Smith v. Henry

Full title: HAWARD SMITH, a/k/a, HAYWARD SMITH v. TERRY HENRY, ET AL.

Court: UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA SHREVEPORT DIVISION

Date published: Jun 24, 2021

CIVIL ACTION NO. 20-1306-P (W.D. La. Jun. 24, 2021)

Opinion

CIVIL ACTION NO. 20-1306-P

06-24-2021

HAWARD SMITH, a/k/a, HAYWARD SMITH v. TERRY HENRY, ET AL.

MAGISTRATE JUDGE HORNSBY

JUDGE DOUGHTY

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

In accordance with the standing order of this court, this matter was referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for review, report and recommendation.

STATEMENT OF CLAIM

Before the court is a civil rights complaint filed in forma pauperis by pro se plaintiff Haward Smith, a/k/a Hayward Smith ("Plaintiff"), pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This complaint was received and filed in this court on October 6, 2020. Plaintiff is incarcerated in the Caddo Correctional Center in Shreveport, Louisiana, and claims his civil rights were violated by prison officials. He names Terry Henry, Deputy Young, and the Caddo Parish Correctional Center as defendants.

Plaintiff claims that on July 25, 2020, he fell in his cell and hit his arm, back, and head on the door. He claims he fell because of his torn shower shoes. He claims he has repeatedly asked for shower shoes but did not receive a new pair.

Plaintiff claims that on July 27, 2020, he was seen by a doctor and given Ibuprofen tablets for seven days. He claims the medication did not stop his pain. Plaintiff complains that he was not seen at LSU Medical Center, checked, or x-rayed. Plaintiff admits that he was not denied medical care and was given Ibuprofen for his pain [Doc. 8, pp.1 and 4]. Plaintiff claims he should have been given more than Ibuprofen.

Accordingly, Plaintiff seeks monetary compensation.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

Conditions of Confinement

Plaintiff filed this claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act which provides redress for persons "deprived of any rights, privileges or immunities" by a person acting under color of state law. The particular right protected under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in matters which concern alleged unconstitutional conditions of confinement is the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Under the Eighth Amendment, prison officials are required to provide humane conditions of confinement, ensuring that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter and medical care, and must take reasonable measures to guarantee safety of inmates. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (1994).

An Eighth Amendment claim has two required components. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 2324 (1991). First, the deprivation alleged must be sufficiently serious. See id., 111 S. Ct. at 2324. "[O]nly those deprivations denying 'the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities' are sufficiently grave" to constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Id., 111 S. Ct. at 2324 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 2399 (1981)). Second, the prison official must have acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. See id. at 305, 111 S. Ct. at 2328; Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838, 114 S. Ct. at 1979. In prison condition of confinement cases, that state of mind is deliberate indifference, which the Supreme Court defined as knowing of and disregarding an excessive risk to inmate health or safety. See id., 114 S. Ct. at 1979. However, mere neglect and/or negligence do not constitute deliberate indifference. See Fielder v. Bosshard, 590 F.2d 105, 107 (5^th Cir. 1997).

After a thorough review of Plaintiff's complaint, read in a light most favorable to him, the court finds that the facts alleged do not support a finding that the defendants' conduct was sufficiently harmful enough to deprive him of life's basic necessities. See Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298, 111 S. Ct. at 2324. Furthermore, the court finds that the facts alleged do not support a finding that Defendants knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to his health or safety. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838, 114 S. Ct. at 1979.

Plaintiff's claim amounts to negligence at most. See Noble v. Grimes, 350 F. Appx 892, 893 (5^th Cir. 2009)(unpublished per curiam)( inmate's complaint for injuries sustained as result of slip and fall in standing water in shower area amounted to negligence at most and was insufficient to raise claim of deliberate indifference even though Defendants were aware of water and failed to take measures); Marsh V. Jones, 53 F.3d 707, 711-712(5^th Cir. 1995)(inmate's complaint for injuries sustained as result of slip and fall in standing water from leaky air conditioner amounted to negligence at most and was insufficient to raise claim of deliberate indifference). As in the cases above, Plaintiff's claim does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation and is one of negligence which is not actionable under Section 1983. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 US 327 (1986).

Accordingly, Plaintiff claim should be dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.

Medical Care

Plaintiff claims that on July 27, 2020, he was seen by a doctor and given Ibuprofen tablets. He claims the medication did not stop his pain. Plaintiff complains that he was not seen at LSU Medical Center, checked, x-rayed, or given more than Ibuprofen.

Plaintiff filed this claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act which provides redress for persons "deprived of any rights, privileges or immunities" by a person acting under color of state law. The right protected under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in matters which concern alleged denial of, or inadequate medical care is the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.

The lack of proper inmate medical care rises to the level of a constitutional deprivation under the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution only if the evidence shows that the prison officials showed "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S. Ct. 285, 292 (1976); See also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1978 (1994). It is only deliberate indifference, "an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" or an act "repugnant to the conscience of mankind," that constitutes conduct proscribed by the Eighth Amendment. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06, 97 S. Ct. at 292; See also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S. Ct. 2909 (1976). Further, the plaintiff must establish that the defendants possessed a culpable state of mind. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297-302, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2323-27 (1991); Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838-47, 114 S. Ct. at 1979-84. A delay in medical care will violate the Eight Amendment only if the delay is based on deliberate indifference and results in substantial harm. Mendoza v. Lynaugh, 989 F.2d 191, 195 (5^th Cir. 1993). In addition, disagreement with the diagnostic measures or methods of treatment afforded by prison officials does not state a claim for Eighth Amendment indifference to medical needs. See Norton v. Dimazana, 122 F.3d 286, 292 (5th Cir. 1997).

After a thorough review of Plaintiff's complaint, read in a light most favorable to him, the court finds that the facts alleged do not support a finding of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. To the contrary, the record demonstrates that Defendants were attentive to the medical needs of Plaintiff. It has been consistently held that an inmate who has been examined by medical personnel fails to set forth a valid showing of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. Norton v. Dimazana, 122 F.2d 286, 292 (5th Cir. 1997); Callaway v. Smith County, 991 F. Supp. 801, 809 (E.D. Tex. 1998); Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1985); Mayweather v. Foti, 958 F.2d 91 (5th Cir. 1992). Plaintiff admits that he was seen by a doctor and given Ibuprofen tablets [Doc. 1, p.3]. Plaintiff's complaint is devoid of factual allegations that would tend to show Defendants acted with a culpable state of mind or that their actions were "unnecessary and wanton." Plaintiff does not allege how the alleged two day delay in receiving medical treatment was based on deliberate indifference or caused substantial harm.

Plaintiff disagrees with the treatment Defendants provided him. He claims he should have been seen at LSU Medical Center, x-rayed, and given medicine other than Ibuprofen. As previously discussed, disagreement with the diagnostic measures or methods of treatment afforded by prison officials does not state a claim for Eighth Amendment indifference to medical needs.

Plaintiff's allegations, if accepted as true, may amount to a state law claim for negligence, a tort. However, mere negligence, neglect or medical malpractice does not amount to a denial of a constitutional right as these actions on the part of Defendants do not rise to the level of a constitutional tort. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 329-30, 106 S. Ct. 662, 664 (1986); Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106, 97 S. Ct. at 292; Lewis v. Woods, 848 F.2d 649, 651 (5th Cir. 1988). The fact that Plaintiff does not believe that his medical treatment was as good as it should have been is not a cognizable complaint under the Civil Rights Act. See Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179, 181 (5th Cir. 1985). Prisoners are not constitutionally entitled to the best medical care that money can buy. See Mayweather v. Foti, 958 F.2d. 91 (5th Cir. 1992).

Accordingly, these medical care claims should be dismissed with prejudice as frivolous.

CONCLUSION

Because Plaintiff filed this proceeding in forma pauperis ("IFP"), if this court finds Plaintiff's complaint to be frivolous, it may dismiss the complaint as such at any time, before or after service of process, and before or after answers have been filed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e); Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116, 1119 (5th Cir. 1986); Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179, 181 (5th Cir. 1985). District courts are vested with extremely broad discretion in making a determination of whether an IFP proceeding is frivolous and may dismiss a claim as frivolous if the IFP complaint lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. See Hicks v. Garner, 69 F.3d 22 (5th Cir. 1995); Booker v. Koonce, 2 F.3d 114 (5th Cir. 1993); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 109 S.Ct. 1827 (1989).

For the reasons heretofore stated, it is recommended that Plaintiff's complaint be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).

OBJECTIONS

Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), parties aggrieved by this recommendation have fourteen (14) days from service of this Report and Recommendation to file specific, written objections with the Clerk of Court, unless an extension of time is granted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b). A party may respond to another party's objection within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Counsel are directed to furnish a courtesy copy of any objections or responses to the District Judge at the time of filing.

A party's failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions and recommendations set forth above, within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking, on appeal, the proposed factual findings and legal conclusions that were accepted by the district court and that were not objected to by the aforementioned party. See Douglas v. U.S.A.A., 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).

THUS DONE AND SIGNED, in chambers, in Shreveport, Louisiana, on this 24th day of June 2021.

/s/ _________

Mark L. Hornsby

U.S. Magistrate Judge