Opinion
No. CIV S-03-1871 LKK KJM P.
August 2, 2007
ORDER
Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding through counsel, has filed this application for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § on all the parties and which contained notice to all parties that objections to the findings and recommendations were to 636(b)(1)(B) and Local General Order No. 262.
On March 20, 2007, the magistrate judge filed findings and recommendations which were served be filed within twenty days. Both parties filed objections.
In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Local Rule 72-304, this court has conducted a de novo review of this case. Having carefully reviewed the entire file, the court determines that the findings and recommendations are supported by the record and by proper analysis.
Although the court adopts the findings and recommendations, it is worth remarking on respondents' objections, which are lengthy and detailed. Respondents argue that the California Court of Appeal's decision was not objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established federal law. Respondents contend that the magistrate judge misinterpreted and misapplied three key Supreme Court cases: Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231 (1988), Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466 (1933), and Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3 (2002). Having independently reviewed these cases, this court finds that the cases were properly interpreted and applied by the magistrate judge.
First, contrary to respondents' contention, Lowenfield v. Phelps merely sets forth the standard for assessing jury coercion claims. Respondents' argument that the Supreme Court has yet to clearly state what amounts to coercion is without merit.Lowenfield specifically addresses jury coercion and directs courts to examine the totality of circumstances by "consider[ing] the supplemental charge given by the trial court `in its context and under all the circumstances.'" Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 237. For this reason, the magistrate judge properly relied onLowenfield in reaching her holding.
Second, the magistrate judge did not, as respondents contend, misinterpret Quercia, 289 U.S. 466 (1933). The magistrate judge correctly relied on the primary holding of the case, namely, that a judge may "express his opinion upon the facts, provided he makes it clear to the jury that all matters of fact are submitted to their determination." Quercia, 289 U.S. at 469. That theQuercia court also addressed the situation of a judge adding to the evidence is irrelevant for the purposes of the pending petition.
Third, and finally, respondents argue that the magistrate judge failed to properly apply Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3 (2002). InEarly, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's finding that the state court's determination of jury coercion was unreasonable. The Supreme Court found that the state court had in fact mentioned all the circumstances petitioner argued had caused the coercion. Id. at 9. In the case at bar, the state court did not mention all of the circumstances raised by petitioner. For example, as the magistrate judge explained, the state court failed to consider the portion of the Allen instruction directed at Juror Ten. See Findings and Recommendations at 22:10-23:7. For this reason, the court agrees with the magistrate judge's conclusion that Early is distinguishable.
In sum, it is evident that the magistrate judge properly accounted for and applied the relevant Supreme Court cases on the issue of jury coercion. Accordingly, respondents' objections are unavailing. The court orders as follows:
1. The findings and recommendations filed on March 20, 2007, are adopted in full; and
2. Petitioner's application for writ of habeas corpus is GRANTED as to the jury coercion claim but is denied in all other respects.
IT IS SO ORDERED.