Therefore, this court applies a de novo standard of review when reviewing issues of contract interpretation. Pierce Point Cinema 10, L.L.C. v. Perin–Tyler Family Found. L.L.C., 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2012–02–014, 2012-Ohio-5008, 2012 WL 5306126, ¶ 10, citing Smith v. Littrell, 12th Dist. Preble No. CA2001–02–004, 2001 WL 1598301, *2 (Dec. 17, 2001). "However, once the court determines the contract to be ambiguous, it must decide the meaning of the terms in the contract."

Courts have found that an easement is a contract and that claims arising from an easement agreement fall under R.C. 2305.06's statute of limitations. See Smith v. Littrell, 12th Dist. Preble No. CA2001–02–004, 2001 WL 1598301, *2–3 (Dec. 17, 2001) (easement agreement interpreted as a contract); Hoffman v. Akron, 9th Dist. Summit No. 12724, 1987 WL 9348, 1 (Apr. 1, 1987) (where the claim arose from an express easement requiring maintenance of the easement by the owner, R.C. 2305.06 applied). If an easement can operate as a contract or an agreement, then the 15–year statute of limitations in former R.C. 2305.06 would apply to claims “upon” such an agreement.

Thus, when reviewing issues of contract interpretation, this court applies a de novo standard of review. Smith v. Littrell, 12th Dist. No. CA2001-02-004, 2001 WL 1598301, *2 (Dec. 17, 2001). However, once the court determines the contract to be ambiguous, it must decide the meaning of the terms in the contract.

In other words, specific performance of a contract for an interest in real property "may be had as a matter of right, because there is nothing else in the world exactly equivalent to conveyance of the particular piece of real estate contracted for." Link v. Burke (1926), 5 Ohio Law Abs. 676, 676-677; Smith v. Littrell (Dec. 17, 2001), Preble App. No. CA2001-02-0004; Gleason, at 672. Thus, we do not find the trial court's order of specific performance was based upon personal services, and specific performance was the proper remedy to enforce the real estate contract.

Carnahan v. Weeks (May 21, 1999), Montgomery App. No. 17302. Courts should not specifically enforce a contract that is uncertain. Progress Properties, Inc. v. Baird (Oct. 23, 1997), Cuyahoga App. No. 70286, discretionary appeal not allowed (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 1447, following Mr. Mark Corp. v. Rush, Inc. (1983), 11 Ohio App.3d 167. "Specific performance will not be decreed where the terms of the contract are indefinite as to any material feature to be performed by either party, or if they are left open for future determination by the parties, or they are so uncertain or equivocal in their meaning that the intention of the parties in regard thereto cannot be determined." Smith v. Littrell (Dec. 17, 2001), Preble App. No. CA2001-02-004. {¶ 10} In the present case, a real estate purchase contract was submitted as evidence of the parties' agreement to transfer the property from appellee to appellant.