Smith v. Forrester

14 Citing cases

  1. Thomas v. State

    351 S.E.2d 453 (Ga. 1987)   Cited 4 times

    4. The motion for mistrial came too late. Objection should have been made immediately upon the asking of the question. Absent timely objection or motion, there was no error. Adams v. State, 173 Ga. App. 877 ( 328 S.E.2d 767) (1985); State v. Peabody, 247 Ga. 580, 581 ( 277 S.E.2d 668) (1981). Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

  2. Pickens v. State

    225 Ga. App. 792 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997)   Cited 53 times
    Holding that, despite complaint that information from anonymous tipster lacked sufficient “indicia of reliability” to justify approaching defendant's motel room, law enforcement's approach to defendant's residence did not implicate the Fourth Amendment because there was no “stop”

    He has not shown how he was harmed or prejudiced by the refusal, which he must demonstrate in order for a violation of OCGA § 17-5-30 to constitute reversible error. State v. Peabody, 247 Ga. 580, 582 (5) ( 277 S.E.2d 668) (1981). His request was tantamount to asking the court to reconsider the motion to suppress and accept new evidence, which it was not obligated to do. This was not the type situation described in Chastain v. State, 158 Ga. App. 654 ( 281 S.E.2d 627) (1981), where "the legality of the search too often cannot truly be determined until the evidence at the trial has brought all circumstances to light.

  3. Randall v. State

    390 S.E.2d 74 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990)   Cited 6 times

    Because the appellant disavowed any possessory or ownership interest in the 74.8 grams of cocaine found on McQueen's person, it follows that he had no standing to complain of its seizure. See State v. Peabody, 247 Ga. 580, 581, fn. 5 ( 277 S.E.2d 668) (1981). With respect to the 0.3 grams of cocaine seized from the appellant's person, we hold that, in the context of the other evidence in the case, there is no reasonable possibility that the admission of this evidence contributed to his conviction of trafficking in cocaine (see OCGA § 16-13-31 (a)) and that the trial court's refusal to suppress it, if error, was consequently harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

  4. Rutherford v. State

    382 S.E.2d 205 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989)   Cited 1 times

    " Staton v. State, 164 Ga. App. 464, 465 ( 297 S.E.2d 375) (1982). See also State v. Peabody, 247 Ga. 580, 581, n. 5 ( 277 S.E.2d 668) (1981). It is apparent without dispute from the evidence in this case that the appellant was not present in the motel room when the officers entered it and that he had neither a proprietary nor a possessory interest in the room.

  5. Sapp v. State

    184 Ga. App. 527 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987)   Cited 15 times
    In Sapp v. State, 184 Ga. App. 527 (362 S.E.2d 406) (1987), we affirmed the judgment convicting Jake Sapp of violation of OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (4) (the per se offense of operating a moving vehicle while having 0.12 percent or more by weight of alcohol in the blood), but remanded the case with direction that the trial court conduct a hearing on Sapp's pre-trial motion to suppress in which Sapp asserted no probable cause existed for his arrest.

    The error was preserved by appellant's objection to the trial court's ruling that the admissibility of the fruits of his arrest would be determined during the trial itself. Compare State v. Peabody, 247 Ga. 580 (1) ( 277 S.E.2d 668) (1981). However, "harm or prejudice must be demonstrated before a violation of [OCGA § 17-5-30 (b)] can be said to give rise to reversible error.

  6. Eidson v. State

    355 S.E.2d 691 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987)   Cited 12 times

    However, "harm or prejudice must be demonstrated before a violation of [OCGA § 17-5-30 (b)] can be said to give rise to reversible error." State v. Peabody, 247 Ga. 580, 582 ( 277 S.E.2d 668) (1981). Appellant has failed to show such harm or prejudice.

  7. Wilson v. State

    180 Ga. App. 825 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986)   Cited 2 times

    In the cases sub judice, although the defendants had a right to be present during the hearing on their pre-trial motions, because no objection was raised at a time when error could have been remedied without requiring a new trial, the defendants waived the complaint that they have been denied their right to be present during the pre-trial hearing. "To hold otherwise would allow for `sandbagging' of the trial judge; and it would also violate the general rule that a party cannot sit idly by, ignore the commission of error by the trial judge, take his chances on a favorable verdict, and then complain on appeal if the favorable verdict does not materialize." State v. Peabody, 247 Ga. 580, 581 (1) ( 277 S.E.2d 668). Further, since the trial judge conducted a hearing on the record, in the defendants' presence, as soon as defense counsel brought the matter to the court's attention; and, since defense counsel was unable to enumerate any prejudice caused by the omission, any error was harmless.

  8. Heard v. State

    341 S.E.2d 459 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986)   Cited 14 times

    Therefore, admission of the in-court identification evidence was not error. Coleman v. State, 150 Ga. App. 380 (1) ( 258 S.E.2d 12) (1979). See also State v. Peabody, 247 Ga. 580 (5) ( 277 S.E.2d 668) (1981). 3. Appellant argues that the trial court erred in charging the jury that the date alleged in the indictment was not a material element of the indictment because alibi was a part of his defense.

  9. Brown v. State

    338 S.E.2d 718 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985)   Cited 1 times

    However, this statutory provision may be waived by defendant. State v. Peabody, 247 Ga. 580 ( 277 S.E.2d 668). In the case sub judice, defendant argues that the motion to suppress issues remained open and appropriate for submission to the jury because the trial court had not entered any order ruling on his motion to suppress evidence.

  10. Kilgore v. State

    303 S.E.2d 524 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983)   Cited 2 times

    ]" Coleman v. State, 150 Ga. App. 380 (1) ( 258 S.E.2d 12) (1979). See also State v. Peabody, 247 Ga. 580, 582 ( 277 S.E.2d 668) (1981). The error was harmless.