Opinion
CASE No. 1:23-cv-736
2023-11-21
Levarn SMITH, Jr., Angela Smith, and L.S., a minor, by Levarn Smith, Jr., and Angela Smith, his Next Friends, Plaintiffs, v. KALAMAZOO PUBLIC SCHOOLS, Defendant.
Robert A. Lusk, Educators Legal Services, PLLC, Commerce Township, MI, for Plaintiffs. Gregory N. Longworth, Jordan Michael Bullinger, Marshall W. Grate, Clark Hill PLC, Grand Rapids, MI, for Defendant.
Robert A. Lusk, Educators Legal Services, PLLC, Commerce Township, MI, for Plaintiffs.
Gregory N. Longworth, Jordan Michael Bullinger, Marshall W. Grate, Clark Hill PLC, Grand Rapids, MI, for Defendant. ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT
ROBERT J. JONKER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
INTRODUCTION
The son (L.S.) of Levarn Smith, Jr. and Angela Smith is a high school student in the Kalamazoo Public Schools ("the District"). The Smiths say L.S. has a variety of emotional disabilities and that his mood and behavior drastically deteriorated in the spring and summer of 2022 after the District refused to help him catch up on his schoolwork following a monthlong absence due to COVID-19. His condition was so bad that his parents hospitalized him twice for his own safety. The Smiths now seek compensatory and punitive damages —as well as damages for emotional distress and loss of consortium—related to L.S.'s mental health spiral. The District moves to dismiss, principally arguing that Plaintiffs' claims are improper attempts to enforce the Individuals with Disabilities with Education Act ("IDEA") without first satisfying the IDEA's exhaustion requirement. (ECF Nos. 11, 12). Plaintiffs counter that their claims seek only backward-looking remedies unavailable under the IDEA and thus qualify for the narrow exception to the IDEA's exhaustion requirement articulated in Luna Perez v. Sturgis Public Schools, 598 U.S. 142, 143 S.Ct. 859, 215 L.Ed.2d 95 (2023). For the following reasons, the District's Motion to Dismiss, (ECF No. 11), is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
As part of their opposition to the District's motion, Plaintiffs submitted a Motion for Leave to File a Sur-Reply. (ECF No. 31). Because the motion is unopposed and Plaintiffs' proposed sur-reply brief assists the Court in its consideration of the District's motion to dismiss, the Court grants Plaintiffs' motion.
I. BACKGROUND
L.S. is a minor student in the District with a variety of disabilities, including emotional dysregulation, attention deficit disorder, and conversion disorder. (ECF No. 6 ¶ 16 at PageID.34). He has had a § 504 plan since 2018. (Id. ¶¶ 17-19 at PageID.34). In December 2021, when L.S. was in ninth grade, he contracted COVID-19 and could not attend school for almost a month. (Id. ¶¶ 20-21 at PageID.34). Even though L.S. fell significantly behind in school because of his extended absence, Plaintiffs allege that the District refused to update L.S.'s § 504 plan or otherwise help him catch up on his missed assignments, causing him to fail almost all of his classes. (Id. ¶¶ 22-23 at PageID.34-35). Consequently, L.S.'s mood and behavior deteriorated, and he began refusing to attend school altogether. (Id. ¶ 23 at PageID.35). The District rejected the Smiths' request for homebound education services, and by April 2022, L.S.'s mood worsened to the point that his parents hospitalized him for two weeks. (Id. ¶¶ 24-26 at PageID.35). After L.S.'s release from the hospital, his father took an unpaid leave under the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA") to care for him, costing the family approximately
A § 504 plan is a document that describes the regular or special education and related aids and services a disabled student will receive from a federally-funded public educational agency to comply with § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), an antidiscrimination statute. Neither the statute nor any implementing regulations require such plans, but the Department of Education encourages them, and school districts commonly use them. A § 504 plan typically includes a school district's plans for compliance with the broader statutory mandate to provide a free appropriate public education ("FAPE") in the IDEA. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1).
$20,000 in lost wages. (Id. ¶¶ 27-28 at PageID.35). Unfortunately, however, L.S.'s mood and behavior continued to spiral downwards, ultimately leading to a second hospitalization from early August until late October 2022. (Id. ¶¶ 33-34 at PageID.37). After his second discharge, L.S. reenrolled in the District, which then determined that L.S. qualified for an Individualized Education Program ("IEP") under the IDEA. (Id. ¶¶ 35-36 at PageID.37). L.S.'s new IEP took effect on February 16, 2023. (Id.)
The Smiths filed this action against the District in July 2023, bringing claims under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12132, and the Michigan Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act ("PWDCRA"), MICH COMP. LAWS §§ 37.1102(2), 37.1402(a). (ECF No. 6 ¶¶ 38-72, 84-88 at PageID.37-48, 51-53). Plaintiffs also assert a federal civil rights deprivation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that is predicated on the same factual allegations as their § 504, ADA, and PWDCRA claims. (Id. ¶¶ 72-83 at PageID.48-51). The core of the Amended Complaint is that the District's refusal to accommodate L.S. after he missed a significant amount of school from COVID-19 violated his rights under the IDEA, § 504, the ADA, and their implementing regulations to a free appropriate public education ("FAPE"), and that this denial of a FAPE caused a severe downward spiral in L.S.'s mental health in the spring and summer of 2022. (Id. ¶¶ 38-88 at PageID.37-53). Plaintiffs seek to recover $300,000 in costs incurred from L.S.'s two hospitalizations; the $20,000 in lost wages from L.S.'s father's FMLA leave; damages for mental anguish, emotional distress, and loss of consortium; and punitive damages. (Id. ¶¶ 55, 71, 83, 88 at PageID.43, 48, 51, 53). The District moves to dismiss all of Plaintiffs' claims. (ECF No. 11).
II. ADA AND § 504 CLAIMS
A. Administrative Exhaustion.
1. Legal Standards. The District first moves to dismiss Plaintiffs' ADA and § 504 claims for hospitalization costs and lost wages for failure to satisfy the IDEA's administrative exhaustion requirement. The IDEA provides that, in exchange for federal funding, states must offer all disabled children a FAPE, 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A), which consists of "special education and related services" that are provided at public expense and supervision, 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9). Providing disabled children a FAPE is the primary purpose of the IDEA, and IEPs are the main vehicles that school districts utilize to ensure that IDEA-eligible students receive a FAPE. See, e.g., Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Schs., 580 U.S. 154, 167, 137 S.Ct. 743, 197 L.Ed.2d 46 (2017) (citing 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400(d)(1)(A), 1412(a)(1)(A)). When a lawsuit is predicated on the denial of a FAPE, the IDEA's administrative exhaustion requirements generally apply. See id. at 168, 137 S.Ct. 743 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l)). This is true even when plaintiff's claims are brought under a different statute—such as Title II of the ADA or § 504—rather than directly under the IDEA. Id.
The Supreme Court crafted a narrow exception to the IDEA's administrative exhaustion requirement in Luna Perez v. Sturgis Pub. Schs., 598 U.S. 142, 143 S.Ct. 859, 215 L.Ed.2d 95 (2023). In Perez, the defendant school district provided the plaintiff—a deaf high school student—with unqualified or absent aides, and it misrepresented plaintiff's educational progress to plaintiff and his parents. Id. at 145, 143 S.Ct. 859. The district ultimately refused to graduate the plaintiff, who then sued for compensatory damages under the ADA.
Id. Even though plaintiff's claim was entangled with the district's alleged past failure to provide plaintiff a FAPE, the Supreme Court concluded that the IDEA's administrative exhaustion requirements did not apply because they only cover suits that "see[k] relief ... also available under [the IDEA]," 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l), and "everyone agree[d]" for purposes of that appeal that plaintiff sought compensatory damages unavailable under the IDEA. Perez, 598 U.S. at 147-48, 143 S.Ct. 859.
The IDEA's administrative exhaustion requirement and the Supreme Court's subsequent carveout in Perez are at the heart of the District's motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' ADA and § 504 claims for hospitalization costs and lost wages. While Plaintiffs classify their requested relief as "damages," the District argues that the monetary relief Plaintiffs seek is actually reimbursement for expenses they incurred to provide L.S. a FAPE—a type of equitable relief available under the IDEA. (ECF No. 12 at PageID.75-77). Accordingly, the District contends that IDEA's exhaustion requirements apply, and that because the parties agree that Plaintiffs have not exhausted their claims under the IDEA, Plaintiffs' ADA and § 504 claims for hospitalization costs and lost wages must be dismissed. (Id.).
The Court treats the District's motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust identically to a FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Shefice v. Macomb Intermediate Sch. Dist., No. 22-1283, 2023 WL 3698219, at *1 (6th Cir. May 23, 2023). To survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must allege facts that—taken as true by the Court—are sufficient "to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). In the context of IDEA exhaustion, this means Plaintiffs' well-pleaded factual allegations must allow the Court to reasonably infer that their requested "damages" for hospitalization costs and lost wages are exempt from the IDEA's administrative exhaustion requirement under Perez. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). The Smiths have satisfied that standard here.
2. Hospitalization Costs. In support of its argument that L.S.'s hospitalization costs are reimbursable expenses under the IDEA, the District cites to School Committee of Burlington, Massachusetts v. Department of Education of Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 359, 105 S.Ct. 1996, 85 L.Ed.2d 385 (1985). In Burlington, the district's IEP for a disabled child placed him in a public school, but the child's father believed a private placement was better suited for his child's needs. Id. at 362, 105 S.Ct. 1996. The father appealed the IEP and placed his child in the private school during the administrative and judicial review processes at his own expense. Id. He later sought reimbursement for the cost of the interim private placement. Id. at 363-64, 105 S.Ct. 1996.
The district developed the student's IEP under the Education of the Handicapped Act ("EHA"), the precursor to the IDEA.
Eventually, the case arrived at the Supreme Court on an interlocutory appeal by the district. Id. at 367, 105 S.Ct. 1996. The Court held that courts are empowered to reimburse parents for their expenditures on a private placement during the interim review process if the court ultimately agrees with the parents that a private placement is necessary to provide a FAPE. Id. at 369-70, 105 S.Ct. 1996. This type of monetary relief was not "damages"
because the district would simply be "belatedly pay[ing] expenses that it should have paid all along and would have borne in the first instance had it developed a proper IEP." Id. at 370-71, 105 S.Ct. 1996.
The District argues that this is precisely the situation the Smiths pleaded here, but the Court disagrees. Unlike in Burlington, Plaintiffs use the language "compensatory damages" instead of "reimbursement," and more importantly, they do not allege that they intended L.S.'s hospitalizations to serve as a type of interim "private placement" because they believed inpatient hospitalization or homebound education was necessary to provide L.S. a FAPE. Instead, the gravamen of Plaintiffs' allegations is that the District's inaction after L.S. missed almost a month of school from COVID-19 caused L.S.'s mental health to drastically deteriorate to the point that he became suicidal and needed hospitalization for his own safety. Put differently, the Smiths assert that L.S. would not have suffered such a severe mental breakdown —and thus they would not have been forced to hospitalize L.S. or take an unpaid FMLA leave from their jobs to care for him—had the District properly accommodated L.S. after his extended absence from school. Plaintiffs' ADA and § 504 claims for hospitalization costs thus ultimately seek only "backward-looking relief" for an avoidable past harm—a mental health crisis —flowing from the District's purported past denial of a FAPE. See Perez, 598 U.S. at 149-50, 143 S.Ct. 859. Such backward-looking relief is unavailable under the IDEA and therefore not subject to its exhaustion requirement. Id.; see also Li v. Revere Loc. Sch. Dist., No. 21-3422, 2023 WL 3302062, at *13 (6th Cir. May 8, 2023) (post-Perez case describing the difference between forward-looking reimbursement and backward-looking compensatory damages).
3. Lost Wages. Similarly, the District argues that Plaintiffs failed to exhaust their ADA and § 504 claims for $20,000 in lost wages. The District concedes that there is no controlling law on this issue, however, and it contends only that dismissal is required based on the same analogy to Burlington it put forward in support of its argument to dismiss Plaintiffs' claims for hospitalization costs. But this argument fails for the same reasons. As with Plaintiffs' demand for hospitalization costs, their request for the $20,000 of income L.S.'s father lost when he took a FMLA leave to care for his son is best categorized as a legal remedy for a concrete harm caused by the District's purported past denial of a FAPE, see Perez, 598 U.S. at 149-50, 143 S.Ct. 859, as opposed to equitable reimbursement for expenses the District "should have paid all along" to provide L.S. a FAPE, see Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370-71, 105 S.Ct. 1996. The Court therefore denies the District's motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' ADA and § 504 claims for hospitalization costs and lost wages for failure to exhaust.
B. Mental Anguish, Emotional Distress, Loss of Consortium, and Punitive Damages.
1. Mental Anguish, Emotional Distress, and Punitive Damages. Alternatively, the District moves to dismiss Plaintiffs' ADA and § 504 claims for mental anguish, emotional distress, and punitive damages. Plaintiffs concede that both § 504 and Title II of the ADA bar recovery of punitive damages, Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 189-190, 122 S.Ct. 2097, 153 L.Ed.2d 230 (2002), and that § 504 bars recovery of mental anguish and emotional distress damages, Cummings v. Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C., 596 U.S. 212, 230, 142 S.Ct. 1562, 212 L.Ed.2d 552 (2022). Nonetheless, Plaintiffs assert that Cummings
does not extend to their ADA claim for mental anguish and emotional distress because the ADA—unlike § 504—is not a Spending Clause statute and is thus not limited to traditional contract remedies. See Cummings, 596 U.S. at 221-22, 142 S.Ct. 1562 (explaining that emotional distress damages are unavailable under Spending Clause statutes like § 504 because they are not generally recoverable for breach of contract). (ECF No. 24 at PageID.135-37; ECF No. 31 at PageID.184-86). The District counters that Title II of the ADA expressly incorporates the same remedies as those available under § 504, so Plaintiffs should not be able to recover any damages under Title II of the ADA that are unavailable under § 504. (ECF No. 12 at PageID.73-75; ECF No. 25 at PageID.145-47).
The Court agrees with the District. Title II of the ADA provides that "[t]he remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in [§ 505 of the Rehabilitation Act] shall be the remedies, procedures, and rights" that apply to Title II claims. 42 U.S.C. § 12133. Because the remedies provided by Title II to ADA claimants are coextensive to those available under the Rehabilitation Act, id., and emotional distress damages are not available under the Rehabilitation Act, see Cummings, 596 U.S. at 230, 142 S.Ct. 1562, "[i]t necessarily follows that ... emotional distress damages would not be available in Title II cases, either." Williams v. Colorado Dep't of Corr., No. 21-cv-02595, 2023 WL 3585210, at *5 (D. Colo. May 22, 2023). The Court is unpersuaded that this commonsense logic falls apart because the ADA is not a Spending Clause statute. Indeed, in Barnes, the Supreme Court emphasized that the coextensive nature of ADA and § 504 remedies makes the ADA's status as a non-Spending Clause statute "quite irrelevant." See 536 U.S. at 189 n.3, 122 S.Ct. 2097. Accordingly, the Court concludes that damages for mental anguish and emotional distress are not recoverable in actions brought under Title II of the ADA. See Williams, 2023 WL 3585210, at *6 & n.6 (collecting cases).
2. Loss of Consortium. Applying the same contract-law analogy used in Cummings and Barnes, the Court also concludes that loss of consortium damages are unavailable under Spending Clause statutes like § 504—and thus, by extension, Title II of the ADA. Section 693 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS describes loss of consortium as a derivative claim that flows from tortious conduct, as opposed to breach of contract. But even if loss of consortium could be categorized as a type of mental suffering—a category of damages sometimes available in contract actions—mental suffering is not a usual contract remedy, so it would be unavailable in suits brought under § 504 and the ADA. See Cummings, 596 U.S. at 230, 142 S.Ct. 1562; Barnes, 536 U.S. at 189 n.3, 122 S.Ct. 2097. The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiffs' ADA and § 504 claims for mental anguish and emotional distress damages, loss of consortium damages, and punitive damages.
Plaintiffs' prayer for relief also seeks "exemplary damages." (ECF No. 6 ¶ 91 at PageID.54). To the extent exemplary damages are different from punitive damages, exemplary damages—like punitive damages—are not traditionally available in breach of contract actions. See, e.g., 11 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 65.2 (4th ed. 2020); see also Kewin v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 409 Mich. 401, 295 N.W.2d 50, 55 (1980) (holding that exemplary damages may not be awarded in Michigan common-law commercial contract actions "absent allegation and proof of tortious conduct"). It therefore follows from Cummings and Barnes that exemplary damages are not recoverable in actions brought under § 504 or the ADA.
C. Statute of Limitations.
The District also asserts that Plaintiffs' ADA and § 504 claims are
barred by MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.5805(2), the applicable three-year statute of limitations. "[T]he statute of limitations begins to run when the reasonable person knows, or in the exercise of due diligence should have known, both his injury and the cause of that injury." Bishop v. Children's Ctr. for Developmental Enrichment, 618 F.3d 533, 536-37 (6th Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted). Plaintiffs seek damages related to the mental breakdown L.S. suffered in the spring and summer of 2022 after the District purportedly refused to help him catch up on schoolwork he missed during a monthlong absence due to COVID-19. Thus, the actions giving rise to this lawsuit began in spring 2022, so Plaintiffs' action— filed a year later in July 2023—is well within the three-year statute of limitations. See Cataldo v. U.S. Steel Corp., 676 F.3d 542, 547 (6th Cir. 2012) (explaining that like all other Rule 12(b)(6) motions, a motion to dismiss based on the statute of limitations must take the allegations in the complaint as true).
III. § 1983 CLAIM
In addition to challenging Plaintiffs' ADA and § 504 claims, the District also moves to dismiss Plaintiffs' § 1983 claim on the grounds that the IDEA cannot be enforced through 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 12 at PageID.79-80). But as the Court has repeatedly stated in this Order, Plaintiffs are not attempting to enforce the IDEA. Rather, they are seeking compensatory damages under Title II of the ADA and § 504 for the mental health crisis L.S. experienced after the District allegedly failed to help L.S. catch up on his school-work after an extended absence due to COVID-19. These are backward-looking non-educational legal remedies unavailable under the IDEA.
Whether violations of Title II of the ADA and § 504 are also cognizable under § 1983 is an open question in this Circuit. The Court is persuaded by those courts that have concluded that the specific and comprehensive enforcement schemes in Title II of the ADA and § 504 demonstrate that Congress intended to preclude individuals from using the more general remedial scheme in § 1983 to remedy ADA and § 504 violations. See, e.g., Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999, 1011 (8th Cir. 1999) (en banc); D.A. ex rel. Latasha A. v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 629 F.3d 450, 456-57 (5th Cir. 2010) (same); Holbrook v. City of Alpharetta, Ga., 112 F.3d 1522, 1531 (11th Cir. 1997) (same); Bartlett v. New York State Bd. of L. Examiners, 970 F. Supp. 1094, 1144-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (Sotomayor, J.) (same) (procedural history omitted). Alternatively, even if Plaintiffs could pursue a parallel § 1983 claim for ADA and § 504 violations, the Court notes that the only Defendant in this action is the District, a local government entity. But Plaintiffs have not set forth any facts suggesting that the District's alleged ADA and § 504 violations were the result of a District policy or custom, as required to succeed on a § 1983 municipal liability claim. See, e.g., Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). For both of these reasons, the Court grants the District's motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' § 1983 claim.
IV. MICHIGAN PWDCRA CLAIM
Finally, the District asks the Court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' Michigan PWDCRA claim. The only jurisdictional basis for this claim is the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, and the Court routinely exercises its broad discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims like this one. Not only do these types of state law claims needlessly distract time and attention from the federal disability civil rights at stake, but they also
put the federal Court in the position of evaluating state law claims against local government entities. Those matters are best addressed by state, not federal, courts. The Court therefore declines supplemental jurisdiction over the Smiths' PWDCRA claim and dismisses it without prejudice.
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS ORDERED THAT Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 11) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as follows:
The District's motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' § 504 and ADA claims (Counts I and II) for mental anguish and emotional distress, loss of consortium, exemplary damages, and punitive damages is GRANTED. The District's motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' ADA and § 504 claims is DENIED in all other respects.
The District's motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' § 1983 Claim (Count III) is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Plaintiffs' Michigan PWDCRA claim (Count IV) is DISMISSED because the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over this pendent state law claim.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File a Sur-Reply, (ECF No. 31), is GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.