The hospital moved to exclude his testimony, contending that he was not qualified as an expert because he had not worked in small Georgian hospitals similar to Archbold Memorial. The trial court granted this motion, and after Wade finished her offer of proof, the Hospital moved for and was granted a directed verdict. Relying on Emory University v. Porter, 103 Ga. App. 752 (2) ( 120 S.E.2d 668) (1961), and Smith v. Hospital Authority, 161 Ga. App. 657 (1) ( 288 S.E.2d 715) (1982), the Court of Appeals found that the proper standard of care for physical therapists employed by hospitals was the standard exercised in similar hospitals in similar communities. Wade v. Archbold Memorial Hospital, supra at 487.

We find readily distinguishable such cases as Pegg v. State, 183 Ga. App. 668 ( 359 S.E.2d 678) (1987); Russell v. State, 181 Ga. App. 624 ( 353 S.E.2d 820) (1987); and Penn. c. Ins. Co. v. Gilliam, 88 Ga. App. 451 ( 76 S.E.2d 834) (1953), which speak only of a physician's qualifications as an expert witness and make no mention of a nurse's qualifications. Smith v. Hospital Auth., 161 Ga. App. 657 ( 288 S.E.2d 715) (1982) is also distinguishable. In that case the exclusion of testimony proffered by a nurse was upheld because it was determined that the excluded testimony dealt with "decisions and treatment that were exclusively within the professional skills of medical doctors," id. at 660, unlike the observation of the scarred vaginal tissue which, in the instant case, was well within the expertise of the specially trained nurse practitioner.

A hospital owes to its patients only the duty of exercising ordinary care to furnish equipment and facilities reasonably suited to the uses intended and such as are in general use under the same, or similar, circumstances.... [Emphasis supplied.] Accord Candler Gen. Hosp. v. McNorrill, 182 Ga. App. 107, 109 ( 354 S.E.2d 872) (1987); Reed v. Adventist Health Systems/Sunbelt, 181 Ga. App. 750, 752-753 ( 353 S.E.2d 523) (1987); Smith v. Hosp. Auth. of Terrell County, 161 Ga. App. 657 (1) ( 288 S.E.2d 715) (1982). See generally Anno., 14 ALR3d 1254 (1967).

We find no such abuse. Smith v. Hosp. Auth. of Terrell County, 161 Ga. App. 657, 659 (2) ( 288 SE2d 715) (1982). Appellants argue that the trial court misconstrued the statute.

In diagnosing and treating patients, medical doctors use not only their scientific knowledge, but also employ skills which are exclusively within the scope of their expertise. Smith v. Hosp. Auth., 161 Ga. App. 657, 660 ( 288 S.E.2d 715) (1982). However, in some cases a specific allegation of medical malpractice may involve only a standard of care lying wholly within an area of expertise mutually shared by physicians with a non-physician.

(Cits.)" Smith v. Hosp. Auth. of Terrell County, 161 Ga. App. 657, 659 (2) ( 288 S.E.2d 715) (1982). "Generally, nothing more is required to qualify an expert than that he has been educated in a particular trade or profession; and this special knowledge may be derived from experience as well as study and mental application.

See Emory Univ. v. Porter, 103 Ga. App. 752, 755 ( 120 S.E.2d 668). See also Smith v. Hosp. Auth. of Terrell County, 161 Ga. App. 657 ( 288 S.E.2d 715)." Hodges v. Effingham County Hosp. Auth., 182 Ga. App. 173 (1) ( 355 S.E.2d 104). "[T]he underlying rationale for the `locality rule' is that the care a small hospital can provide is limited by its location and resources.

See Emory Univ. v. Porter, 103 Ga. App. 752, 755 ( 120 S.E.2d 668). See also Smith v. Hosp. Auth. of Terrell County, 161 Ga. App. 657 ( 288 S.E.2d 715). By motion in limine, plaintiffs sought to preclude any reference which might inform the jury of the "locality rule" in relation to the appropriate standard of nursing care.

" (Emphasis in original.) Smith v. Hosp. Auth. of Terrell County, 161 Ga. App. 657, 658-659 ( 288 S.E.2d 715) (1982). The affidavit of appellant's nurse does not purport to address the question of whether the facilities and services that were provided in appellant's emergency room were comparable to those furnished by such other hospitals as function under the same or similar circumstances as does appellant.

Appellant next contends that the trial court gave the jury an inappropriate charge on the standard of care required of appellee. The questioned instruction was taken from Smith v. Hosp. Auth. of Terrell County, 161 Ga. App. 657 (1) ( 288 S.E.2d 715) (1982); and Emory Univ. v. Porter, 103 Ga. App. 752 (1) ( 120 S.E.2d 668) (1961), and informed the jury that the standard of care applicable to appellee hospital was that standard of care exercised in similar hospitals in similar communities. Citing Wade v. Archbold Memorial Hosp., 252 Ga. 118 ( 311 S.E.2d 836) (1984), appellant contends it was error to apply the "locality rule" to this case.