Moreover, it is hardly foreign to Missouri law, which the parties agree applies to Byron Financial's claim, that a terminated contract can be resuscitated by mutual agreement and that parties may orally waive a provision requiring a writing. See, e.g. , Crabby's, Inc. v. Hamilton , 244 S.W.3d 209, 214–16 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008) ; Smith v. Mohan , 723 S.W.2d 94, 97 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).Wright next asserts that the trial evidence does not support the finding that his employment contract was in fact extended.

Such foreclosure on direct attack in a court of equity is irregular and voidable, if not void. Wiltsie on Mortg. Foreclosure (4th Ed.) § 297. The reason of the rule requiring property covered by a mortgage or lien which is in "separate parcels, distinctly marked for separate and distinct enjoyment," to be first offered for sale in parcels rather than en masse, is that a sale in parcels or lots opens a field to a greater number of bidders, is conducive to a better price, and "tends to prevent odious speculation upon the distress of the debtor," and enables him to redeem some of the property without being compelled to redeem it all. Bank of New Brockton v. Dunnavant, 204 Ala. 636, 87 So. 105; Power v. Larabee, 3 N.D. 503, 57 N.W. 789, 44 Am. St. Rep. 577; Woods v. Monell et al., 1 Johns. Ch. (N.Y.) 502; Mohan v. Smith, 30 Minn. 259, 15 N.W. 118. And this rule applies "where the property covered by the mortgage is separated into several distinct tracts or lots, either by natural boundaries, by the way in which it is platted or laid out, or by the fact that the parcels are not contiguous," (41 C. J. 973, § 1421), and inures to the benefit of a party who has acquired rights in subordination to the mortgage by a conveyance from the debtor (Brock et al. v. Berry, 132 Ala. 95, 31 So. 517, 90 Am. St. Rep. 896). We recognize the general rule that the mortgagee, or those standing in his right, ordinarily, may sell the property as described in the mortgage.

Also, "[e]xecutory land sale contracts may be rescinded orally . . . and such contracts are considered executory where legal title has not been transferred." Warrenton, 787 S.W.2d at 855 (citing Smith v.Mohan, 723 S.W.2d 94, 97-98 (Mo.App. 1987)). However, this same authority also teaches that "contracts required to be written under the statute of frauds, including land sale contracts, § 432.010 RSMo [1994], may not be modified orally."

He contends that he orally rescinded his guaranty in December 1992, when there was nothing due on the contract between South-Branch and Farmland, so that he was discharged from any further obligations under the guaranty agreement. Mr. Bittner relies on Smith v. Mohan, 723 S.W.2d 94, 98 (Mo. App. 1987), to support his contention that he orally rescinded his guaranty in December 1992. In Smith, there was a contract for the sale of real estate, which provided the purchaser with the option of rescinding the contract before the date of closing, if the premises were destroyed by a natural disaster prior to this date.

Executory land sale contracts may be rescinded orally, however, and such contracts are considered executory where legal title has not been transferred. Smith v. Mohan, 723 S.W.2d 94, 97-98 (Mo.App. 1987). Thus, respondents could not show the sales contract had been modified, but they could show that it had been rescinded and a new contract formed.

Such a declaration and subsequent conduct, inconsistent with the continued existence of the contract, may be considered as an abandonment of the contract by plaintiffs, thereby precluding their entitlement to specific performance. See Ferguson v. Kindle, 396 S.W.2d 626, 629 (Mo. 1965); Smith v. Mohan, 723 S.W.2d 94, 97 (Mo.App. 1987). Furthermore, the determination of whether specific performance should be decreed rests in the sound discretion of the trial court.