See id. at 344 (reversing grant of habeas corpus; stating that even assuming the lower court “correctly determined that the verdicts are facially inconsistent, . . . there is no federal requirement that a state trial judge explain his reasons for acquitting a defendant in a state criminal trial” because “even if the acquittal rests on an improper ground, that error would not create a constitutional defect in a guilty verdict that is supported by sufficient evidence and is the product of a fair trial”); Smith v. Herbert, 275 F.Supp.2d 361, 371 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (“A purported inconsistency in a state court verdict is generally not a basis on which to grant habeas corpus relief.”)
At the threshold, Williams's claim does not set forth a federal question and is, therefore, not cognizable on federal habeas review. See Harris v. Rivera, 454 U.S. 339, 345, 102 S.Ct. 460, 70 L.Ed.2d 530 (1981) (per curiam) (holding that a defendant could not obtain relief by writ of habeas corpus on the basis of inconsistent verdicts rendered after a state bench trial because "[i]nconsistency in a verdict is not a sufficient reason for setting it aside"); see also Smith v. Herbert, 275 F. Supp. 2d 361, 371 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) ("A purported inconsistency in a state court verdict is generally not a basis on which to grant habeas corpus relief."). In any event, Williams would not be entitled to habeas relief on this claim because the verdict is not inconsistent.
(citing United States v. Monteleone, 257 F.3d 210, 219 (2d Cir. 2001)); Black v. Rock, 103 F.Supp.3d 305, 317 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (“The petitioner has the burden of demonstrating, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the witness committed perjury.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). If a petitioner can meet that threshold requirement, “a conviction must be set aside if ‘the prosecution knew, or should have known, of the perjury,' and ‘there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury.'” Smith v. Herbert, 275 F.Supp.2d 361, 367 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)).
If the evidence is false or the witness committed perjury, “a conviction must be set aside if ‘the prosecution knew, or should have known, of the perjury,' and ‘there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury.'” Smith v. Herbert, 275 F.Supp.2d 361, 367 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)). All of the instances cited by Griffin fail on the threshold question of veracity.
"In order to obtain a writ of habeas corpus in federal court on the ground of error in a state court's instructions to the jury on matters of state law," a petitioner "must show not only that the instruction misstated state law but also that the error violated a right guaranteed to him by federal law." Smith v. Herbert, 275 F. Supp. 2d 361, 369 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (quoting Casillas v. Scully, 769 F.2d 60, 63 (2d Cir. 1985)). That is, "[t]he question is not whether the trial court gave a faulty instruction, but rather whether the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process."
"In order to obtain a writ of habeas corpus in federal court on the ground of error in a state court's instructions to the jury on matters of state law," Petitioner "must show not only that the instruction misstated state law but also that the error violated a right guaranteed to him by federal law." Smith v. Herbert, 275 F. Supp. 2d 361, 369 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (quoting Casillas v. Scully, 769 F.2d 60, 63 (2d Cir. 1985)). "To be entitled to federal habeas relief, a petitioner must show not merely that a particular jury instruction is 'undesirable, erroneous, or even universally condemned,' but also that it violated some right that was guaranteed to him by the federal constitution."
"'In order to obtain a writ of habeas corpus in federal court on the ground of error in a state court's instructions to the jury on matters of state law, the petitioner must show not only that the instruction misstated state law but also that the error violated a right guaranteed to him by federal law.'" Smith v. Herbert, 275 F. Supp. 2d 361, 369 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (quoting Casillas v. Scully, 769 F.2d 60, 63 (2d Cir. 1985)). Specifically, "a petitioner must show not merely that a particular jury instruction is 'undesirable, erroneous, or even universally condemned,' but also that it violated some right that was guaranteed to him by the federal constitution."
Warden Bracy characterizes the Ground Two claim as a noncognizable challenge to allegedly inconsistent verdicts on Count Two and Count Five, citing case law holding that inconsistent verdicts do not create a cognizable issue on habeas review. See U.S. v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 66 (1984); Smith v. Herbert, 275 F. Supp. 2d 361, 371 (E.D.N.Y. 2003); Cunningham v. Palmer, No. 2:09-12553, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21761, at *15 (E.D. Mich. March 10, 2010). Taylor argues that he is not challenging the inconsistency of verdicts.
"'In order to obtain a writ of habeas corpus in federal court on the ground of error in a state court's instructions to the jury on matters of state law, the petitioner must show not only that the instruction misstated state law but also that the error violated a right guaranteed to him by federal law.'" Smith v. Herbert, 275 F. Supp. 2d 361, 369 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (quoting Casillas v. Scully, 769 F.2d 60, 63 (2d Cir. 1985)). "To be entitled to federal habeas relief, a petitioner must show not merely that a particular jury instruction is 'undesirable, erroneous, or even universally condemned,' but also that it violated some right that was guaranteed to him by the federal constitution."
"'In order to obtain a writ of habeas corpus in federal court on the ground of error in a state court's instructions to the jury on matters of state law, the petitioner must show not only that the instruction misstated state law but also that the error violated a right guaranteed to him by federal law.'" Smith v. Herbert, 275 F. Supp. 2d 361, 369 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (quoting Casillas v. Scully, 769 F.2d 60, 63 (2d Cir. 1985)).