Opinion
E065954
11-16-2017
LAURA SMITH, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. HELEN HUERTA, Defendant and Appellant.
Helen Huerta, in pro. per. for Defendant and Appellant. Laura Smith, in pro. per. for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super.Ct.No. CIVRS1600043) OPINION APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. James J. Hosking, Judge. Affirmed. Helen Huerta, in pro. per. for Defendant and Appellant. Laura Smith, in pro. per. for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff and respondent, Laura Smith, obtained a three-year civil harassment restraining order against defendant and appellant, Helen Huerta. (Code Civ. Proc., § 527.6.) The restraining order identifies the restrained person as "Helen Huerta AKA Linda Huerta." Smith testified at the hearing on the restraining order, but Huerta did not appear. Three days after the court entered the restraining order, Huerta filed a motion to vacate the order based on mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect. (§ 473, subd. (b).) Huerta argued that Smith did not properly serve her with the request for a restraining order and she was thus unable to defend herself. She also asserted that Smith asked the court to change the name of the restrained person at or after the hearing, such that the court added her name—Helen Huerta—at the last minute. At the hearing on Huerta's motion to vacate, both she and Smith testified. The court denied the motion, and Huerta now appeals from the order granting the restraining order and the order denying her motion to vacate.
All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise indicated.
Huerta argues the court erred because there was no evidence Smith served her with the request for the restraining order. She contends Smith sought to restrain "Linda Huerta" and served "Linda Huerta," a name Huerta claims she does not use. Huerta also challenges the proof of Smith's allegations that she harassed Smith. She asks us to reverse the denial of her motion and order the court to vacate the restraining order. We affirm.
II. DISCUSSION
Section 527.6 authorizes a person who has suffered harassment to request a temporary restraining order and injunction against that harassment. (§ 527.6, subd. (a).) The trial court must receive relevant testimony and may make an independent inquiry at the hearing on the restraining order, and if the court finds that unlawful harassment has occurred by clear and convincing evidence, it must issue the restraining order. (§ 527.6, subd. (i).) We apply substantial evidence review to the court's express and implied findings underlying the restraining order. (R.D. v. P.M. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 181, 188.) We independently review whether those facts, when construed in the protected party's favor, are legally sufficient to constitute civil harassment. (Ibid.)
Section 473, subdivision (b) provides that a court may relieve a party from an order obtained through the party's "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." We review the court's order denying relief for abuse of discretion. (Scognamillo v. Herrick (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1148.)
We presume the court's orders are correct, and the appellant bears the burden of showing otherwise. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) The appellant's burden includes providing this court with an adequate record to evaluate his or her contentions. (Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 121, 132.) Several corollaries follow from the presumption of correctness. Specifically, we presume the court followed the law (Wilson v. Sunshine Meat & Liquor Co. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 554, 563), imply all findings necessary to support the court's order (Fladeboe v. American Isuzu Motors Inc. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 42, 58), and where the appellant supplies no reporter's transcript of proceedings, presume the evidence supported the court's findings and orders (Estate of Fain (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 973, 992). Parties who represent themselves, as Huerta does here, are subject to the same rules as attorney-represented parties and are not entitled to exceptional treatment. (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984-985.)
These well-settled principles of appellate review dictate that we affirm the trial court's orders. The record on appeal is problematic in several ways. The clerk's transcript numbers 36 pages in total. It does not include Smith's request for a restraining order. We have no reporter's transcript or settled statement of the restraining order hearing or the motion to vacate hearing. The record does include the single exhibit that the court admitted at the restraining order hearing, a flash drive containing 39 photographs and a six and a half minute video. The photographs appear to depict damage inflicted on a home and furniture. The video, which seems to be recorded from the second story of the same home, depicts a man and a woman in the driveway, slashing with a handheld razor blade what appears to be some of the same furniture from the photographs. Huerta attacks the restraining order as lacking evidence supporting harassment, but we have no way of determining whether that was the case without the papers filed in support of the restraining order or a record of the evidence adduced at the hearing. We must therefore presume that substantial evidence, including the single exhibit in the record, supported the court's implied finding that harassment occurred.
The court's minute orders of these hearings indicate no reporter was present but the matters were "[e]lectronically [r]ecorded." Huerta could have requested that transcripts be prepared from these recordings (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.952(j)), but instead, in her notice designating the record on appeal, she elected to proceed without a record of the oral proceedings. She also had the option of moving to use a settled statement, or "a condensed narrative of the oral proceedings" that she believed were necessary for this appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.137(b)(1).) She did not so move.
Much the same may be said of the order denying Huerta's motion to vacate. Huerta suggests that Smith did not serve her because Smith's papers and proof of service named a Linda Huerta. She does not cite Smith's papers or Smith's proof of service—neither are in the record—and cites instead to the trial court docket showing that Smith filed these documents. This tells us nothing about the evidence on which the trial court relied in denying the motion, nor does anything else in the record disclose the evidence. Even if these documents named Linda Huerta, did Huerta nevertheless receive Smith's request for a restraining order? Were the papers personally served on a person at Huerta's actual address? Was there a dispute as to whether such a person was, indeed, Huerta, and did the trial court resolve that dispute in favor of Smith? Or was there some other reason the court denied the motion to vacate? We cannot say from the inadequate record provided, and that is the crux of the matter. Huerta has not carried her burden of demonstrating error. We must affirm both the order granting the restraining order and the order denying the motion to vacate.
We note that Huerta filed at least one document with this court identifying herself as "Linda Helen Huerta." --------
III. DISPOSITION
The orders are affirmed. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
FIELDS
J. We concur: MILLER
Acting P. J. CODRINGTON
J.