To the complaint in that action a general demurrer was sustained. An appeal was taken to this court which will be found reported in Smith v. McNutt, 156 Cal. 769, [ 106 P. 70]. For convenience, however, the facts may be briefly recapitulated.
Thus, when a cotenant acquires an adverse outstanding title or encumbrance, he does so as trustee for the benefit of his cotenants. ( Smith v. McNutt (1909) 156 Cal. 769 [ 106 P. 70].) Cotenants stand in such confidential relation to one another in respect to the common property and the common title that it would be inequitable to permit one, without the consent of the others, to buy an outstanding adverse claim or title and assert it for his exclusive benefit, and to thereby undermine the common title and injure and prejudice the interests of his cotenants.
" ( Richards v. Plumbe, 116 Cal.App.2d 132, 138 [ 253 P.2d 126].) In Smith v. McNutt, 156 Cal. 769 [ 106 P. 70], it was held that the principle that a cotenant or person placed in a situation of trust or confidence who purchases trust property holds it in trust for the others, can have no application in the absence of the relationship which constitutes the whole reason for its existence. Obviously, the same rule would apply to leasing as well as purchase.
Appellant furnishes no authority, nor are we able to find one, holding that a purchaser at foreclosure sale acquires the absolute title. [2] Appellant insists that the tenancy in common was terminated by the sale to Anderson, citing Smith v. McNutt, 156 Cal. 769 [ 106 P. 70], and McNutt v. Nuevo Land Co., supra. The former recognizes the general equitable principle "applicable in such cases as those of joint tenants, tenants in common, and generally persons placed in a situation of trust or confidence" that "it is not consistent with good faith, nor with the duty which the connection of the parties, as claimants, of a common subject, created, that one of them should be able, without the consent of the other, to buy in an outstanding title and appropriate the whole subject to himself and thus undermine and oust his companion," and holds that the one acquiring such outstanding title will not be allowed to retain it for his own exclusive benefit.
The Commission then held that, as in MISO III, it had to apply the tariff “effective and on file on the date that the interconnection agreement is executed or filed unexecuted.” MISO IV,129 FERC ¶ 61,060 at P. 62; see also Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc. ( MISO I ), 114 FERC ¶ 61,106 P. 70 (2006) (interconnection agreement would be governed by the presently effective tariff, rather than the tariff in effect when the agreement was being negotiated); Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc. (MISO V), 131 FERC ¶ 61,165 P. 32 (2010) (although cost-allocation methodology in tariff changed while interconnection agreement was being negotiated, “the cost allocation methodology that was effective and on file” on the date the agreement was executed or filed with the Commission controlled); Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc. (MISO VI), 138 FERC ¶ 61,199 P. 42 (2012) (declining to apply deadlines in an amended tariff because the interconnection agreement was governed by “the tariff effective and on file at the time the [agreement] was filed with the Commission and proposed to take effect”); MidAmerican Energy Co., 116 FERC ¶ 61,018 P. 13 (2006) (following practice of “review[ing] interconnection agreements based on the terms and conditions in effect on the date when th