Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:02-CV-0862-M
November 13, 2003
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff's "Motion to Alter Judgment," filed July 21, 2003, "Supplement to Plaintiffs Rule 59 Motion to Alter and Amend the Judgment (filed July 21, 2003) and Motion for Relief From Judgment," filed September 8, 2003, Plaintiffs "Motion for New Trial and to Alter and Amend and for Relief From Judgment Denying Recovery of Attorneys' Fees and, to the Extent Necessary, to Amend Plaintiffs Pleadings," filed September 8, 2003, and "Supplement to Plaintiffs Supplemental Rule 59 Motion," filed September 18, 2003. Having considered Plaintiffs Motions, Defendant's responses, and the applicable authorities, the Court is of the opinion that Plaintiffs Motions should be DENIED.
ANALYSIS
A. Plaintiffs Motion to Alter Judgment:
Plaintiffs Motion to Alter Judgment specifically requests that the Court alter its Final Judgment, entered on July 10, 2003, to reflect a prejudgment interest rate often percent, the rate applied under Texas law, rather than the twelve percent rate applied under Massachusetts law. Plaintiffs Motion was filed prior to the Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order and Judgment denying Plaintiffs Motion for Attorneys' Fees, which were signed on August 26, 2003. In its Memorandum Opinion and Order, the Court held that Plaintiffs damages award arose out of and was associated with the Compensation Plans ("Plans") entered into by Plaintiff and Defendant, and was therefore governed by the choice of law provisions contained within the Plans. The choice of law provisions state that Massachusetts law applies to "any matters arising from or associated with the Plan(s)." Because Massachusetts law does not ordinarily permit a plaintiff to recover attorneys' fees on a breach of contract claim, and because no applicable exceptions were brought to the Court's attention, the Court denied Plaintiffs Motion. Based on the reasoning in its Memorandum Opinion and Order, the Court finds that Massachusetts law is equally applicable to the prejudgment interest rate, and therefore denies Plaintiffs Motion to Alter Judgment.
B. Supplement to Plaintiffs Rule 59 Motion to Alter and Amend the Judgment (filed July 21, 2003) and Motion for Relief From Judgment and Supplement to Plaintiffs Supplemental Rule 59 Motion:
Under Local Civil Rule 56.7, a party may not file a supplemental brief without seeking leave of Court. Plaintiffs Supplement does not explicitly request such leave; rather, Plaintiffs Supplement simply points out that the Court "has discretion to consider" it. Because Plaintiff has not requested leave of Court to file supplemental materials, the Court strikes Plaintiffs Supplement and his Supplement to Plaintiffs Supplement. To the extent Plaintiffs Supplement implicitly requests such leave, the Court denies Plaintiffs request.
Plaintiffs supplemental filing also includes a separate Motion for Relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60. Specifically, Plaintiff requests that the Court alter and amend its Final Judgment to award Plaintiff treble damages pursuant to Massachusetts's Weekly Wage Act, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149 § 150 (West 2003).
Section 150 of the Weekly Wage Act provides:
Any employee claiming to be aggrieved by a violation of [the Act] may, at the expiration of ninety days after the filing of a complaint with the attorney general, or sooner, if the attorney general assents in writing, and within three years of such violation, institute and prosecute in his own name and on his own behalf, or for himself and for others similarly situated, a civil action for injunctive relief and any damages incurred, including treble damages for any loss of wages and other benefits. An employee so aggrieved and who prevails in such an action shall be entitled to an award of the costs of the litigation and reasonable attorney fees.
Plaintiff argues that he should now be awarded treble damages under the Weekly Wage Act even though he failed to allege such a claim in his original Complaint. According to Plaintiff, he is entitled to such relief under Rule 60(b)(1) due to "mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect" or Rule 60(b)(6) for "any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." Plaintiff contends that he is entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(1) because, prior to the Court's August 26, 2003 Order holding that Massachusetts law governs Plaintiffs claim for attorneys' fees, Plaintiff believed that Texas law applied to all of his claims. The Court is of the opinion that Plaintiffs failure to plead Massachusetts law does not constitute the sort of mistake or neglect for which Rule 60(b)(1) affords relief. The Plans specifically provide that Massachusetts law applies, and nothing prevented Plaintiff from making a direct or alternative claim under the Massachusetts Weekly Wage Act.
The Court further concludes that Plaintiff is not entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(6). Under Rule 60(b)(6), a Court may grant a litigant relief from a judgment upon a showing of "extraordinary circumstances." Heirs of H.P. Guerra v. U.S., 207 F.3d 763, 767 (5th Cir. 2000). The Court finds that these facts do not present "extraordinary circumstances" and therefore denies Plaintiffs request for relief under Rule 60(b)(6).
Having found that Plaintiff is not entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(1) or 60(b)(6), the Court denies Plaintiffs Motion for Relief from Judgment.
C. Plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial and to Alter and Amend and for Relief From Judgment Denying Recovery of Attorneys' Fees, and to the Extent Necessary, to Amend Plaintiffs Pleadings:
On September 8, 2003, Plaintiff also filed a Motion for New Trial and to Alter and Amend and for Relief From Judgment Denying Recovery of Attorneys' Fees, and to the Extent Necessary, to Amend Plaintiffs Pleadings. According to Plaintiff, because of the Court's August 26, 2003 Order and Judgment denying his attorneys' fees, Plaintiff is entitled to (1) a partial new trial under Rule 59(a); (2) relief under Rule 60 from the Judgment denying attorneys' fees; (3) an alteration or amendment of the Judgment denying attorneys' fees under Rule 59(e); and/or (4) to the extent necessary, leave to amend his pleadings under Rule 15(a) to allege a violation of the Weekly Wage Act.
In his Motion for a New Trial, Plaintiff requests that the Court grant him a partial new trial on the issue of attorneys' fees. Under Rule 59(a), a Court has discretion to grant a new trial "where it is necessary 'to prevent injustice.'" U.S. v. Flores, 981 F.2d 231, 237 (5th Cir. 1993) (quoting Delta Engineering Corp. v. Scott, 322 F.2d 11, 15-16 (5th Cir. 1963)). Plaintiff, however, does not explain why a partial new trial is appropriate in this case. Rather, he directs the Court's attention to the Massachusetts Weekly Wage Act without elaborating on how he will suffer injustice in the absence of a new trial. Because the Plans expressly state that Masschusetts law applies, and because Plaintiff was free at all times to plead the applicability of the Weekly Wage Act, the Court concludes that a partial new trial on the issue of attorneys' fees is unnecessary. Therefore, Plaintiffs Motion for a New Trial is denied to the extent it seeks relief from the Court's Judgment denying attorneys' fees.
It is unclear from Plaintiffs Motion for a New Trial whether Plaintiff also seeks a new trial on the issue of treble damages under the Weekly Wage Act. Because such relief relates to the Court's Final Judgment, the Court must consider whether Plaintiffs Motion is timely as to that Judgment. Under Rule 59(b), a motion for a new trial must be filed within ten days of the entry of the court's judgment. The Court's Final Judgment was signed on July 10, 2003. Plaintiffs Motion was filed on September 8, 2003, more than ten days later. However, while Plaintiffs Motion is untimely under Rule 59(b), the Court may treat a late-filed Rule 59(a) motion as a Rule 60 motion for relief from judgment. Halicki v. Louisiana Casino Cruises, Inc., 151 F.3d 465, 470 (5th Cir. 1998). Therefore, to the extent Plaintiff requests relief under Rule 59(a), the Court will consider Plaintiffs request as a Rule 60 motion. and will analyze such Motion along with Plaintiffs request for relief pursuant to Rule 60 from the Court's Judgment denying attorneys' fees. Nonetheless, the Court is of the opinion that Plaintiffs requests should be denied.
Plaintiff does not state in his Motion which provision(s) of Rule 60(b) he relies upon. However, parts (2)-(5) refer to relief on specific grounds which are clearly inapplicable to the present case. The only provisions that could arguably apply are part (1), which provides relief for "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect," and part (6), which provides relief for "any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." Accordingly, the Court analyzes Plaintiffs Rule 60 claim and his converted Rule 59(a) claim under Rule 60(b)(1) and 60(b)(6).
First, Plaintiff does not present an argument for relief under Rule 60(b) that is separate and distinct from his argument under Rule 59. In reviewing Plaintiffs Rule 59 argument, the Court is unable to locate "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect" sufficient to warrant Rule 60(b)(1) relief.
Second, the Court finds that there are no "extraordinary circumstances" justifying relief under Rule 60(b)(6). Plaintiffs contention that the Weekly Wage Act affects his previous claims and the Court's Judgments is in error. As this Court reads the statute, it is a prerequisite to bringing a cause of action under the Act that a party must obtain consent from the Massachusetts Attorney General. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 150 (West 2003). The Court concludes that this consent must be obtained prior to instituting a cause of action. In the present case, Plaintiff received consent after the trial. Therefore, he is precluded from obtaining relief under the Massachusetts Weekly Wage Act. Because the Act affords Plaintiff no relief from the Court's Final Judgment and the Judgment denying attorneys' fees, the Court finds that no "extraordinary circumstances" exist. Therefore, Plaintiff cannot obtain relief under Rule 60(b)(6).
Because Plaintiff is not entitled to relief under Rules 60(b)(1) or 60(b)(6), the Court denies Plaintiffs Motion for Relief under Rule 60 from the Final Judgment and the Judgment denying attorneys' fees.
Plaintiff also seeks to amend or alter the Court's Judgment denying attorneys' fees under Rule 59(e). Specifically, Plaintiff requests that the Court reconsider its Judgment in light of the Massachusetts Weekly Wage Act. Plaintiff contends that he did not delay in filing his Motion to amend and that Defendant will not be prejudiced by a reconsideration of the Judgment. Therefore, Plaintiff argues, reconsideration is appropriate.
In order to prevail on a motion to alter or amend a judgment under Rule 59(e), a party "must clearly establish either a manifest error of law or fact or must present newly discovered evidence." Rosenzweig v. Azurix Corp., 332 F.3d 854, 863 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting Simon v. U.S., 891 F.2d 1154, 1159 (5th Cir. 1990)). Such a motion "cannot be used to raise arguments which could, and should, have been made before the judgment issued." Id. at 863-64 (quoting Simon, 891 F.2d at 1159). In the present case, Plaintiff has failed to identify an error of fact or law in the Court's Judgment or the existence of newly discovered evidence, In addition, Plaintiff could have asserted a claim under the Massachusetts Weekly Wage Act at any time prior to the entry of the Court's Judgment. Furthermore, as previously explained, relief under the Weekly Wage Act is unavailable to Plaintiff because he has failed to satisfy the Act's procedural requirements. Thus, even if the Court held that alteration or amendment was appropriate in this case, such alteration or amendment would be futile.
Because Plaintiff has failed to make the requisite showing under Rule 59(e), and because amendment or alteration would be futile even if it was appropriate, Plaintiffs Motion to Alter and Amend the Court's Judgment denying attorneys' fees is denied.
Finally, the Court denies Plaintiffs Motion to Amend his Complaint pursuant to Rule 15(a). A plaintiff is not permitted to amend his complaint after the entry of a final judgment, unless the plaintiff demonstrates that the judgment should be altered or amended under Rule 59(e) or that he is entitled to relief under Rule 60. See 6 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE PROCEDURE § 1489. When a plaintiff seeks to amend a complaint under such circumstances, the Fifth Circuit has held that five factors may be considered in determining whether amendment is appropriate:
. . . undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of the allowance of the amendment [and] futility of the amendment. . . . Rosenzweig, 332 F.3d at 864 (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182(1962).
In the present case, the Court finds that the undue prejudice factor and the futility of amendment factor render amendment inappropriate. First, Plaintiff was free at all times to plead the applicability of the Weekly Wage Act, but never sought to do so. If Plaintiff were permitted to now amend his Complaint to allege claims for attorneys' fees and treble damages under a Massachusetts statute, Defendant would clearly be prejudiced. The potential for multiplied damages would greatly affect litigation strategy. To permit Plaintiff to retroactively assert new claims would deny Defendant the opportunity to make important strategic trial decisions. From the selection of the jury to closing argument, a party facing a treble damage claim would want to know that in approaching the case.
Second, as explained previously, because Plaintiff did not satisfy the procedural requirements of the Massachusetts Weekly Wage Act, amendment of the Complaint would be futile, even if amendment were otherwise appropriate.
Accordingly, the Court denies Plaintiffs Motion to Amend under Rule 15(a).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES the relief sought in Plaintiffs Motion to Alter Judgment, Supplement to Plaintiffs Rule 59 Motion to Alter and Amend the Judgment (filed July 21, 2003) and Motion for Relief From Judgment, Supplement to Plaintiffs Supplemental Rule 59 Motion, and Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial and to Alter and Amend and for Relief From Judgment Denying Recovery of Attorneys' Fees, and to the Extent Necessary, to Amend Plaintiffs Pleadings.
SO ORDERED.