"The test of publication is: Were the words spoken in such a tone or manner and under such circumstances that the defendant had a reasonable expectation that no one would hear the words" except those with a legitimate interest in the matter. Smith v. Jones, 335 So.2d 896, 897 (Miss. 1976). The testimony in the record is equivocal and speculative on this point.
Defamatory statements must be made to a third party and not to the claimant. See Smith v. Jones, 335 So.2d 896, 897 (Miss. 1976). Summary judgment on the defamation claim was proper.
Accordingly, Defendant is protected by the qualified immunity extended to employers and, therefore, is immune from Plaintiff's libel action. Slander is a defamatory statement published by spoken words.Smith v. Jones, 335 So. 2d 896, 897 (Miss. 1976). Spoken words which are actionable irrespective of special harm are known as "slander per se."
Looking to guidelines established for tort liability for slander and/or libel (for which "publication" is also an essential element), the communication or statement must be made to or in the presence of a third party who is able to receive and understand the communication. See Smith v. Jones, 335 So.2d 896, 897 (Miss. 1976). The Defendant "published" the statement to the Rays when he executed the Second Bill of Sale for the property and delivered it to them.
See Smith v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 819 So.2d 1258, 1261 (Miss. 2002); Smith v. Jones, 335 So.2d 896, 897 (Miss. 1976). In short, "[t]he conflict in the evidence made the jury the judges of what the truth was with reference thereto, and we are unable to say that the jury reached the wrong result."
SeeSmith v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 819 So. 2d 1258, 1261 (Miss. 2002); Smith v. Jones, 335 So. 2d 896, 897 (Miss. 1976). In short, "[t]he conflict in the evidence made the jury the judges of what the truth was with reference thereto, and we are unable to say that the jury reached the wrong result."
The trial court has broad discretion in instructing the jury, and this Court will not reverse, even if the instruction is erroneous, when the evidence is overwhelmingly in favor of the prevailing party and there has been no miscarriage of justice. Smithv. Jones, 335 So.2d 896, 897 (Miss. 1976). Where two or more instructions are in hopeless and substantive conflict, the Court may reverse.