The day of the entry of the decree must be excluded in computing the time for taking the appeal. Smith v. Gale, 137 U.S. 577, 11 S. Ct. 185, 34 L. Ed. 792; United States v. Beaman (C.C.A.) 61 F.2d 493. Weidemann's appeal was taken on March 27, 1935, which was within three months after entry of the decree and was, therefore, in time.
28 USCA ยง 230. The day of the entry of the judgment or decree must be excluded in computing the time for taking an appeal to review it. Smith v. Gale, 137 U.S. 577, 11 S. Ct. 185, 34 L. Ed. 792; Burnet v. Willingham Loan Trust Company, 282 U.S. 437, 51 S. Ct. 185, 75 L. Ed. 448. It follows that the appeal was in time if it was applied for and allowed on October 29, 1931. No formal order of allowance is necessary. Brandies v. Cochrane, 105 U.S. 262, 26 L. Ed. 989. The time of the allowance of an appeal may be shown otherwise than by a filing with the clerk of an order allowing it. Donaldson v. Baltimore Acceptance Corporation (C.C.A.) 38 F.2d 215. Though the filing date on the statement entered upon defendant's prรฆcipe and signed by plaintiff's attorney was October 30, 1931, that statement shows that before it was filed, on October 29, 1931, within the time allowed for applying for an appeal, plaintiff's attorney in effect admitted that an appeal had been taken, and waived formal service of citation. We think the record sufficiently shows that the appeal was applied for within the time allowed by the statute.
28 USCA ยง 230. In the case of Smith v. Gale, 137 U.S. 577, 11 S. Ct. 185, 34 L. Ed. 792, decided when the time for appeal was two years instead of three months, it was held that an appeal taken on May 25, 1888, from a final judgment entered May 25, 1886, was taken in time. Randall Co. v. Foglesong Mach. Co. (C.C.A.) 200 F. 741; U.S. v. Beaman (C.C.A.) 61 F.2d 493.
In computing the thirty-day period, the day on which the notice was given is regarded as an entirety, or a point of time, and is excluded. Burnet v. Willingham Loan Trust Co., 282 U.S. 437, 51 S.Ct. 185, 75 L.Ed. 448; Smith v. Gale, 137 U.S. 577, 11 S.Ct. 185, 34 L.Ed. 792; Freeman v. Pew, 61 App.D.C. 223, 59 F.2d 1037; In re Schmidt, D.C., 54 F. Supp. 262; United States v. Barber, D.C., 24 F. Supp. 229; Sartor v. United Gas Public Service Co., D.C., 20 F. Supp. 660; Wheeler v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co., D.C., 6 F. Supp. 532. Furthermore, thirty full days of notice are required; and the period of notice therefore had to extend to the last minute of the thirtieth day, which was September 16. See International Manufacturers' Co. v. United States, 85 Ct.Cl. 683, certiorari denied, 303 U.S. 651, 58 S.Ct. 749, 82 L.Ed. 1111; Merritt v. Thompson, 53 App.D.C. 233, 289 F. 631; MacCrone v. American Capital Corporation, D.C., 51 F. Supp. 462; Zoby v. Kosmadakes, D.C.Mun.App., 61 A.2d 618. We infer that this is also the Civil Service Commission's interpretation. "The advance notice * * * shall be submitted to the employee at least thirty (30) days before the effective day of such proposed action * * *."
" This principle of computation of time by excluding the first day and including the last day is sustained by the following cases: Credit Co. v. Ark. C. R. Co., 128 U.S. 258, 9 Sup. Ct. 107, 32 L.Ed. 448; Best v. Doe, 18 Wall. 112, 21 L.Ed. 805; Smith v. Gale, 137 U.S. 577, 11 Sup. Ct. 185, 34 L.Ed. 792; Supreme Council v. Gootee, 89 Fed. 941, 32 C. C. A. 436; also two well-reasoned cases in point are Bemis v. Leonard, 118 Mass. 502, 19 Am. Rep. 470; Seward v. Hayden, 150 Mass. 158, 22 N.E. 629, 5 L. R. A. 844, 15 Am. St. Rep. 183. The principle announced in the foregoing authorities amply sustains the rule in construing statutes of the character of the one involved here, that the first day or the day on which the act was done, from which the period of limitation runs, should be excluded and the last day of the period included, which would make the federal rule conform to the statutory rule of the state, and it is therefore unnecessary to determine whether or not the statute of this state is applicable, as under either the action was commenced within the time limit fixed by the usury act