Opinion
No. NNH CV 08 4031442
November 26, 2008
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS (#101)
The plaintiff has commenced this action against the defendants in their official and individual capacities alleging that they have violated his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiff claims that the department of children and families (DCF) wrongly substantiated child abuse and neglect charges against him and wrongly placed him on the central registry. General Statutes § 17a-101k(a) requires the commissioner of DCF to "maintain a registry of the commissioner's findings of abuse or neglect of children . . ." The defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of sovereign and quasi-judicial immunity, failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and lack of personal jurisdiction. The plaintiff has filed a memorandum in opposition. Oral argument was heard on October 27, 2008.
The named defendants are Darlene Dunbar, the former commissioner of the department of children and families (DCF); Maria Hernandez, a social worker for DCF; and Charlotte Shea, a hearing officer for DCF.
From a fair reading of the complaint and the exhibits attached thereto, the plaintiff has alleged that on June 26, 2006, he was advised by letter that DCF had substantiated allegations of abuse or neglect committed by him upon his child, Isiah T. The letter informed him that DCF "finds that you pose a risk to the health, safety or well-being of children and is recommending that you be placed on the Child Abuse and Neglect Central Registry." The letter also informed him that unless he exercised his right to appeal the finding, he would be placed on the registry. Exhibit C to the plaintiff's complaint is a letter from the DCF legal director, setting forth the procedural events between the June 26, 2006 letter and the defendant's present action. On or about December 6, 2006, DCF scheduled an administrative hearing to allow the plaintiff to contest the substantiation and placement on the registry. The plaintiff responded to DCF that he did not want a hearing and refused to attend. Hearing officer Charlotte Shea informed the plaintiff by letter that the hearing had been canceled at his request. This suit was commenced on May 23, 2008.
"A motion to dismiss . . . properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court . . . A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction." Beecher v. Mohegan Tribe of Indians of Connecticut, 282 Conn. 130, 134, 918 A.2d 880 (2007); Pedro v. Miller, 281 Conn. 112, 116, 914 A.2d 524 (2007).
"[T]he doctrine of sovereign immunity implicates subject matter jurisdiction and is therefore a basis for granting a motion to dismiss." Beecher v. Mohegan Tribe of Indians of Connecticut, supra, 282 Conn. 134. "When a . . . court decides a jurisdictional question raised by a pretrial motion to dismiss, it must consider the allegations of the complaint in their most favorable light . . . In this regard, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader." Cogswell v. American Transit Ins. Co., 282 Conn. 505, 516, 923 A.2d 638 (2007); Cox v. Aiken, 278 Conn. 204, 211, 897 A.2d 71 (2006); Filippi v. Sullivan, 273 Conn. 1, 8, 866 A.2d 599 (2005). Although the defendants have raised several grounds in their motion to dismiss, the court addresses only those that are dispositive of the motion.
I. Sovereign Immunity
The defendants claim that the motion to dismiss should be granted because of the protections afforded them in their official capacities under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. "The principle that the state cannot be sued without its consent, or sovereign immunity, is well established under our case law. See Miller v. Egan, 265 Conn. 301, 313, 828 A.2d 549 (2003) . . . Not only have we recognized the state's immunity as an entity, but `[w]e have also recognized that because the state can act only through its officers and agents, a suit against a state officer concerning a matter in which the officer represents the state is, in effect, against the state.' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Miller v. Egan, supra, 313, quoting Fetterman v. University of Connecticut, 192 Conn. 539, 550-51, 473 A.2d 1176 (1984). Exceptions to this doctrine are few and narrowly construed under our jurisprudence. See Miller v. Egan, supra, 314-16 . . ." C.R. Klewin Northeast, LLC v. Fleming, 284 Conn. 250, 258, 932 A.2d 1053 (2007).
Federal statute 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a civil action for deprivation of rights and provides in relevant part: "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). "[W]hen sovereign immunity is claimed as a defense to a cause of action pursuant to § 1983, federal sovereign immunity jurisprudence preempts analysis under state law." Sullins v. Rodriguez, 281 Conn. 128, 133, 913 A.2d 415 (2007).
"[T]he [United States] Supreme Court has taken the view that Congress did not intend to defeat traditional notions of sovereign immunity in enacting § 1983 . . . Instead, these principles inform the meaning of the term `person' as used in § 1983." (Citation omitted.) Sullins v. Rodriguez, supra, 281 Conn. 140. "A state, as an entity having immunity under the [e]leventh [a]mendment to the United States constitution, is not a `person' within the meaning of § 1983 and thus is not subject to suit under § 1983 in either federal court or state court . . . This rule also extends to state officers sued in their official capacities." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Miller v. Egan, supra, 265 Conn. 311. "Put another way, state officials sued for money damages in their official capacities are not `persons' within the meaning of § 1983 because the action against them is one against the office and, thus, no different from an action against the state itself." Sullins v. Rodriguez, supra, 141. Therefore, when a state official is sued in his or her official capacity, the only type of immunity available to the official is the immunity possessed by the governmental entity.
"State officials are, however, `persons' within the meaning of § 1983 and may be held personally liable when sued as individuals for actions taken in their official capacities, and, thus, under color of law." Id. It is, however, well established that officials acting in a judicial capacity are entitled to absolute immunity from § 1983 actions, and this immunity acts as a complete shield to claims for money damages. See Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 199-200, 106 S.Ct. 496, 88 L.Ed.2d 507 (1985); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-56, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978).
In the present case, the plaintiff seeks monetary damages as well as injunctive relief. With respect to the money damages that the plaintiff seeks, he has failed to allege that the state has waived its statutory immunity, as required by General Statutes § 4-160(c) or that the legislature has authorized the suit. Thus, his claim for monetary damages must fail.
General Statutes § 4-160(c) provides in relevant part: "In each action authorized by the Claims Commissioner . . . the claimant shall allege such authorization and the date on which it was granted, except that evidence of such authorization shall not be admissible in such action as evidence of the state's liability. The state waives its immunity from liability and from suit in each such action and waives all defenses which might arise from the eleemosynary or governmental nature of the activity complained of. The rights and liability of the state in each such action shall be coextensive with and shall equal the rights and liability of private persons in like circumstances."
The plaintiff also seeks injunctive relief, requesting the court to order the removal of his name from the child abuse registry and personal notification to him when that is complete. With respect to injunctive, or prospective, relief, a plaintiff seeking to surmount the doctrine of sovereign immunity can do so by demonstrating the applicability of one of three exceptions. "These are: (1) when the legislature, either expressly or by force of a necessary implication, statutorily waives the state's sovereign immunity; Martinez v. Dept. of Public Safety, 263 Conn. 74, 85-86, 818 A.2d 758 (2003); (2) when an action seeks declaratory or injunctive relief on the basis of a substantial claim that the state or one of its officers has violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights; Doe v. Heintz, 204 Conn. 17, 31, 526 A.2d 1318 (1987); and (3) when an action seeks declaratory or injunctive relief on the basis of a substantial allegation of wrongful conduct to promote an illegal purpose in excess of the officer's statutory authority. Antinerella v. Rioux, 229 Conn. 479, 497, 642 A.2d 699 (1994), overruled in part, Miller v. Egan, [ supra, 265 Conn. 325]." Tuchman v. State, 89 Conn.App. 745, 753, 878 A.2d 384, cert. denied, 275 Conn. 920, 883 A.2d 1252 (2005). Thus, state-law claims seeking to overcome sovereign immunity first must be categorized by the type of relief sought and then analyzed according to the exceptions available for that type of relief. See, e.g., Barde v. Board of Trustees, 207 Conn. 59, 60-61, 539 A.2d 1000 (1988) (treating the plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief and money damages separately); see Fetterman v. University of Connecticut, supra, 192 Conn. 553 (treating claims for monetary damages and declaratory relief separately).
As noted, the doctrine of sovereign immunity is pierced when the substantial claim is that one of the state's officers violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights or acted in excess of her statutory authority. Here, the plaintiff's complaint alleges that he received notice from Maria Hernandez of the substantiation of the claims made and the process by which to challenge those findings. The plaintiff was afforded the opportunity to contest the determination and he refused to participate. While the plaintiff may disagree with DCF's conclusions, his complaint has failed to allege any facts to demonstrate that his constitutional rights were violated or that the named defendants acted in excess of their statutory authority. Therefore, the claims against the defendants in their official capacities must be dismissed.
II. Personal Jurisdiction
The defendants next argue that this court lacks personal jurisdiction over them because they have not been served in their individual capacities as required by General Statutes § 52-57(a). A review of the complaint discloses that the plaintiff's suit was instituted against the "State of Connecticut Department of Children and Families: Commissioner Darlene Dunbar, Social Worker Maria Hernandez and Hearing Officer Charlotte Shea." Although the complaint states that "each named defendant is being sued in their individual and official capacities," the return of service on the complaint indicates that the state marshal made service only at the office of the attorney general. That service was required under General Statutes § 52-64, which mandates that service of process in an action against the state or any employee of the state is to be made at the attorney general's office in Hartford. Thus, the court must first determine whether the defendants were sued in their individual capacities, and if so, whether they were properly served in those capacities.
General Statutes § 52-57(a) provides: "Except as otherwise provided, process in any civil action shall be served by leaving a true and attested copy of it, including the declaration or complaint, with the defendant, or at his usual place of abode, in this state."
General Statutes § 52-64 provides: "Service of civil process in any civil action . . . against . . . the state or against any institution, board, commission, department or administrative tribunal thereof, or against any officer, servant, agent or employee of the state or of any such institution, board, commission, department or administrative tribunal, as such, may be made by a proper officer (1) leaving a true and attested copy of the process, including the declaration or complaint, with the Attorney General at the Attorney General's office in Hartford, or (2) sending a true and attested copy of the process, including the summons and complaint, by certified mail, return receipt requested, to the Attorney General at the Attorney General's office in Hartford."
A similar issue was presented in Sienkiewicz v. Ragaglia, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. CV 03 0401770 (April 3, 2007, Matasavage, J.) wherein the plaintiffs brought suit against five employees of the department of children and families. The ten-count complaint sought monetary damages as well as injunctive relief for the alleged violations of their civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The question presented in Sienkiewicz was whether the defendants had, in fact, been sued in their individual capacities. There, the complaint referred to the defendants "as employees of the State of Connecticut acting under color of state law" and the complaint was served only upon the attorney general. In holding that the parties had not been sued in their individual capacities, the court used the test from Spring v. Constantino; 168 Conn. 563, 362 A.2d 871 (1975). "The court in Spring `set forth four criteria to determine whether an action is, in effect, one against the state and cannot be maintained without its consent[:] (1) a state official has been sued; (2) the suit concerns some matter in which that official represents the state; (3) the state is the real party against whom relief is sought; and (4) the judgment, though nominally against the official, will operate to control the activities of the state or subject it to liability.' . . . Miller v. Egan, supra, 265 Conn. 308." Sienkiewicz v. Ragaglia, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 03 0401770.
Similarly here, when the court looks beyond the summons, it is clear that the suit is one against the defendants in their official capacities only. The first two criteria of the Spring test are satisfied because the plaintiff's summons lists the defendants by name and occupation with DCF, and the suit concerns a matter in which they represent the state. The third criterion is satisfied because the state will be liable for the plaintiff's claims for damages under General Statutes § 5-141d(a). Finally, any finding against these employees would undoubtedly have an effect on the procedures used by the agency in the future. As such, the judgment will operate to control the operations of the state, and the fourth criterion is met. Therefore, an examination of the nature and effect of the present proceedings demonstrates that the plaintiff has brought the action against the defendants in their official capacities only.
General Statutes § 5-141d(a) provides in relevant part: "The state shall save harmless and indemnify any state . . . employee, as defined in section 4-141, . . . from financial loss and expense arising out of any claim, demand, suit or judgment by reason of his alleged negligence or alleged deprivation of any person's civil rights . . . if the . . . employee . . . is found to have been acting in the discharge of his duties or within the scope of his employment and such act or omission is found not to have been wanton, reckless or malicious."
Even assuming, arguendo, that the suit was properly brought against the defendants in their individual capacities, the court finds service upon them to be improper. See Sala v. Metro-North Commuter Rd. Co., Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. CV 03 0199222 (November 22, 2005, Tobin, J.) (40 Conn. L. Rptr. 329) (service of process on a state official pursuant to § 52-64 is insufficient to confer jurisdiction over him in his individual or personal capacity); see Banerjee v. Roberts, 641 F.Sup. 1093, 1099 (D.Conn. 1986) (service of process on the attorney general did not confer jurisdiction over the defendants, state officials, in their personal capacities); see also Burgos v. Dept. of Children and Families, 83 F.Sup.2d 313, 315 (D.Conn. 2000). Therefore, the claims against the defendants in their individual capacities must also be dismissed.
For all the foregoing reasons, the defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED.