First Amendment and RLUIPA was violated when his religious oils were confiscated and subsequently characterized as non-commissary oils constituting contraband. The court considers two separate issues here: first, whether the defendants had the right to seize the oils, and second, whether the oils constituted contraband.
The defendants agree that the plaintiff is entitled to the right of free exercise of his religion, O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348, 107 S.Ct. 2400, 96 L.Ed.2d 282 (1987), but argue that those rights must be balanced against the complex duties arising from administration of the penal system and must yield if contrary to prison regulations that are " reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987). As to the first issue, the right to seize, when the plaintiff was placed in RHU, his oils were seized and stored along with his other personal property. The defendants argue that this was a necessary precaution to prevent an inmate from using the oils to ignite fire, mask drugs, or throw off odor detection of canines working in the facility. This standard DOC policy is reasonable for both safety and security reasons in the RHU. Thus, as to the initial seizure and temporary storage of the oils while the plaintiff was in RHU and to any damages he may seek in that regard, this court finds no First Amendment or RLUIPA violation. As to this first issue of the plaintiff’s claim regarding the temporary storage of his religious oils, the defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.
The second issue is whether or not these oils were in fact non-commissary items constituting contraband and whether or not they were in excess of the permitted number of oils. If not, the plaintiff claims he was prevented from having them for his further religious use once he was transferred from RHU back to the general population. The plaintiff claims that his religious oils were not contraband, but actually were in their original commissary bottles, bottles which were sold in the commissary in the past. (Plaintiff’s Exhibit C.) The defendants contend that these oils are contraband and thus, were legally seized from the plaintiff’s belongings, not to be returned. (Defendants’ Exhibit 3, p. 5; Affidavit of Marco Perez, para. 19-22.) The plaintiff argued that those oils, some of which are not currently sold at the commissary, were sold there at one time, that the bottles they were stored in were sold at the commissary at one time as well, and thus, would be " grandfathered in" for his continued personal use. (Plaintiff’s D, para. 4-5, Plaintiff’s E, para. a-b.) The plaintiff also argues that there is no policy regarding how many oils an inmate may legally possess.
Accordingly, an issue of material fact exists as to both the plaintiff’s first amendment and RLUIPA claims regarding the classification of these oils as contraband and the number of oils an inmate may possess and whether or not they should have been returned to the plaintiff for his continued religious use. Consequently, as to the issue of failure to return the plaintiff’s oils subsequently classified as contraband, the Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.
B. The Gold Chain and Cross
The second part of the alleged confiscation involved the storage of the plaintiff’s gold chain and cross. The plaintiff again argues that this was a violation of both his First Amendment right to practice his religion and the rights to which he was entitled under RLUIPA. The defendants argue that these two items were removed from the plaintiff and put in storage when he was transferred to the RHU pending the ongoing investigation. There is no question nor any argument that the storage of the gold chain and cross was temporary, and they were returned to the plaintiff on August 26, 2011, shortly after he transferred from RHU. (Affidavit of Marco Perez, para. 25; Defendants’ Exhibit 3, p. 9.) The plaintiff argues that he could have been given the chain and cross to pray in an area that was visible to the correctional staff and then returned the items when he was done with prayer. In this court’s opinion, that procedure would be effectively impossible for staff to accommodate. Rather, it is a reasonable procedure that the chain and cross were removed from the plaintiff for safety reasons since such items could be used as weapons to harm others or for the plaintiff to harm himself. Such a temporary removal satisfies the four factors set forth in Turner v. Safley, supra, 482 U.S. 89. (The regulation has a valid, rational connection to a legitimate objective, i.e. safety; the plaintiff could exercise his religious beliefs without the item; the plaintiff is not entitled to special treatment to possess an item that may cause safety concerns within the RHU; and the plaintiff has not shown that there are alternative means of facilitating exercise of the right that have only a de minimus adverse effect on valid penological interests because of safety concerns with the gold chain and cross.)
Accordingly, there is no issue of material fact as to the gold chain and cross. The court concludes that the temporary storage of the chain and cross did not violate either the plaintiff’s First Amendment right or his rights under RLUIPA to practice his religious beliefs, and the Motion for Summary Judgment as to these issues is granted.
C. The Sneakers
The plaintiff claims that the seizure of his sneakers were violations of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, a violation of the ADA, and in contravention to the settlement agreement reached in a prior case. (See Defendants’ Exhibit 2 and Plaintiff’s Exhibit N.) The parties do not contest that the plaintiff entered into a stipulated agreement with then Warden Sieminski and other DOC employees in 2008. This was a result of the plaintiff’s claim at that time that prison officials and staff failed to allow him to receive appropriate footwear which he believed he needed due to a prior gunshot wound to his lower right leg. (Plaintiff’s J.) That agreement provided that the plaintiff would be allowed to receive a pair of sneakers sent from home at intervals of approximately six months as long as the sneakers conformed to prison safety and security requirements. (Defendants’ Exhibit 2 and Plaintiff’s Exhibit N, para. 1.)
During oral argument before this court on September 20, 2017, the plaintiff stated that he had been shot in his leg seven times in the past, necessitating special footwear that could not be purchased in the commissary.
At the time that the plaintiff was placed in RHU, his " special sneakers" were seized and temporarily stored along with the rest of his personal property. The plaintiff had on flip-flops when he was placed in segregation. The plaintiff claims that he was denied his special footwear which caused muscle atrophy and that this is a violation of the Eighth Amendment, the ADA, and the settlement agreement. The defendants argue that no such violations occurred.
1. The Eighth Amendment and The Settlement Agreement
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment. This would include any punishment that involves the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976). This amendment applies to states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and prohibits detention in a manner that constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981); Hunnicut v. Commissioner of Correction, 67 Conn.App. 65, 66, 787 A.2d 22 (2001). " Cruel and unusual punishment refers to punishment that involves the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain or is grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fuller v. Commissioner of Correction, 75 Conn.App. 133, 136, 815 A.2d 208 (2003), cert. denied, 278 Conn. 914, 899 A.2d 620 (2006); Santiago v. Commissioner of Correction, 39 Conn.App. 674, 683, 667 A.2d 304 (1995). A medical condition which affects an inmate’s daily activities may constitute a serious medical need. If that need is ignored, that may cause the plaintiff to suffer from a serious condition, enough to invoke the Eighth Amendment. Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 702 (2d Cir. 1998). However, " every denial of a prisoner’s request for medical care does not reflect cruel and unusual punishment. The seriousness of a prisoner’s medical condition must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis in light of a standard of ‘seriousness’ that has proven difficult for courts to articulate." Faraday v. Commissioner of Correction, 95 Conn.App. 1, 8, 894 A.2d 1048 (2001), rev’d, 288 Conn 326 , 952 A.2d 764 (2008).
In this matter, a settlement agreement was reached between the DOC and the plaintiff in 2008 permitting the plaintiff to have special shoes, provided by his family at regular intervals to accommodate a physical issue with the plaintiff’s leg due to multiple gunshot wounds he had previously suffered. When he was placed in the RHU, he was denied those sneakers and argues that as a result, he suffered muscle atrophy. (Plaintiff’s Exhibit, L.) Accordingly, there is an issue of material fact as to a violation of both the Eighth Amendment and the settlement agreement as to the plaintiff’s sneakers. As to this issue, the defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.
2. ADA
Congress passed the Americans with Disabilities Act in 1990. It is a comprehensive civil rights law that addresses the needs of people with disabilities, prohibiting discrimination in employment, public services, public accommodations, and telecommunications. In order to state a claim under the ADA, an individual needs to show that (1) he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) the defendants are subject to the ADA; (3) he was denied the opportunity to participate in or benefit from defendants’ services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the defendants, because of his disability.
As the defendants correctly argue, the plaintiff makes this claim with no supporting factual allegations nor has he provided any evidence that he is a qualified individual with a disability. He provides no information or documentation that the DOC denied him the opportunity to participate in DOC’s programs, services or activities. The plaintiff has shown no way in which he was discriminated against due to any alleged disability.
Accordingly, the defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is granted as to this claim.
D. The Fourteenth Amendment
The plaintiff also claims that the confiscation of his personal property, specifically, the gold chain and cross, the oils, and the sneakers, were a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights. He claims that the defendants violated DOC Administrative Directive 6.10 by denying him his property items and denying him the option of sending home his excess property items. If he is to prevail on his due process claim, the plaintiff must prove that he has been deprived of a property interest, which is recognized under the due process clause, and the deprivation of that property has occurred without due process of law. As the defendants cite, the United States Supreme Court has held that the unauthorized negligent or intentional " deprivation of property by a state employee does not constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause ... if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available." (Emphasis added.) Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984).
First, the defendants have shown that the plaintiff was offered an opportunity to decide what to do with his excess personal property by either discarding it, sending it home, or having a visitor pick up the property. (Affidavit of Marco Perez, para. 16; Defendants’ Exhibit 3, pp. 4 and 7.) There is also a procedure for inmates who claim a deprivation for lost or damaged property through a grievance process that includes an appeal to the state claims commissioner. General Statutes § 18-81y provides in relevant part: " The Commissioner of Correction shall establish a lost property board within the Department of Correction to hear and determine any claim by an inmate of a correctional facility who seeks compensation ... for lost or damaged personal property ... If the board denies a claim ... the inmate may ... present the claim to the Claims Commissioner ..." This procedure has been found to satisfy the due process clause. See Jimenez v. Melendez, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-14-5038461-S (June 16, 2016, Huddleston, J.).
Accordingly, the plaintiff has not established a fourteenth amendment due process violation.
E. Qualified Immunity
The defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity. Defendants enjoy qualified immunity from suit " if their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would know ... and are entitled to summary judgment if when looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to, and drawing all inferences most favorable to the plaintiff, it was objectively reasonable for the defendants to believe that their conduct or actions did not violate an established federally protected right ..." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Harrison v. Barkley, 219 F.3d 132, 138 (2d Cir. 2000). " [O]n a motion for summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity, the defendants bear the burden of showing that as to that defense there is no genuine issue of material fact to be tried." Wiseman v. Armstrong, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-02-4022076-S (March 1, 2007, Langenbach, J.); see also Harrison v. Barkley, supra, 219 F.3d 136. When a motion for summary judgment is based on an assertion of qualified immunity under the federal civil rights statute, the first issue is whether a clearly established right is at stake and if it is, the court must then address whether the conduct was objectively reasonable and if not, the motion must be denied. Morgan v. Bubar, 115 Conn.App. 603, 625, 975 A.2d 59 (2009).
In this case, as noted previously, the defendants’ version of the underlying facts as they relate to the plaintiff’s claims regarding the characterization of his religious oils as contraband and the denial of his sneakers while in RHU are disputed. The court agrees with the defendants that the handling and temporary storage of the plaintiff’s oils and gold chain and cross while in RHU were appropriate to address the DOC’s security and safety concerns. As articulated, however, the court has found that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to the defendants’ subsequent classification of the plaintiff’s oils as contraband and the denial of the plaintiff’s stipulated footwear while in RHU. Viewing these allegations and the evidence submitted in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the court finds that the defendants have not met their burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether or not their conduct was objectively reasonable as to the oils, which the defendants classified as contraband and the denial of the plaintiff’s special sneakers. Those issues remain to be tried such that the defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on their qualified immunity defense at this stage of the proceedings.
III. CONCLUSION
The plaintiff’s complaint was extensive and at times, confusing and repetitive. To the extent that the court was able to parse out the issues, it concludes in sum as follows:
A. Religious Oils
The motion for summary judgment is granted as to any first amendment or RLUIPA claims regarding the initial seizure and temporary storage of the plaintiff’s oils. The motion for summary judgment is denied as to any first amendment or RLUIPA claims regarding the defendants’ subsequent classification of the plaintiff’s oils as contraband, thus denying him possession of those oils for his alleged religious purposes.
B. Gold Chain and Cross
The motion for summary judgment as to both of the plaintiff’s claims regarding violations of the first amendment and RLUIPA is granted.
C. Sneakers
The motion for summary judgment as to the plaintiff’s claims regarding a violation of the eighth amendment and the settlement agreement is denied. The motion for summary judgment regarding a violation of the ADA is granted.
D. Fourteenth Amendment
The plaintiff has not established any fourteenth amendment due process violations, and accordingly, any such claims thereto are dismissed.
E. Qualified Immunity
There is a question of fact as to whether it was objectively reasonable for the defendants to believe that their actions in all instances were reasonable in regards to the classification of the plaintiff’s oils as contraband and the denial of the plaintiff’s special sneakers. For this reason, there is an issue as to whether the plaintiffs may be entitled to monetary damages. The motion for summary judgment as to this limited issue is denied.