The first ended in a mistrial. The second resulted in a verdict for Hawthorne and led to our opinion in Smith v. Hawthorne (Smith I), 2006 ME 19, 892 A.2d 433. In Smith I, we vacated the judgment because the court had admitted into evidence only the second finding of the panel, that is, the finding that Hawthorne's "acts or omissions complained of by the Smiths were not the legal cause of the injuries that [Smith] has alleged."
24 M.R.S. § 2857(1). [¶ 13] We recently analyzed the admissibility of such panel findings in Smith v. Hawthorne (Smith I), 2006 ME 19, 892 A.2d 433. Before our decision in Smith I, findings of a medical malpractice panel as to both a defendant's negligence and whether that negligence was the proximate cause of the injury to the plaintiff were admissible at trial against a defendant, but only if both findings were unanimous and both were against the defendant. Smith I, 2006 ME 19, ¶ 10, 892 A.2d at 436. If panel findings on either of the issues of negligence or causation were favorable to the defendant, however, then that panel finding, if unanimous, was admissible against the plaintiff, even though the other panel finding favored the plaintiff.
See Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 217, 36 S.Ct. 595, 60 L.Ed. 961 (1916); Thermos Co. v. Spence, 1999 ME 129, ¶ 7 n. 2, 735 A.2d 484. Smith v. Hawthorne, 2006 ME 19, ¶ 20, 892 A.2d 433 (quotation marks omitted). Darling's and MADA do not contend that a historical exception to article 1, section 20 of the Maine Constitution applies in this case.
This case has proceeded through the pre-litigation screening panel. Pursuant to 24 M.R.S.A. § 2857(1)(C), those findings are now admissible. (24 M.R.S.A. § 2857 found unconstitutional on other grounds not applicable here as asymmetrically applied in Smith v. Hawthorne, 2006 ME 19, 892 A.2d 433.) Maine Law provides " If the unanimous findings of the panel as to either section 2855, subsection 1 or 2, are in the negative, the claimant must release the claim or claims based on the findings without payment or be subject to the admissibility of those findings under section 2857, subsection 1, paragraph B." 24 M.R.S.A. § 2858(2). In addition, to determining the issues of proximate causation and comparative negligence, the panel is required to determine "Whether the acts or omissions complained of constitute a deviation from the applicable standard of care by the health care practitioner or health care provider charged with that care."
We have a duty to interpret a statute in a way that preserves its constitutionality if that can be done reasonably. See Nader I, 2012 ME 57, ¶ 19, 41 A.3d 551; Smith v. Hawthorne, 2006 ME 19, ¶ 29, 892 A.2d 433. To be constitutionally sound, section 556 cannot be read to infringe on a plaintiff's right to a jury trial-an infringement that we now recognize was the consequence of Gaudette I.
We agree with RSU 21's assertion that section 1479(3) contains no language supporting any temporal limitation on its application, and we acknowledge that the effect may undermine RSU 21's attempt to consolidate the public education of the children living within the RSU. It is for the Legislature, however, to consider such a result from a public policy perspective; we cannot ignore the plain language of the statute based on a dispute about the advisability of the underlying policy decisions. SeeSmith v. Hawthorne , 2006 ME 19, ¶ 42, 892 A.2d 433 (Levy, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Constitution entrusts the exclusive authority for the adoption of statutory law with the Legislature because it is the branch of government best suited to undertake the investigation, fact-finding, and analysis needed to establish policies that account for social interests that are much broader than the narrow, personal interests of the parties to a lawsuit. Accordingly, the Legislature's determination of public policy is binding on the courts so long as it is within constitutional limits.").
[¶ 17] We review the interpretation of statutes de novo. Garrison City Broad., Inc. v. York Obstetrics Gynecology, P.A., 2009 ME 124, ¶ 9, 985 A.2d 465, 468. Only when we determine that a statute is ambiguous do we look beyond the plain language of the statute and the context of the whole statutory scheme to indicia of legislative intent such as the statute's history and its underlying policy. Id.; Pennings v. Pennings, 2002 ME 3, ¶ 13, 786 A.2d 622, 627; Smith v. Hawthorne, 2006 ME 19, ¶ 30, 892 A.2d 433, 440 (Alexander, J., concurring). [¶ 18] As provided in section 11.05 of the OGG Operating Agreement, the agreement, including the parties' retained "right to appeal any questions of law" in section 11.01, is governed by the laws of Maine. The MUAA provides, "Upon application of a party, the court shall confirm an award, unless . . . grounds are urged for vacating . . . the award, in which case the court shall proceed as provided in section[] 5938. . . ."
This provision has "historically been construed as guaranteeing the right to a trial by jury in civil cases unless it is demonstrated that such a right did not exist at the time of the adoption of [Maine's] Constitution." Smith v. Hawthorne, 892 A.2d 433, 444 (Me. 2006). We do note that the heightened pleading standard under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) does not violate the Seventh Amendment.
Maine's statute provided that, if the panel's findings were unanimous, they were admissible in subsequent court actions. See Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 24, § 2857, invalidated by Smith v. Hawthorne, 892 A.2d 433 (Me. 2006). In Daigle v. Maine Medical Center, Inc., the plaintiff argued that, even though the medical panel unanimously found against her, because the case was in federal court, federal evidentiary rules applied, making the findings inadmissible as hearsay.