Smith v. Lampe

19 Citing cases

  1. In re Motor Ship Pacific Carrier

    489 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1974)   Cited 26 times

    To respondent's exception to the jurisdiction the court held: "The following cases indicate that a cause in personam in admiralty exists, if it be proven that a tort arising on land takes effect on navigable waters, to the injury of a vessel on behalf of which the cause is asserted: Philadelphia, W. B. R. R. Co. v. Philadelphia, etc., Co., 23 How. 209, 16 L.Ed. 433; Leonard v. Decker, D.C., [2 Cir.] 22 F. 741; Galena, D. D. M. Packet Co. v. Rock Island, etc., 6 Wall. 213, 18 L.Ed. 753; The Normannia, D.C., [2 Cir.] 62 F. 469, at 472; Hermann v. Port Blakely Mill Co., D.C., [9 Cir.] 69 F. 646; Dorrington v. Detroit, 6 Cir., 223 F. 232, at 242; Smith v. Lampe, 6 Cir., 64 F.2d 201." In Smith v. Lampe, 6 Cir., 1933, 64 F.2d 201, two vessels collided in a thick fog allegedly because of the negligent signalling by respondent with the horn of his automobile to the vessels in the fog.

  2. Taghadomi v. U.S.

    401 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 2005)   Cited 56 times
    Holding that this test was met where kayakers fell overboard and a rescue mission was attempted, because the "efficacy of search-and-rescue operations has a direct effect on the health and lives of seamen"

    It is clear, then, that the place of injury is the determinative factor. See also Smith v. Lampe, 64 F.2d 201, 202 (6th Cir. 1933) ("[W]here the negligent act orginates on land and the damage occurs on water, the cause of action is within the admiralty jurisdiction."); In re Motor Ship Pacific Carrier, 489 F.2d 152, 157 (5th Cir. 1974); 2 Am.Jur.2d Admiralty ยง 75 ("For the purpose of determining admiralty jurisdiction, the tort is deemed to occur, not where the wrongful act or omission has its inception, but where the impact of the act or omission produces such injury as to give rise to a cause of action.").

  3. Executive Jet Aviation v. City of Cleveland

    448 F.2d 151 (6th Cir. 1971)   Cited 7 times
    In Executive Jet, the Supreme Court reviewed several "perverse and casuistic borderline situations" involving contacts with both land and water. 409 U.S. at 255.

    SIXTH CIRCUIT ADMIRALTY CASES In Smith v. Lampe, 64 F.2d 201 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 289 U.S. 751, 53 S. Ct. 695, 77 L.Ed. 1496 (1933), Judge Simons stated the traditional test of maritime jurisdiction for this Circuit saying, "Where the negligent act originates on land and the damage occurs on water, the cause of action is within the admiralty jurisdiction." Id. at 202.

  4. Watz v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.

    431 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1970)   Cited 98 times
    In Watz v. Zapata Off-Shore Company, 431 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1970), we found that a district court had jurisdiction over the claim of an employee injured when a hoist gave way while he was repairing a vessel on navigable waters.

    See, e.g., Weinstein v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 3 Cir. 1963, 316 F.2d 758, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 940, 84 S.Ct. 343, 11 L.Ed.2d 271. Weinstein v. Eastern Airlines, 3 Cir. 1963, 316 F.2d 758, 765 (airplane crash into sea because of negligence in inspection and maintenance on land is within admiralty jurisdiction); Smith v. Lampe, 6 Cir. 1933, 64 F.2d 201, cert. denied, 1933, 289 U.S. 751, 53 S.Ct. 695, 77 L.Ed. 1496 (blowing of automobile horn on land causing damage to barge when tug believed horn to be fog signals held, within admiralty jurisdiction); Southern Bell Telephone Telegraph Co. v. Burke, 5 Cir. 1933, 62 F.2d 1015 (negligently maintained telegraph wires not in or covered by navigable waters damaged ship's smokestack; held, within admiralty jurisdiction). Certainly this case meets such a test.

  5. Chapman v. City of Grosse Pointe Farms

    385 F.2d 962 (6th Cir. 1967)   Cited 45 times
    Holding tort that occurred on dock was outside of admiralty jurisdiction

    See Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. City of Monterey, 6 F.2d 893 (N.D.Cal. 1925); Upper Lakes Shipping Ltd. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n., 33 F.R.D. 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Hess v. United States, 259 F.2d 285 (9th Cir. 1958), rev'd on other grounds, 361 U.S. 314, 80 S.Ct. 341, 4 L.Ed.2d 305 (1960); Weinstein v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 316 F.2d 758, 765 (3rd Cir. 1963). And, as stated by this court in Smith v. Lampe, 64 F.2d 201, 202 (6th Cir. 1933), "where the negligent act originates on land and the damage occurs on water, the cause of action is within the admiralty jurisdiction." However, a number of troublesome borderline cases have arisen: where claimant sustained injuries on the dock after falling from a defective gangway of a ship; where claimant was on a vessel, when struck by a swinging hoist and precipitated upon the wharf; where claimant was standing on a stage resting upon the wharf when struck by a sling and knocked into the water where he was later found dead; where claimant was allegedly caused to fall from a negligently maintained dock into a slip where he was subsequently found drowned; and where claimant fell through a hole in an extension of a pier, sustaining injuries only after striking the water.

  6. Carufel v. Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company

    286 F.2d 193 (6th Cir. 1961)   Cited 3 times

    " In Creasy v. Ohio Power Co., 6 Cir., 248 F.2d 745, 747, it was said: "It is not here contended that Ohio has abandoned the common law tests of actionable conduct that liability must be imposed only if danger should have been perceived by a reasonably prudent man, under all circumstances of a particular case." See also: Gedeon v. East Ohio Gas Co., 128 Ohio St. 335, 190 N.E. 924; Davis v. Cleveland Ry. Co., 135 Ohio St. 401, 21 N.E.2d 169; Smith v. Lampe, 6 Cir., 64 F.2d 201, certiorari denied 289 U.S. 751, 53 S.Ct. 695, 77 L.Ed. 1496; Erie R. Co. v. Lade, 6 Cir., 209 F.2d 948. We find no evidence in the record from which a jury might have even inferred that a reasonable person should have anticipated that the vapor lights would combine with fog and headlights and cause an injury.

  7. Harbison-Walker Refractories Co. v. Smith

    194 F.2d 530 (6th Cir. 1952)

    Where injury could reasonably have been foreseen in the light of attending circumstances, and where the thing done or omitted to be done, is a substantial factor in bringing it about, it is not necessary that the party charged should have had in mind the particular means by which it is brought about. Johnson v. Kosmos Portland Cement Company, 6 Cir., 64 F.2d 193, Pittsburgh Steamship Company v. Palo, 6 Cir., 64 F.2d 198, and Smith v. Lampe, 6 Cir., 64 F.2d 201, and that heavy rainfall and resulting flood is not so unusual a manifestation of natural phenomena as to break the causal relation between negligence and resulting injury. Johnson v. Portland Cement Company, supra, Milwaukee St. P.R. Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U.S. 469, 24 L.Ed. 256, Vyse v. Chicago, B. Q. Ry. Company, 126 Iowa 90, 101 N.W. 736, Bohlen Studies in the Law of Torts 29. The judgment below is affirmed.

  8. Holder v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co.

    172 F.2d 217 (6th Cir. 1949)   Cited 1 times

    The classical test to be applied in the determination of negligence or its causal relation to injury, depends on whether, under all of the circumstances, there is reasonable expectation of injurious consequences flowing from wrongful acts or omissions. This test was applied in an early day in Milwaukee St. P.R. v. Kellogg, 94 U.S. 469, 24 L.Ed. 256, and has been fully discussed by us in a series of cases including Johnson v. Kosmos Portland Cement Co., 6 Cir., 64 F.2d 193; Pittsburgh S.S. Co. v. Palo, 6 Cir., 64 F.2d 198; and Smith v. Lampe, 6 Cir., 64 F.2d 201, and in the American Law Institute Restatement of Torts, ยง 310. Reasonable expectation of injury may be sufficient to establish both negligence and its causal relation to accident, even though no injuries have previously been sustained, Johnson v. Kosmos Portland Cement Co., supra. Here it is alleged and not denied that many accidents have happened on the structure here involved prior to the one in issue. We are not advised that Tennessee law applies a contrary principle for assaying negligence.

  9. Hylton v. Southern Railway Co.

    87 F.2d 393 (6th Cir. 1937)   Cited 9 times

    The failure to promulgate a rule, or, more accurately, the discontinuance of the rule in effect until 1912, cannot be said to have had any causal relation in bringing about the derailment. Was the derailment which is under scrutiny here within the realm of foreseeable consequences as required under the rules as to actionable negligence? Johnson v. Kosmos Portland Cement Co., 64 F.2d 193 (C.C.A. 6); Pittsburgh S.S. Co. v. Palo, 64 F.2d 198 (C.C.A. 6); Smith v. Lampe, 64 F.2d 201 (C.C.A. 6); Louisville N.R. Co. v. Davis (C.C.A. 6) 75 F.2d 849. Hylton knew and fully appreciated all the dangers incident to the operation of freight trains down the various grades of the tracks without turning the retainer valve handles up. He assumed the risk of any injury resulting from such method of operation.

  10. Norfolk W. Ry. Co. v. Brumfield

    64 F.2d 961 (6th Cir. 1933)   Cited 1 times

    Appellant complains of the verdict and judgment against it because, it is said, those in charge of the operations had no apparent ground for belief that the workmen were in any danger of injury by reason of the movement of the beam. Chesapeake Ohio R. Co. v. Mihas, 280 U.S. 102, 108, 50 S. Ct. 42, 74 L. Ed. 207; Atchison, T. S.F.R. Co. v. Calhoun, 213 U.S. 1, 29 S. Ct. 321, 53 L. Ed. 671; Pittsburgh Steamship Co. v. Palo, 64 F.2d 198 (C.C.A. 6); Smith v. Lampe, 64 F.2d 201 (C.C.A. 6). This doctrine is without application to the present case. The injury did not result from moving the crossbeam in the manner originally intended, but in moving it too far and thus causing the stringers to fall.