Smith v. Home Light

31 Citing cases

  1. Boles v. Sun Ergoline

    223 P.3d 724 (Colo. 2010)   Cited 26 times
    Noting that General Assembly's enactment of products liability statutes has “never...fundamentally altered the nature of, or rationale for, a strict products liability claim”

    Rather than resting on negligence principles, it "is premised on the concept of enterprise liability for casting a defective product into the stream of commerce." Smith v. Home Light Power Co., 734 P.2d 1051, 1054 (Colo. 1987) (quoting Jackson v. Harsco Corp. 673 P.2d 363, 365 (Colo. 1983)); see also Camacho v. Honda Motor Co., 741 P.2d 1240, 1246 (Colo.

  2. Cuevas v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo.

    537 P.3d 418 (Colo. App. 2023)   Cited 2 times

    ¶ 22 Because of the inherently dangerous nature of supplying electricity, electrical utilities are held to the "highest degree of care which skill and foresight can attain consistent with the practical conduct of [their businesses] under the known methods and the present state of the particular art." Smith v. Home Light & Power Co. , 734 P.2d 1051, 1058 (Colo. 1987) (quoting Denver Consol. Elec. Co. v. Simpson , 21 Colo. 371, 376–77, 41 P. 499, 501 (1895) ). Electrical utilities that utilize power lines assume this heightened degree of care to protect the public from the dangers of electricity.

  3. Bryant v. Tri-County Elec. Membership

    844 F. Supp. 347 (W.D. Ky. 1994)   Cited 25 times
    Holding that when the most favorable view of the evidence leads to the unavoidable conclusion that a plaintiff cannot identify the movant as a manufacturer, summary judgment is appropriate

    Although identifying the moment of sale is a more challenging task, a reasonable consensus prevails: electricity is typically held to be "sold" when it passes through the customer's meter. See, e.g., Ransome, 275 N.W.2d at 643, 649. It is at this moment that the customer's charges are computed, the seller relinquishes control over its product, and the electricity has been reduced to a voltage suitable for ordinary use. Id.: Aversa v. Public Serv. Elec. Gas Co., 186 N.J. Super. 130, 451 A.2d 976, 980 (Law Div. 1982); Smith v. Home Light Power Co., 734 P.2d 1051, 1055 (Col. 1987). Put another way, strict liability typically applies, if at all, only to injuries suffered inside the home or business, not to those experienced outside.

  4. Camacho v. Honda Motor Co.

    741 P.2d 1240 (Colo. 1987)   Cited 66 times
    Reversing court of appeals’ holding affirming district court's granting of defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's products liability action against motorcycle manufacturers after reinterpreting the standard for when a product is defective and unreasonably dangerous and remanding where the court noted that the answer to this issue could not be determined based on the "limited facts thus far presented to the trial court"

    In determining the extent of liability of a product manufacturer for a defective product, this court has adopted the doctrine of strict products liability as set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A (1965). Smith v. Home Light Power Co., 734 P.2d 1051 (Colo. 1987); Blueflame Gas, Inc. v. Van Hoose, 679 P.2d 579 (Colo. 1984); Anderson v. Heron Eng'g Co., 198 Colo. 391, 604 P.2d 674 (1979); Hiigel v. General Motors Corp., 190 Colo. 57, 544 P.2d 983 (1975).

  5. Bowen v. Niagara Mohawk Corp.

    183 A.D.2d 293 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992)   Cited 12 times

    The Court granted the utility's motion to dismiss, finding "no case in this or any other jurisdiction which has permitted a plaintiff to recover for injuries sustained from contact with an electrical line on the theory of strict products liability" (Farina v Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., supra, at 700). The Court noted that refusal to apply the doctrine was based, among other factors, on the fact that electricity "is not a product within the contemplation of the doctrine's authors" (Farina v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., supra). Courts in other jurisdictions similarly have rejected the argument that electricity is a product while it is still in a transmission line (see, e.g., Smith v. Home Light Power Co., 734 P.2d 1051 [Colo]; Genaust v Illinois Power Co., 62 Ill.2d 456, 343 N.E.2d 465). Here, however, the electricity had passed through the customer's electric meter. Under such circumstance, courts in some jurisdictions have held that electricity is a product because it has been placed in the stream of commerce and is no longer under the control of the supplier (see, e.g., Smith vHome Light Power Co., 734 P.2d 1051, 1055, supra).

  6. Fong v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.

    199 Cal.App.3d 30 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988)   Cited 5 times
    In Fong, plaintiff alleged that defendant's wires were improperly insulated where they entered the weatherhead and allowed arcing which melted the insulation and wires, causing molten aluminum to drop on their garage roof and start a fire.

    (2) It is now firmly settled that electricity can be a product within the meaning of Greenman and section 420A of the Restatement Second of Torts and therefore subject to principles of strict liability in appropriate cases. ( Pierce v. Pacific Gas Electric Co. (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 68, 83-84 [ 212 Cal.Rptr. 283, 60 A.L.R.4th 709]; see also Smith v. Home Light and Power Co. (Colo. 1987) 734 P.2d 1051, 1054; Ransome v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co. (1979) 87 Wisc.2d 605 [ 275 N.W.2d 641, 648]; Houston Lighting Power Co. v. Reynolds (Tex. App. 1986) 712 S.W.2d 761, 766; Elgin Airport Inn v. Commonwealth (1980) 88 Ill. App.3d 477 [ 410 N.E.2d 620, 623-624]; Petroski v. Northern Indiana Pub. Service Co. (1976) 171 Ind. App. 14 [ 354 N.E.2d 736, 747]; Schriner v. Pa. Power Light Co. (1985) 348 Pa. Super. 177 [ 501 A.2d 1128, 1133].) The seminal case in California regarding strict liability in tort for defective electricity is Pierce v. Pacific Gas Electric Co., supra, 166 Cal.App.3d 68.

  7. Hidalgo v. Fagen, Inc.

    206 F.3d 1013 (10th Cir. 2000)   Cited 27 times
    In Hidalgo v. Fagen, Inc., 206 F.3d 1013 (10th Cir.2000), the defendant exercised a peremptory challenge against a woman who appeared to be Hispanic.

    Colorado courts have been reticent about extending the doctrine of strict liability to the provision of services. See Schmaltz, 534 P.2d at 784; see also Smith v. Home Light Power Co., 734 P.2d 1051, 1056 (Colo. 1987) (affirming the view of the court of appeals that provision of a service cannot provide a foundation for imposition of strict products liability); Yarbro v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 655 P.2d 822, 828 (Colo. 1982) ("[T]he tort rationale for product liability does not easily extend to cover the providing of services.").

  8. Daigle v. Shell Oil Co.

    972 F.2d 1527 (10th Cir. 1992)   Cited 189 times
    Holding plaintiffs must cite specific regulations the government is alleged to have violated

    See, e.g., Perreira v. Colorado, 768 P.2d 1198 (Colo. 1989); Smith v. Home Light Power Co., 734 P.2d 1051 (Colo. 1987). Shell merely points to Forrest as a dispositive general rule.

  9. Voelker v. Delmarva Power and Light Co.

    727 F. Supp. 991 (D. Md. 1989)   Cited 8 times
    Holding "transmission of electricity is a daily occurrence in every community" and a matter of common usage

    However, the Court notes that a properly pleaded action based upon products liability would likely be dismissed as the product, electricity, was still in control of Delmarva, and as such had not entered the stream of commerce. See, Smith v. Home Light Power Co., 734 P.2d 1051, 1085 (Colo. 1987); Wood v. Public Service Co., 114 N.H. 182, 317 A.2d 576 (1974); Kemp v. Wisconsin Power Co., 44 Wis.2d 571, 172 N.W.2d 161, 166 (1969); Schriner v. Pennsylvania Power Light Co., 348 Pa. Super. 177, 501 A.2d 1128 (1985); Aversa v. Public Service Electric Gas Co., 186 N.J. Super. 130, 451 A.2d 976, 979 (1982); Williams v. Detroit Power Co., 63 Mich. App. 559, 234 N.W.2d 702 (1975); Genaust v. Illinois Power Co., 23 Ill. App.3d 1023, 320 N.E.2d 412 (1974) aff'd, 62 Ill.2d 456, 343 N.E.2d 465 (1976). The only case cited by plaintiff to support a claim based upon products liability was subsequently reversed.

  10. In re Escalera Res. Co.

    563 B.R. 336 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2017)   Cited 8 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Explaining that courts give undefined terms their ordinary meaning

    (electricity delivered in marketable state to customer is a "product").Smith v. Home Light & Power Co. , 695 P.2d 788, 789 (Colo. App. 1985) ("We agree that electricity itself is a product, but conclude that its distribution is a service."), aff'd, 734 P.2d 1051 (Colo. 1987) ("at least until the electricity reaches a point where it is made available for consumer use, it is not a 'product' that has been 'sold' ").Travelers Indem. Co. of Am. v. Conn. Light & Power Co. , 2008 WL 2447351, at *5 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 4, 2008) ("It is the opinion of this court that the electricity is a product for the purposes of [Connecticut law] once it passes through the meter of a consumer").