Opinion
Civil Action No. 02-0373 (AK).
February 3, 2005
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs' Motion to Show Cause ("Motion") [65], Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion ("Opposition") [66], Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants' Opposition ("Reply") [67]; Plaintiffs' Supplemental Memorandum in support of the Motion ("Supplemental Memorandum") [76] and Defendants' response ["Response") to the Supplemental Memorandum [77].
Plaintiffs additionally filed a second Supplemental Memorandum [79] in support of the Motion but that Supplemental Memorandum was neither authorized by this Court nor did the subject matter contained therein relate to the instant case; rather, the Supplemental Memorandum addressed another case not before this Court. Accordingly, that Supplemental Memorandum and the Defendants' response thereto [81] should be stricken from the record of this Court. Plaintiffs and Defendants have filed a number of Praecipes, in connection with this case, which provide the Court with updates as to the status of payment on Plaintiffs' claims as well as copies of recent decisions addressing the fee cap issue that remains outstanding in this case. Such Praecipes are properly before the Court.
Upon consideration of Plaintiffs' Motion and Supplemental Memorandum, Defendants' Opposition and Response thereto, and Plaintiffs' Reply, for the reasons set forth below, the Plaintiffs' Motion [65] is denied, as indicated in the accompanying Order.
I. Background
On February 26, 2002, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint, which was an aggregation of 97 individual claims by 85 student Plaintiffs who asserted that they prevailed in administrative proceedings under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-87, either by virtue of favorable administrative decisions or through voluntary settlement agreements with the District of Columbia Public Schools ("DCPS").On March 15, 2002, the Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss, or for a More Definite Statement. Following an April 18, 2002 hearing, the trial court denied the Motion to Dismiss but ordered Plaintiffs to provide additional information to the Defendants. Plaintiffs provided the supplemental information on April 24, 2002. On May 8, 2002, Defendants filed a [second] Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Plaintiffs responded by filing a consolidated memorandum in opposition to the Motion to Dismiss and in support of their Motion for Summary Judgment.
District Court Judge Ellen Segal Huvelle was the trial court prior to the parties consenting to proceed before the undersigned Magistrate Judge for all purposes including trial, on April 29, 2002.
On August 15, 2002, this Court held a hearing on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and on September 20, 2002, the Court issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order, denying in part Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, deferring it in part and granting it in part. The Court dismissed without prejudice fee claims by three Plaintiffs, deferred consideration of sixteen claims, and dismissed thirty-three claims that were resolved through settlement agreements. On February 20, 2003, the Court entered a Memorandum Order relating to the 16 claims that were deferred [51]. On June 24, 2003, the Court issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order [55, 56] granting in part and denying in part Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, whereby Plaintiffs were awarded attorneys' fees and costs in the amount of $146,056.79, which was a reduction of $84,119.60 from the amount they claimed. Plaintiffs appealed the Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order [55, 56] and the Court's Order denying Defendant's Motion to Alter Judgment [60]. On December 3, 2004, the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed the rulings of this Court. See Elaine Ball Smith, et al. v. District of Columbia, et al., Appeal No. 03-7130 (D.C. Cir. December 3, 2004).
These three claims were later dismissed with prejudice after Plaintiffs unsuccessfully moved to amend their Complaint to include these claims.
To date, Defendants have made payments totaling $84,440.87 to Plaintiffs, an amount they contend is the total amount they can pay pursuant to the applicable statutory fee cap. See Response at 1-3. Plaintiffs argue that Defendants should show cause why they should not be held in contempt for failure to remit full payment of the $146,056.79. Supplemental Memorandum at 1-2, 5. The Court finds that, because Defendants have paid the fee award to the extent that they are permitted under pertinent law, Plaintiffs' Motion to Show Cause is unwarranted and should be denied.
II. Legal Standard
This Court has inherent authority to enforce its orders through the exercise of contempt powers. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991). In order to successfully move for contempt, a movant must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence the violation of a clear and unambiguous order requiring certain conduct by respondent. Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, 1 F.3d 1274, 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (citations omitted); Food Lion, Inc. v. United Food and Commercial Workers Int'l Union, 103 F.3d 1007, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1997). A court may hold a party in contempt for the express purpose of remedying noncompliance with its order. Petties v. District of Columbia, 897 F.Supp. 626, 629 (D.D.C. 1995) (citations omitted). "[A] finding of bad faith, on the part of the contemnor is not required." National Labor Relations Bd. v. Blevins, 659 F.2d 1173, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (emphasis in original).
III. Discussion
Plaintiffs allege violation of this Court's June 24, 2003 Order, which states in relevant part that it is:
ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted in part and denied in part. Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of attorneys' fees and costs in the amount of $146,056.79, which is a reduction of $84,119.60 from the fees and costs which Plaintiffs claimed.
June 24, 2003 Order [56]. Defendants do not dispute that they have made payments totaling $84,440.87, and further, that such "amounts payable for individual students were recalculated by DCPS applying the $4,000 fee cap." Response at 1-2. Notwithstanding Defendants' refusal to pay the entire amount awarded by the Court, Plaintiffs' Motion must be denied.
Relying on Section 144 of the District of Columbia Appropriations Act of 2003, which establishes a $4,000 fee cap, Defendants maintain that the maximum amount of compensation that Plaintiffs can be paid is $4,000 per Plaintiff. Response at 2-3. Section 144 provides in relevant part that:
None of the funds contained in this Act may be made available to pay the fees of an attorney who represents a party in an action or an attorney who defends any action, including an administrative proceeding, brought against the District of Columbia Public Schools under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ( 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.) in excess of $4,000 for that action.
Section 144 of the District of Columbia Appropriations Act, 2003, Pub.L. No. 108-7, 117 Stat. 1, 131-32 (2003) ("Section 144"). The Section 144 attorneys' fees cap relied upon by the Defendants is one of the most recent in a line of fee caps enacted by Congress, starting in 1998.
The current fee cap statute is codified at Section 327(1) of the District of Columbia Appropriations Act, 2005, Pub.L. No. 108-335, 118 Stat. 1322 (2005).
See Section 130 of the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999, Pub.L. No. 102-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998); Section 129 of the District of Columbia Appropriations Act of 2000, Pub.L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501, 1517 (1999); Section 122 of the District of Columbia Appropriations Act of 2001, Pub.L. No. 106-522, 114 Stat. 2440, 2464 (2000); Section 144 of the District of Columbia Appropriations Act, 2003, Pub.L. No. 108-71, 117 Stat. 11 (2003); Section 432 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2004, Pub. L No. 108-199, 118 Stat. 3 (2004).
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that Section 130, the earliest fee cap, did not prevent courts from making awards of IDEA attorneys' fees in excess of such cap. Calloway v. District of Columbia, 216 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2000). That case left unresolved the question of whether a court can require the District of Columbia to pay a total fee award greater than the fiscal year cap. 216 F.3d at 11. Since the Calloway decision, several judges from this District Court have addressed the issue of damage awards exceeding the fee cap, beginning with District Judge Paul Friedman's decision in Armstrong v. Vance, 328 F. Supp.2d 50 (D.D.C. 2004).
In Armstrong, Judge Friedman ruled that courts cannot require the District of Columbia to pay attorneys' fees in excess of the statutory cap. The Armstong decision discussed the District of Columbia Appropriations Act of 2002, which did not include a statutory fee cap, but instead included "express language prohibiting the payment of `attorneys' fees accrued prior to the effective date of this Act that exceeds a cap imposed by prior appropriations Acts that were in effect during the fiscal year when the work was performed, or when payment was requested for work previously performed.'" Armstrong, 328 F.Supp.2d at 61, quoting Section 140(a), District of Columbia Appropriations Act of 2002. Judge Friedman found that the language of Section 140 meant that "defendants cannot pay — and will never be required to pay — more than they have already paid with respect to these claims absent another change in the statute." Id.
Subsequent to the decision in Armstrong, District Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly issued a Memorandum Opinion [107] and Order [106] in Pullins-Graham v. District of Columbia, Civ. No. 98-3065 (D.D.C. September 16, 2004). That case involved Plaintiffs' allegation that Defendants should be held in contempt for violating the Court's order by failing to remit payment of an award of attorneys' fees in connection with an IDEA action. Defendants relied on Section 144 of the District of Columbia Appropriations Act of 2003, arguing that the Act limited the amount the District can pay in attorneys' fees for an IDEA suit.
Judge Kollar-Kotelly agreed with the reasoning and analysis of Judge Friedman in Armstrong, holding that the Court could not compel payment of fees in excess of the cap because Congress specifically curtailed payment beyond the fiscal year caps. Thus, Defendants could not be held in contempt for violating the Court's Order awarding legal fees in excess of the cap. September 16, 2004 Memorandum Opinion at 6. Judge Kollar-Kotelly found that "Defendants in the instant case lack the authority to pay in full because it would be a violation of federal law for Defendants to pay any additional attorneys' fees beyond $4,000." Id. at 7. The Court further opined that, "[alt]hough courts have the authority to award attorneys' fees in excess of the statutory caps, Calloway, 216 F.3d at 12, they cannot order the Defendants to violate an act of Congress to pay the total award." Id., citing Armstrong, 2004 WL 1763984 at *9-10. Judge Kollar-Kotelly therefore denied Plaintiffs' motion to hold Defendants in contempt.
On December 17, 2004, District Judge Gladys Kessler issued a Memorandum Opinion [35] and Order [34] in Scorah v. District of Columbia, Civ. Action No. 03-160 (D.D.C. December 17, 2004), another case involving an award of attorneys' fees and costs incurred by Plaintiffs in connection with their successful administrative action under the IDEA. The matter came before the Court on Defendants' motion for reconsideration of Judge Kessler's November 5, 2004 Order granting in part and denying in part Plaintiffs' request. Defendants sought no change in the substantive determinations made by the Court but instead argued that the Court's November 5, 2004 Memorandum Opinion [30] "awarded" Plaintiffs $75,739.28 in attorney's fees and costs, and the Order accompanying that Opinion directed that "Defendants shall, within 30 days of this Order, pay Plaintiffs' counsel $75,739.28 in attorney's fees and costs. . . ." November 5, 2004 Memorandum Opinion at 4; November 5, 2004 Order at 1.
Defendants argued that because Section 327(1) of the District of Columbia Appropriations Act, 2005, Pub.L. 108-335, 118 Stat. 1322 (2005), bars the District Government from paying more than $4,000 of the fees awarded, "the Court should revise its November 5th Order so as to `remove the inconsistency of its wording with the legislative restriction.'" December 17, 2004 Memorandum Opinion at 3 (citation omitted). The Court granted the Defendants' motion for reconsideration and ordered that Defendants shall pay Plaintiffs' counsel "that much of the $75,739.28 in attorney's fees and costs awarded as is permitted by Section 327 of the District of Columbia Appropriations Act, 2003,. . . ." December 17, 2004 Order.
IV. Conclusion
This Court agrees with the analysis of statutory fee caps found in the District of Columbia Appropriations Acts, as set forth in the Armstrong, Pullins-Graham, and Scorah cases. Plaintiffs offer no case law or substantive argument rebutting the application of statutory fee caps. Instead, they focus on the language of this Court's June 24, 2003 Order, arguing that it requires the Defendants to make full payment of the amount mentioned in that Order. The June 24, 2003 Order does not mandate full payment; rather, it states that "Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of attorneys' fees and costs in the amount of $146,056.79,. . . ." June 24, 2003 Order [56].
While the Calloway decision does not prevent the Court from making an award of attorneys' fees and costs in excess of the statutory fee cap amount, courts cannot "order the Defendants to violate an act of Congress to pay the total [fee and costs] award." Scorah, No. 03-160 (GK), Memorandum Opinion at 4, citing Pullins-Graham v. District of Columbia, No. 98vc3065 (CKK), Sept. 16, 2004, Mem. Op. at 7 (citing Armstong v. Vance, 328 F.Supp.2d 50, 60 (D.D.C. 2004).) Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendants have not violated this Court's June 24, 2003 Order, and they have made payments consistent with the statutory fee cap, and thus, Plaintiffs' Motion to Show Cause should be denied.