Smith v. Morris Manning

10 Citing cases

  1. U.S. Mexican Development Corporation v. Condor

    91 Civ. 5925 (JSM) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 1992)   Cited 1 times

    In the case of a commercial, nonphysical tort such as this, the cite of the injury is where "the critical events associated with the dispute took place." Smith v. Morris Manning, 647 F. Supp. 101, 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (quoting American Eutectic Welding Alloy Sales Co. v. Dytron Alloys Corp., 439 F.2d 428, 433 (2d Cir. 1971); Faherty v. Fender, 572 F. Supp. 142, 149 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Weiss v. Greenburg, Traurig, Askew, Hoffman, Lipoff, Quentel Wolff. P.A., 85 A.D.2d 861, 446 N.Y.S.2d 447, 449 (App.Div. 1981)),vacated and transferred, 657 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); accord Chemical Bank v. World Hockey Ass'n, 403 F. Supp. 1374, 1379 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). Plaintiff might seek to assert that in addition to the pecuniary damage, he also lost his right to bring suit in New York, a potential loss within the contemplation of the alleged tortfeasor, and a more localized injury than financial detriment.

  2. Vieira v. Korda

    Civil Action No. 2:17-cv-160-jmc (D. Vt. May. 8, 2018)   Cited 1 times

    Here, only Stenger's referral and Vieira's independent decision to invest in the Jay Peak Project connect Korda with Vermont. Indeed, the Complaint fails to allege that, in the course of the parties' attorney-client relationship, Korda communicated with Vieira while he was living in Vermont. Absent additional and plausible allegations that Korda intentionally directed his conduct at Vermont residents, Korda cannot be haled into a Vermont court based on his attenuated interactions with Stenger and Jay Peak. Id.; see also Smith v. Morris & Manning, 647 F. Supp. 101, 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (declining personal jurisdiction where the attorney "performed all of its services for [the plaintiff] in Georgia, leaving those services to be performed within New York to [the plaintiff's] local counsel" and "[t]he agreement under which [the plaintiff] retained [the attorney] was entered into while he resided in South Carolina, and no one from the firm has ever been present within [New York] in connection with the firm's services for [the plaintiff]."). At the hearing, Vieira's counsel expanded on this allegation, claiming that Stenger referred "well over 20 and less than 100" potential Jay Peak investors to Korda and arguing that, because Korda profited from these referrals, personal jurisdiction was appropriate in Vermont.

  3. Ace Decade Holdings Ltd. v. UBS AG

    2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 32415 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2016)   Cited 1 times   1 Legal Analyses

    Similarly, in Smith v. Morris & Manning (on which the Pell court relied), the defendant continued to communicate with a plaintiff after the plaintiff moved to New York. 647 F. Supp. 101, 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (applying New York law). The Court rejected the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction because the defendant performed all its services outside of New York, and—as here—the relevant agreement was entered into before the plaintiff moved to New York.

  4. Statek Corp. v. Coudert Bros. LLP

    No. 3:07-cv-00456 (SRU) (D. Conn. Feb. 12, 2018)   Cited 9 times
    Concluding defendant did not transact business under Conn. Gen.Stat. § 52-59b based solely on its "out-of-state business for a Connecticut client" or "mail[ing] to Connecticut bills for services that were performed and directed elsewhere"

    "The location of a non-physical pecuniary injury for jurisdictional purposes is . . . where 'the critical events associated with the dispute took place.'" Smith v. Morris & Manning, 647 F. Supp. 101, 103-04 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (quoting Dytron Alloys Corp., 439 F.2d at 433); see also Ryan, 282 Conn. at 124 n.15 ("From all that appears, the situs of the plaintiff's injury is New York, where all of the critical events occurred."). "[I]n evaluating the 'critical events' for the purposes of jurisdiction, the plaintiff's residence or domicile within a state, in and of itself, is not a sufficient predicate for the exercise of jurisdiction," Greene v. Sha-Na-Na, 637 F. Supp. 591, 597 (D. Conn. 1986), for "courts must distinguish between the situs of the injury and the place where the plaintiff suffers damages."

  5. Eastboro Found. Charitable Trust & James Bernath v. Penzer

    950 F. Supp. 2d 648 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)   Cited 16 times
    Concluding that possession of a law license does not confer jurisdiction on the licensing state and collecting cases

    See also, e.g., Bill–Jay Mach. Tool Corp. v. Koster Indus., Inc., 29 A.D.3d 504, 506, 816 N.Y.S.2d 115, 117–18 (2d Dep't 2006) (“Assuming, without deciding, that [defendant] committed a ‘tortious act’ in California, [plaintiff] failed to establish, on this record, that [defendant] expected or should reasonably have expected such tortious act to have consequences in New York, as it is well settled that ‘the indirect financial loss resulting from the fact that the injured person resides or is domiciled [in New York],’ without more, is insufficient to confer jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii).”). See, e.g., Reiss v. Steigrod, 866 F.Supp. 747, 750 (S.D.N.Y.1994) (Sotomayor, D.J.); Smith v. Morris & Manning, 647 F.Supp. 101, 104 (S.D.N.Y.1986) (“The complaint does not sufficiently allege, and the Court is convinced that the underlying facts do not establish, that [defendant] ‘regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from services rendered, in the state or ... from interstate or international commerce.’

  6. Don King Prod., Inc. v. Douglas

    735 F. Supp. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)   Cited 47 times
    Holding that the central question for § 302 analysis is whether defendant performed purposeful acts in New York in relation to the contract which is the basis upon which jurisdiction is asserted

    Chemical Bank v. World Hockey Ass'n, 403 F. Supp. at 1380 (holding § 302(a)(3) provided no jurisdiction over defendants accused of interfering with New York based-plaintiff's secured interest in hockey franchise, where the "crucial dealings" — the signing and negotiating of the allegedly interfering contract with a competing franchise — occurred in Maryland and the interfering contract called for athletic performances in New Jersey). See also Smith v. Morris and Manning, 647 F. Supp. 101, 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Mije Associates v. Halliburton Services et al., 552 F. Supp. 418, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). Here, the crucial dealings — formation of the Douglas-Mirage contract that allegedly interferes with the Trump-King contract — occurred in Nevada and Ohio and the interfering contract calls for performance in Nevada.

  7. Walters v. Fullwood

    675 F. Supp. 155 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)   Cited 14 times
    Foreclosing a party from "collect[ing] the rewards of corruption" by holding that the underlying agreements violate public policy

    Cf. Fantis Foods, Inc., supra; Patrician Equity Corp. v. Meadows, 86 Civ. 5045 (MJL) (S.D.N Y 1987) [Available on WESTLAW, 1987 WL 4910] (not yet reported) (Loss of customers in New York as a result of alleged conversion of customer list in California by a California defendant not injury in New York for purposes of the statute); Smith v. Morris Manning, 647 F. Supp. 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (No New York injury creating "long-arm" jurisdiction over defendant Georgia law firm for out-of-state malpractice causing increased tax liability for plaintiff in New York). This Court has personal jurisdiction over defendant Fullwood, but not over defendant Kickliter.

  8. Smith v. Morris Manning

    657 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)   Cited 8 times
    Noting "the somewhat stringent requirements of Rule 60, which is aimed at protecting the finality of judgments from belated attack"

    KEENAN, District Judge: Plaintiff Harvey M. Smith (hereinafter "Smith") moves the Court for an order vacating a judgment entered November 21, 1986 dismissing the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendants, 647 F. Supp. 101. Smith further requests that the Court transfer this action to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. Finding that justice would be best served by a transfer of this case, the Court will grant the motion. Smith's complaint, filed on March 15, 1985, alleged that defendants Morris, Manning Martin, Nicholas Sears and James Altenbach failed to use reasonable skill and diligence in giving Smith legal advice.

  9. Runberg, Inc. v. McDermott, Will & Emery LLP

    2015 N.Y. Slip Op. 30739 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015)

    The location of the injury for jurisdictional purposes is not merely the state in which the plaintiff resides but instead the injury is where "the critical events associated with the dispute took place." Smith v Morris & Manning, 647 F Supp 101, 103-04 (1986) (quoting American Eutectic Welding Alloy Sales Co. v Dytron Alloys Corp., 439 F2d 428, 433 [2d Cir. 1971 ]).

  10. Runberg, Inc. v. McDermott, Will & Emery LLP

    2015 N.Y. Slip Op. 30739 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015)

    The location of the injury for jurisdictional purposes is not merely the state in which the plaintiff resides but instead the injury is where "the critical events associated with the dispute took place." Smith v Morris & Manning, 647 F Supp 101, 103-04 (1986) (quoting American Eutectic Welding Alloy Sales Co. v Dytron Alloys Corp., 439 F2d 428, 433 [2d Cir. 1971 ]).