Opinion
No. 04 C 8297.
June 6, 2005
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the court on Defendants' motion to dismiss. For the reasons stated below, we grant Defendants' motion to dismiss.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs Michael Smith ("Smith"), Katis Cain ("Cain"), and Courtney Brown ("Brown") allege that they were all employees of the University of Illinois Medical Center at Chicago ("Medical Center"). Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Sherry B. Hearn ("Hearn") was and is now the Interim Chief Human resource Operations Officer of the Medical Center. Plaintiffs also allege that Defendant John J. Denardo ("Denardo") was the Executive Director of the Medical Center. Plaintiffs claim that in August of 2004, each of them was called into a meeting with the Chief Information Officer at the Medical Center and each of the Plaintiffs was allegedly accused of including inaccurate information regarding their academic qualifications on their employment applications. Plaintiffs claim that at the meeting, they were given several alternatives in regards to their future employment at the Medical Center and Plaintiffs chose the option that allowed them to take a "Terminal" contract that would be terminated in September 16, 2005. (Compl. Par. 8). Plaintiffs claim that the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois issued them their "Terminal" contracts and that the understanding between all the parties involved was that the issue of the alleged inaccurate employment applications was resolved. (Compl. Par. 8-10).
Plaintiffs allege that on October 11, 2004, Hearn sent each of them a letter indicating that they were on administrative leave until they appeared for a disciplinary meeting on October 18, 2005. Plaintiffs also claim that Hearn sent each of them a notice of intent to terminate for cause based upon their failure to accurately state their educational credentials on their employment applications. Plaintiffs allege that they appeared at the disciplinary meeting and denied the allegations made against them. Plaintiffs claim that at the meeting, Hearn and Denardo "acted as both accuser, prosecutor and decision maker. . . ." (Compl. Par. 15). According to Plaintiffs, on October 19, 2004, each of them was sent a letter informing them that their employment had been terminated. Plaintiffs brought the instant action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983").
LEGAL STANDARD
In ruling on a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court must draw all reasonable inferences that favor the plaintiff, construe the allegations of the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and accept as true all well-pleaded facts and allegations in the complaint. Thompson v. Illinois Dep't of Prof'l Regulation, 300 F.3d 750, 753 (7th Cir. 2002); Perkins v. Silverstein, 939 F.2d 463, 466 (7th Cir. 1991). The allegations of a complaint should not be dismissed for a failure to state a claim "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); See also Baker v. Kingsley, 387 F.3d 649, 664 (7th Cir. 2004) (stating that although the "plaintiffs' allegations provide[d] little detail . . . [the court could not] say at [that] early stage in the litigation that plaintiffs [could] prove no set of facts in support of their claim that would entitle them to relief."). Nonetheless, in order to withstand a motion to dismiss, a complaint must allege the "operative facts" upon which each claim is based. Kyle v. Morton High School, 144 F.3d 448, 445-55 (7th Cir. 1998); Lucien v. Preiner, 967 F.2d 1166, 1168 (7th Cir. 1992). Under current notice pleading standard in federal courts a plaintiff need not "plead facts that, if true, establish each element of a "cause of action. . . .'" See Sanjuan v. American Bd. of Psychiatry and Neurology, Inc., 40 F.3d 247, 251 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating that a "[a]t this stage the plaintiff receives the benefit of imagination, so long as the hypotheses are consistent with the complaint" and that "[m]atching facts against legal elements comes later."); Walker v. Thompson, 288 F.3d 1005, 1007 (7th Cir. 2002) (stating that "there is no requirement in federal suits of pleading the facts or the elements of a claim"). The plaintiff need not allege all of the facts involved in the claim and can plead conclusions. Higgs v. Carter, 286 F.3d 437, 439 (7th Cir. 2002); Kyle, 144 F.3d at 455. However, any conclusions pled must "provide the defendant with at least minimal notice of the claim," Id., and the plaintiff cannot satisfy federal pleading requirements merely "by attaching bare legal conclusions to narrated facts which fail to outline the bases of [his] claim." Perkins, 939 F.2d at 466-67. The Seventh Circuit has explained that "[o]ne pleads a `claim for relief' by briefly describing the events." Sanjuan, 40 F.3d at 251.
DISCUSSION
Defendants argue that the suit against them is a suit against the Board of Trustees, which is a state agency and the suit is thus barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The Eleventh Amendment bars federal subject matter jurisdiction "over lawsuits against state officials acting in their official capacities when the state is the real party at interest" except where: "(1)Congress has abrogated the state's immunity from suit through an unequivocal expression of its intent to do so through a valid exercise of its power; (2) a state has properly waived its immunity and consented to suit in federal court; and (3) the plaintiff seek[s] prospective equitable relief for ongoing violations of federal law . . . under the Ex Parte Young doctrine." Sonnleitner v. York, 304 F.3d 704, 717 (7th Cir. 2002) (quoting Marie O. v. Edgar, 131 F.3d 610, 614-15 (7th Cir. 1997)).
Plaintiffs do not contest Defendants' contention that the Board of Trustees is a state agency or that Illinois law provides that the Illinois Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over such claims brought against the Board of Trustees. 705 ILCS 505/8. Plaintiffs argue in response to the motion to dismiss that they now intend to bring claims against the Defendants in their individual capacities. Although a plaintiff can choose whether to sue a defendant in his or her official or individual capacity, "[i]f the theory is that the defendant occupied a given office, and the occupant of that office had a duty (one attaching to any occupant of the office) to do such-and-such, then [the court has before it] . . . an `official capacity suit. . . .'" Walker v. Rowe, 791 F.2d 507, 508 (7th Cir. 1986). An individual capacity suit is a suit in which the plaintiff alleges that "the defendant did something that is tortious independent of the office the defendant holds. . . ." Id. Plaintiffs claim that they now intend to sue Defendants in their individual capacities, but Plaintiffs admit in their answer to the motion to dismiss that they "neglected to indicate in the Complaint that Plaintiffs are suing Defendants in their individual capacity." (Ans. 1 n. 1). See Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1107 (7th Cir. 1984) (stating that "it is axiomatic that the complaint may not be amended by the briefs in opposition to a motion to dismiss."). Plaintiffs' complaint explicitly states the following: "At all times relevant herein, Defendants HEARN and DENARDO were acting within the course and scope of their employment and under color of the laws of the State of Illinois and rules and regulations of the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois." (Compl. Par. 6). Thus, the complaint specifically indicates that Defendants were acting in their official capacity at the pertinent times in question and indicates that the suit is being brought against them in their official capacities. There is no indication in the complaint that Defendants engaged in any alleged tortious misconduct independent of their official positions. Therefore, the instant action is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing analysis, we grant Defendants' motion to dismiss.