Opinion
December 19, 1952. Rehearing Denied January 16, 1953.
Appeal from the Circuit Court, Clay County, Bayard B. Shields, J.
Bedell Bedell, Jacksonville, for appellant.
Adair, Kent, Ashby McNatt, Jacksonville, and Rodney Durrance, Tallahassee, for appellees.
The appellant has appealed from an order of the Circuit Court in and for Clay County, Florida, affirming an order of the Florida Industrial Commission entered in a workmen's compensation case, and the appellee has filed a motion to dismiss such appeal on the ground that the appellant failed to follow the appellate procedure prescribed by the Workmen's Compensation Act, Section 440.27, Florida Statutes, F.S.A.
The sole issue here is whether appeals in compensation cases are required to be perfected in accordance with the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, or whether such appeals may be perfected in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 59, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., the so-called Uniform Appeals Act, enacted in 1945 by Chapter 22854, Laws of Florida, Acts of 1945.
It is the contention of the appellant that the Uniform Appeals Act provides an alternative method of procedure in appeals in workmen's compensation cases because of the provisions of Section 59.01(2) of such Act that "This chapter shall also be applicable: '(a) As a uniform alternative method of taking appeals from orders of state boards, commissions, and other bodies, where appeals from such orders are permitted by law", and also because of the language of Section 59.43 of such Act, providing that "This chapter shall govern appellate review and proceedings in all courts and cases, including appellate proceedings from boards, commissions, and other bodies where provided for by law, where not otherwise expressly provided, and where otherwise provided may be used as an alternative method of review."
As originally enacted, the Workmen's Compensation Act, Chapter 17481, Laws of Florida, Acts of 1935, provided in general terms for an appeal to a Circuit Court from an order of the Commission within thirty days after the compensation order was filed, and for an appeal to the Supreme Court from the Circuit Court's order within thirty days after the decision of the Circuit Court. In 1937, by Chapter 18413, the provisions of the 1935 Act respecting appeals from compensation orders were amended to provide specifically for the procedure to be followed in perfecting such appeals. The time limit of thirty days for filing an appeal was retained in the 1937 Act, and it was further provided therein that the notice of appeal should specify a return date "more than thirty days and not more than ninety days from the date of the judgment or award appealed from."
In 1941, by Chapter 20672, the appeals procedure in compensation cases was again amended. By the 1941 amendment, the time for taking an appeal was shortened to twenty days, and the return date was also shortened to require that the appeal should be returnable to the Circuit Court from the Commission more than thirty and not more than sixty days from the date the order or award appealed from was filed in the office of the Commission. The same time limit was specified for appeals to this court from the order of the Circuit Court. The 1941 Act provided, also, that "Except in cases where it is inconsistent herewith, the statutes and rules governing appeals in chancery shall govern appeals in compensation cases." Section 440.27(8), Florida Statutes, F.S.A. This provision was reenacted by the Legislature in 1947 in an amendatory act, Chapter 23908, Laws of Florida, Acts of 1947, which was, of course, subsequent to the enactment of the Uniform Appeals Act, Chapter 22854, Laws of Florida, Acts of 1945.
From the history of the Workmen's Compensation Act, recounted above, it is apparent that in this particular class of cases it is the policy of the Legislature to provide a speedy method of appeal in order to secure to injured workers as quickly as possible the compensation provided for them under the Act and upon which they and their families must depend for food and shelter during the period of disability of the wage earner. To effect a change in this established and salutary policy would seem to require an express legislative mandate, directed specifically to appeals in workmen's compensation cases. This, the 1945 Uniform Appeals Act did not do.
We are confirmed in our view that the Legislature did not intend the provisions of the 1945 Uniform Appeals Act to apply to appeals in workmen's compensation cases by the fact that, as noted above, it re-enacted in 1947 the provisions of the 1941 Act, Chapter 20672, providing, in effect, that the appellate procedure prescribed by the Workmen's Compensation Act should control in cases of inconsistency between such provisions and those of the general law and rules of court respecting appeals.
While the impact of Chapter 59 on the appeal provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act was not discussed by this court in the cases of City of Miami v. Saco, 156 Fla. 634, 24 So.2d 115, and Davis v. Combination Awning Shutter Co., Fla., 47 So.2d 436, we held that the appellate provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act must be followed in perfecting appeals to this court in such cases, and rightly so.
For the reasons stated, the appellee's motion to dismiss the appeal in the instant case is granted.
SEBRING, C.J., TERRELL, HOBSON, and DREW, JJ., and FABISINSKI, Associate Justice, concur.
THOMAS, J., dissents.
The case of City of Miami v. Saco, supra, was decided after the effective date of Chapter 22,854, Laws of Florida, 1945, but it is fair to assume that the appeal was initiated before the passage of that Act. As a result, the exact question now before the Court was not decided in that case. It is also apparent that no question arose in that case as to the time of taking the appeal. It is significant that two members of the Court dissented, being of the conviction that under the rules then in force, see Supreme Court Rules 2 and 18, 30 F.S.A., and which rules are shown by the preamble of the Act to have had important bearing upon the legislation, the Court intended to provide a uniform method of taking appeals to the Supreme Court. In spite of their stand in this respect the majority of the Court held that the provisions of 440.27 (12) F.S. governed the time of taking appeals in Workmen's Compensation appeals.
The conflicting provisions provide a trap for the unwary, but the Court has maintained the position taken in the Saco case by its decision in the case of Davis v. Combination Awning Shutter Co., supra. The case of Dixon v. Stone, Fla., 38 So.2d 459, relating to appeals in unlawful detainer cases from the Civil Court of Record of Dade County to the Circuit Court of Dade County is not helpful in determining the present appeal. See Fonell v. Williams, 157 Fla. 673, 26 So.2d 800, 801. In that case Justice Thomas, in passing commenting on the preamble to Chapter 22,854, says that it was intended "to extend them [amended Chapters 59 and 67] to appellate proceedings from orders of state boards, commissions and other bodies where appeals are allowed"; but this is obiter dicta.
There are strong reasons for making the practice in appeals uniform, but I agree with Justice Roberts that the abbreviated time for taking appeals in Workmen's Compensation cases was a calculated and deliberate provision for a salutary purpose, and that the legislature intended it to operate independently of Chapter 22,854. It is not clear that Rules 18 and 19 of the Supreme Court relating to advancing appeals would serve the purpose of securing the same prompt disposition of such cases as is possible under the statute.