Smith v. Du Rant

7 Citing cases

  1. Sales Intern. Ltd. v. Black River Farms, Inc.

    270 S.C. 391 (S.C. 1978)   Cited 4 times
    Providing a "reasonable probability of litigation" renders title unmarketable

    As to Respondent's not having been insufficient compliance with the contract relating to additionaldrainage to require Appellant to specifically perform the contract: 266 S.C. 81, 221 S.E.2d 773; 9 S.C. 438; 249 S.C. 289, 153 S.E.2d 912; 71 Am. Jur.2d, Specific Performance § 65. John P. Gardner, and John P. Gardner, Jr., of Gardner, Gardner, Darlington, and Albert L. James, III, of Pauling James, Darlington, for Respondents, cite: As to the Appellant'snot being entitled to rescind the contract on thegrounds that the Respondents were unable to convey goodand merchantable fee simple title to the property: 48 S.C. 282, 26 S.E. 657; 150 S.C. 249, 148 S.E. 18; 226 S.C. 1, 83 S.E.2d 559; 238 S.C. 475, 120 S.E.2d 865; 193 S.C. 98, 7 S.E.2d 724; 23 Am. Jur.2d Deeds, Section 159; 92 S.C. 65, 75 S.E. 530; 112 S.C. 113, 99 S.E. 465; 227 S.C. 81, 87 S.E.2d 40; 236 S.C. 80, 113 S.E.2d 349; 229 S.C. 1, 91 S.E.2d 548; 150 S.C. 249, 148 S.E. 18; 59 S.C. 342, 37 S.E. 934; 48 S.C. 282, 26 S.E. 657; 171 S.C. 18, 171 S.E.2d 449. As to the Appellant's not being entitled to rescind the contractof sale under condition 4 thereof dealing with mineralrights: 310 F. Supp. 491; 17 Am. Jur.2d Contracts, Sections 366 and 367; 266 S.C. 55, 221 S.E.2d 526; 17 Am. Jur.2d Contracts, Section 276. As to Respondentshaving been in sufficient compliance with condition 6of the contract relating to additional drainage to requireAppellant to specifically perform the contract: 45 S.C. 138, 19 S.E. 963; 266 S.C. 68, 221 S.E.2d 767; 17 Am.Jur.2d Contracts, Sections 320 and 323; 17 Am. Jur. 2d Contracts, Section 503; 249 S.C. 289, 153 S.E.2d 912. March 16, 1978.

  2. Gardner v. Mozingo

    293 S.C. 23 (S.C. 1987)   Cited 29 times

    The terms of an unambiguous deed may not be varied or contradicted by evidence drawn from sources other than the deed itself. Smith v. DuRant, 236 S.C. 80, 113 S.E.2d 349 (1960). When intention is not expressed accurately in the deed evidence aliunde may be admitted to supply or explain it. The instrument is not thereby varied or contradicted but is explained or corrected.

  3. Kirven v. Bartell

    223 S.E.2d 597 (S.C. 1976)   Cited 2 times

    As tothere being error in the Court's ruling that the words "moreor less" following the distance contained in the descriptionput Appellant on inquiry or constructive notice that the distanceactually could have been greater, changing the natureof the tract of land he purchased and, therefore, subject tovariation: 103 S.C. 95, 87 S.E. 540; 14 S.C. 312; 71 S.C. 67, 50 S.E. 671. Messrs. Kirven Strobel, of Florence, for Respondent, cite: As to the legal effect to be given to the words "moreor less" in a deed where the description of a parcel of landis only given in metes and bounds and one of those calls ofdistance is followed by the phrase "more or less": 208 S.C. 252, 37 S.E.2d 658; 171 S.C. 466; 236 S.C. 80, 113 S.E.2d 349; 99 Mass. 231; 69 Ga. 506; 54 F. Supp. 851; 116 S.C. 228, 107 S.E. 914; 64 S.C. 216, 41 S.E. 898. March 29, 1976.

  4. Walters v. Summey Building Systems, Inc.

    311 S.C. 507 (S.C. Ct. App. 1993)   Cited 1 times

    The terms of such a deed may not be varied or contradicted by evidence drawn from sources other than the deed itself." Vause v. Mikell, 290 S.C. 65, 68, 348 S.E.2d 187, 189 (Ct.App.1986) (citation omitted); see Hammond v. Lindsay, 277 S.C. 182, 284 S.E.2d 581 (1981); Smith v. DuRant, 236 S.C. 80, 113 S.E.2d 349 (1960).        Extrinsic evidence is admissible to resolve ambiguities but not to create them where none exist.

  5. Walker v. Harris

    354 S.E.2d 56 (S.C. Ct. App. 1987)

    The appellants contend, however, that parol evidence is admissible to show mistake. It is well settled that parol evidence is inadmissible to vary the terms of an unambiguous written instrument, except in the case of fraud, accident, or mistake. Smith v. DuRant, 236 S.C. 80, 113 S.E.2d 349 (1960). "[P]arol testimony might be given in evidence, to explain the situation of land, contrary to the face of the deed; if it is evident from thenature of the thing itself, that there is a mistake in the deed, as where north is mentioned for south; or south for north, et vice versa, c."

  6. Vause v. Mikell

    348 S.E.2d 187 (S.C. Ct. App. 1986)   Cited 7 times

    The terms of such a deed may not be varied or contradicted by evidence drawn from sources other than the deed itself. See Smith v. DuRant, 236 S.C. 80, 113 S.E.2d 349 (1960). In our opinion, the deed to Mrs. Mikell unambiguously conveys a one-half undivided interest and no ambiguity is created as to the intention of Mr. Mikell by his use of the words "all my" before the words "undivided one-half interest."

  7. Hellams v. Harnist

    325 S.E.2d 569 (S.C. Ct. App. 1985)   Cited 4 times

    Where a contract evidences care in its preparation, it will be presumed that its words were employed deliberately and with intention. McPherson v. J.E. Sirrine Co., 206 S.C. 183, 33 S.E.2d 501 (1945). We additionally note that in this state when there is a conflict in a description of a deed between distances and boundaries, the boundary should control, Smith v.Durant, 236 S.C. 80, 113 S.E.2d 349 (1960). There are exceptions to this rule, but we hold them to be inapplicable to this case.