Smith v. Jones

7 Citing cases

  1. Garziano v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co.

    818 F.2d 380 (5th Cir. 1987)   Cited 47 times
    Finding that the statement of one of the defendant's supervisors that there was "talk" about plaintiff's termination in a neighboring town was insufficient to show that information was communicated outside the protected circle of privilege

    "The test of publication is: Were the words spoken in such a tone or manner and under such circumstances that the defendant had a reasonable expectation that no one would hear the words" except those with a legitimate interest in the matter. Smith v. Jones, 335 So.2d 896, 897 (Miss. 1976). The testimony in the record is equivocal and speculative on this point.

  2. Harris v. Pontotoc Cty. Sch. Dist

    635 F.3d 685 (5th Cir. 2011)   Cited 116 times
    Holding that although the student's disciplinary transfer to an alternative school did not trigger due process protections, his short-term suspension prior to transfer did

    Defamatory statements must be made to a third party and not to the claimant. See Smith v. Jones, 335 So.2d 896, 897 (Miss. 1976). Summary judgment on the defamation claim was proper.

  3. Lamb v. Lowndes County School District

    CAUSE NO.: 1:07CV125-SA-JAD (N.D. Miss. Jul. 2, 2008)

    Accordingly, Defendant is protected by the qualified immunity extended to employers and, therefore, is immune from Plaintiff's libel action. Slander is a defamatory statement published by spoken words.Smith v. Jones, 335 So. 2d 896, 897 (Miss. 1976). Spoken words which are actionable irrespective of special harm are known as "slander per se."

  4. B&B Unlimited, Inc. v. Beecroft (In re Beecroft)

    Case No.: 12-14217-JDW (Bankr. N.D. Miss. Jun. 13, 2014)

    Looking to guidelines established for tort liability for slander and/or libel (for which "publication" is also an essential element), the communication or statement must be made to or in the presence of a third party who is able to receive and understand the communication. See Smith v. Jones, 335 So.2d 896, 897 (Miss. 1976). The Defendant "published" the statement to the Rays when he executed the Second Bill of Sale for the property and delivered it to them.

  5. Franklin Corp. v. Tedford

    2007 CA 1454 (Miss. 2009)   Cited 37 times
    Upholding punitive damage award against furniture manufacturer who used glue containing a known neuro-toxin, but reducing award from $7.5 million to $5 million

    See Smith v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 819 So.2d 1258, 1261 (Miss. 2002); Smith v. Jones, 335 So.2d 896, 897 (Miss. 1976). In short, "[t]he conflict in the evidence made the jury the judges of what the truth was with reference thereto, and we are unable to say that the jury reached the wrong result."

  6. Franklin Corp. v. Tedford

    2007 CA 1454 (Miss. 2009)

    SeeSmith v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 819 So. 2d 1258, 1261 (Miss. 2002); Smith v. Jones, 335 So. 2d 896, 897 (Miss. 1976). In short, "[t]he conflict in the evidence made the jury the judges of what the truth was with reference thereto, and we are unable to say that the jury reached the wrong result."

  7. Smith v. Mack Trucks

    98 CA 759 (Miss. 2002)   Cited 15 times
    Determining that "like most federal and state jurisdictions, however, the Court ha clearly moved away from a consumer expectation analysis toward[] risk utility."

    The trial court has broad discretion in instructing the jury, and this Court will not reverse, even if the instruction is erroneous, when the evidence is overwhelmingly in favor of the prevailing party and there has been no miscarriage of justice. Smithv. Jones, 335 So.2d 896, 897 (Miss. 1976). Where two or more instructions are in hopeless and substantive conflict, the Court may reverse.