Opinion
5:21-CV-0005 (MAD/ML)
07-02-2021
RIKISHA S. SMITH, Plaintiff, v. JOSEPH JACKSON, Defendant.
RIKISHA S. SMITH Plaintiff, Pro Se
APPEARANCES:
RIKISHA S. SMITH Plaintiff, Pro Se
OF COUNSEL:
ORDER
Mae A. D'Agostino, U.S. District Judge
On January 5, 2021, Plaintiff commenced this action against numerous Defendants including Joseph Jackson, Shawn Corey Carter, Beyonce Giselle Knowles, Andrew Jackson, Katherine Jackson, Erika Badoo, Willow Smith, Patriots, Saints, James Madison, James Monroe, and James K. Polk. SeeDkt. No. 1. Plaintiffs complaint alleges causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2OOOe etseq., the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634(b), American with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). See generally Id. The instant complaint is the latest in a string of unintelligible and incoherent pleadings filed by Plaintiff in this District. As with each of the other complaints, two of which have been reviewed by the undersigned, Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege any entitlement to relief. Accordingly, this action is dismissed with prejudice, and this action is accordingly dismissed with prejudice. Additionally, in light of Plaintiff s history of frivolous filings, the Court will refer to Chief Judge Glenn T. Suddaby the recommendation from Magistrate Judge Lovric that Plaintiff be permanently enjoined from filing any other case in this District without leave of the Chief Judge, unless represented by counsel.
In an Order and Report-Recommendation dated January 11, 2021, Magistrate Judge Lovric denied Plaintiffs in forma pauperis ("IFP") application as moot, as Plaintiff had already paid the statutory filing fee. See Dkt. No. 5 at 5. Additionally, Magistrate Judge Lovric performed an initial review of the complaint and recommended that the Court dismissed Plaintiffs complaint without leave to replead. See Id. at 6. Magistrate Judge Lovric found that Plaintiffs complaint was "comprised of twenty-one pages of incoherent text written on every form-complaint from the Clerk's office." Id. at 6. Further, Magistrate Judge Lovric found that, "[a]s the Complaint is currently drafted, the Court is unable to meaningfully analyze, whether, and to what extent, Plaintiff has pleaded any colorable claim against Defendant." Id. at 7. While noting the policy in this Circuit of affording pro se litigants the opportunity to amend their pleadings prior to outright dismissal, Magistrate Judge Lovric nevertheless recommended that this action be dismissed without leave to amend. Id. at 7-9. In addition, Magistrate Judge Lovric undertook a thorough and comprehensive review of each of the prior cases filed by Plaintiff in this District. See Id. at 2-5. Two of the three suits have been dismissed as frivolous, and the last one is currently before the undersigned. See Id. As such, Magistrate Judge Lovric found that Plaintiff "fits the mold of a pestilent litigator who can only be estopped from pursuing frivolous litigation by sanctions more austere than dismissing her actions." Id. at 11. Magistrate Judge Lovric recommended "in addition to dismissal of the within case ... [with] the Court's inherent authority to control and manage its own docket so as to prevent abuse in its proceedings, Plaintiff [should] be prohibited from making any future filings in this District without prior leave of the Chief Judge." Id. at 12. Plaintiff has not objected to the Order and Report-Recommendation.
When a party files specific objections to a magistrate judge's report-recommendation, the district court makes a ``de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). However, when a party files "[g]eneral or conclusory objections or objections which merely recite the same arguments [that he presented] to the magistrate judge," the court reviews those recommendations for clear error. O'Diah v. Mawhir, No. 9:08-CV-322, 2011 WL 933846, *l (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2011) (citations and footnote omitted). After the appropriate review, "the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge." 28U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
"[I]n apro se case, the court must view the submissions by a more lenient standard than that accorded to 'formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'" Govern v. Campbell, 289 F.Supp.2d 289, 295 (N.D.N.Y. 2007) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972)) (other citations omitted). The Second Circuit has held that the court is obligated to '"make reasonable allowances to protect pro se litigants'" from inadvertently forfeiting legal rights merely because they lack a legal education. Govan, 289 F.Supp.2d at 295 (quoting Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983)).
Having reviewed the January 11, 2021 Order and Report-Recommendation, Plaintiffs complaint and the applicable law, the Court finds that Magistrate Judge Lovric correctly determined that the complaint should be dismissed. A review of Plaintiff s complaint makes clear that it suffers from several deficiencies. Ordinarily, a court should not dismiss a complaint filed by a pro se litigant without granting leave to amend at least once "when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated." Branum v. Clark, 927 F.2d 698, 705 (2d Cir. 1991). An opportunity to amend, however, is not required where "the problem with [plaintiffs] causes of action is substantive" such that "better pleading will not cure it." Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). As the Second Circuit has explained, "[w]here it appears that granting leave to amend is unlikely to be productive, ... it is not an abuse of discretion to deny leave to amend." Ruffolo v. Oppenheimer & Co., 987 F.2d 129, 131 (2d Cir. 1993).
Here, reading the complaint liberally, there is no "suggestion] that the plaintiff has a claim that [she] has inadequately or inartfully pleaded and ... should therefore be given a chance to reframe." Cuoco, 222 F.3d at 112. Moreover, the Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Lovric that Plaintiff is "a pestilent litigator who can only be estopped from pursuing frivolous litigation by sanctions more austere than dismissing her actions." Dkt. No. 5 at 11. As such, Magistrate Judge Lovric correctly recommended that the Court dismiss the complaint with prejudice and that Plaintiff should be referred to Chief Judge Suddaby for a determination whether Plaintiff should be permanently enjoined from filing any additional cases in this District without first obtaining leave from the Chief Judge.
Accordingly, the Court hereby
ORDERS that Magistrate Judge Lovric's Order and Report-Recommendation (Dkt. No. 5) is ADOPTED in its entirety for the reasons set forth therein; and the Court further
ORDERS that Plaintiffs complaint (Dkt. No. 1) is DISMISSED with prejudice; and the Court further
ORDERS that the Court refers to Chief Judge Suddaby the recommendation by Magistrate Judge Lovric that Plaintiff be permanently enjoined from filing any other case in this District without leave of the Chief Judge, unless she is represented by counsel; and the Court further
ORDERS that the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment in Defendants' favor; and the Court further
ORDERS that the Clerk of the Court shall serve a copy of this Order on the parties in accordance with Local Rules.
IT IS SO ORDERED.