Opinion
C079222
07-21-2017
MILLIE SMITH et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, Defendant and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 34201200123101CUBCGDS)
Plaintiffs Millie Smith, John Smith and Gilcrest Care Home (collectively, the Smiths) appeal from a judgment entered after the trial court granted the Department of Social Services' (DSS) motion for summary judgment on the Smiths' first amended complaint. They also challenge an earlier ruling granting DSS's motion for judgment on the pleadings with leave to amend on the basis of res judicata. We conclude the allegations in the original complaint were barred by res judicata, and the Smiths have waived any claim of error with respect to the entry of judgment as to the amended complaint. Accordingly, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Smiths' 2006 Lawsuit
On January 20, 2006, DSS served by mail an accusation seeking revocation of the Smiths' license to operate an adult residential care facility under Health and Safety Code section 1550. When the Smiths did not respond, DSS issued a default decision under Government Code section 11520 finding the allegations in the accusation to be true without a hearing. The decision explained it would become effective March 20, 2006, and the Smiths had seven days after its mailing to request that it be vacated and a hearing set.
Health and Safety Code section 1550, subdivisions (a)-(c), provides in relevant part: "The department may . . . revoke, any license . . . issued under this chapter upon any of the following grounds and in the manner provided in this chapter . . . :
"(a) Violation of this chapter or of the rules and regulations promulgated under this chapter by the licensee or holder of a special permit or certificate.
"(b) Aiding, abetting, or permitting the violation of this chapter or of the rules and regulations promulgated under this chapter.
"(c) Conduct which is inimical to the health, morals, welfare, or safety of either the people of this state or an individual in, or receiving services from, the facility or certified family home."
Undesignated statutory references are to the Government Code.
On March 29, 2006, the Smiths filed a petition for writ of mandate and declaratory relief in superior court against DSS and two of its employees alleging that the decision to revoke the Smiths' license was invalid. Specifically, the Smiths alleged they were not properly served with the accusation seeking to revoke their license or the notice of the decision to do so, and only discovered this information on March 22, 2006. On May 31, 2011, the court granted the Smiths' motion for peremptory writ of mandate. The court found "[DSS] 'did not comply with [] section 11505' because it failed to mail the Notice of Accusation and the Decision to petitioners' 'official mailing address,' '[a]ccordingly, DSS abused its discretion in denying Petitioners' request to set aside the default decision.' " The court ordered that "[a] writ shall issue ordering respondents to vacate the default decision and to reinstate petitioner's license subject to all local and state regulations and statutes." B. The Smiths' 2012 Lawsuit
On April 25, 2012, the Smiths filed a complaint against DSS. It alleged causes of action for breach of contract, negligence and an unspecified "intentional tort" based on the defective service. The complaint alleged the Smiths had proven in the prior writ proceeding that the mailing address DSS had on file was different than the address it used for mailing the accusation and subsequent decision. The Smiths now sought $11 million in damages and "Reinstatement of Vendorization for the Regional Center." DSS filed a general denial. On February 21, 2014, the trial court granted DSS's motion for judgment on the pleadings on the basis of res judicata. The court found the writ proceeding was a final decision on the merits and the Smiths' new complaint arose from the same factual situation. "[The Smiths] . . . now attempt to relitigate the same injury under a different legal theory. Additionally, the Court is not convinced by [the Smiths'] argument that their causes of action did not accrue until the writ of mandate was granted. Here, [the Smiths'] causes of action began to accrue when [DSS] revoked their license. [¶] The Court, however, grants leave to amend. Although [the Smiths] argue in their opposition that the causes of action are based on [DSS]'s failure to reinstate [the Smiths'] license (which did not exist when the writ of mandate was filed), the Complaint fails to allege facts or injury regarding [DSS]'s failure to reinstate. Thus, the Court grants leave to amend as it is not yet convinced that [the Smiths] will be unable to allege facts or injury arising from [DSS]'s failure to reinstate."
The Smiths then filed a first amended complaint on March 3, 2014. The factual allegations were more robust than those in the 2012 complaint. The Smiths alleged they had relocated their clients from the Gilcrest Care Home based on DSS's representations in May 2011. The Smiths also alleged their license had not been reinstated. The complaint asserted twelve causes of action: (1) interference with prospective business and economic advantage; (2) negligent interference with prospective business and economic advantage; (3) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (4) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (5) intentional/tortious interference with contract/contractual relations; (6) breach of contract; (7) breach of fiduciary duty and constructive fraud; (8) failure to discharge a mandatory duty and negligence per se; (9) acts and omissions of employees; (10) fraud and intentional misrepresentation; (11) violation of the due process clauses of the California and federal Constitutions; and (12) negligent infliction of emotional distress.
The Smiths purported to allege two different causes of action for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing—one based on the facts surrounding the reinstatement of the license and one based on the failure to give proper notice of the revocation of the license.
On July 16, 2014, the trial court granted DSS's motion to strike new causes of action set forth in the first amended complaint, concluding that the February 21, 2014, order "did not permit [the Smiths] to add new causes of action and [the Smiths'] amendments exceed the scope of the Order." Therefore, the trial court struck from the complaint all causes of action except: (1) breach of contract and (2) negligent infliction of emotional distress. It added, "To the extent Plaintiffs request leave to file an amended complaint, they must file a motion for leave to amend the complaint."
On December 11, 2014, DSS moved for summary judgment. DSS argued the Smiths' amended complaint and the two claims remaining in it were barred by DSS's immunity under section 818.4 and the Smiths' failure to comply with the claims presentation requirements of section 900 et seq. Additionally, DSS asserted the Smiths' breach of contract claim failed because there was no contract with DSS, and the Smiths' negligent infliction of emotional distress cause of action failed because DSS did not breach a duty owed to them.
On February 26, 2015, the court granted DSS's motion. In doing so, the court appears to have forgotten about its earlier ruling on the motion to strike. In describing the factual background of the proceedings, the court stated the first amended complaint purported to assert twelve causes of action and DSS was moving for summary adjudication as to all of them, even though the motion filed by DSS only sought summary adjudication of the two remaining claims.
The trial court ultimately held that DSS was immune from liability as to all of the Smiths' claims. Eight causes of action were barred by section 815: "[Section] 815 expressly states that a public entity is not liable for injury unless a statute so provides. Moreover, a plaintiff filing suit against a public entity like DSS must also plead the specific statutory basis for an injury claim asserted. [Citation.] In this case, the [first amended complaint] asserts a number of non-statutory [causes of action] against DSS. Because such claims are not permissible as against DSS and plaintiffs cannot prevail on these claims as a matter of law, the Court will grant summary adjudication of [these claims] pursuant to [section] 815." This left four remaining causes of action, which failed because of DSS's immunity for licensing decisions under section 818.4: (1) breach of contract, (2) failure to discharge a mandatory duty and negligence per se, (3) acts and omissions of employees, and (4) violation of due process rights. The trial court explained that because each of these causes of action "fundamentally [arose] out of DSS['s] allegedly improper revocation of plaintiffs' license and/or improper failure to reinstate that license, DSS can have no liability as a matter of law for the injuries and damages now claimed by plaintiffs."
The trial court disposed of the Smiths' claims on other grounds as well. With respect to the breach of contract claim, the court held that this claim also failed for lack of a contract: "The document which plaintiffs allege is the 'contract' [citation] is, by its plain terms, merely an application for a license to operate a care facility in this state. It is not an enforceable contract as it does not possess the fundamental elements of a contract (e.g., offer, acceptance, consideration)." The court further held that the Smiths' claims for (1) failure to discharge a mandatory duty and negligence per se, (2) acts and omissions of employees, and (3) violation of due process rights were also barred by the Smiths' failure to fully and timely comply with the claims presentation requirements.
The court overruled the Smiths' written objections to evidence and sustained all but one of DSS's written objections.
Judgment was entered on March 9, 2015. The Smiths timely appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
The Smiths contend the trial court's order granting DSS's motion for judgment on the pleadings with leave to amend erred in holding that res judicata barred their 2012 complaint. They also argue their government claim was timely. Additionally, the Smiths assert the court erred in determining they were required to present a government claim for their federal due process cause of action. Finally, they purport to appeal the evidentiary rulings the trial court made in the context of granting DSS's motion for summary judgment.
Before we address the merits of these arguments, we note that the Smiths' briefing contains several potential holes. The Smiths do not challenge the trial court's July 16, 2014, order striking all but two of the causes of action alleged in their first amended complaint. As such, we need not address the Smiths' arguments pertaining to their federal due process clause claim as it was first alleged in the amended complaint and had been stricken (in an unchallenged ruling) by the time of the February 26, 2015, order purporting to grant summary judgment with respect to the already-stricken cause of action. Additionally, we need not reach the claims presentation issues because the trial court also entered judgment based on its holding that immunity barred the prosecution of the remaining causes of action in the first amended complaint. As we discuss below, the Smiths failed to adequately challenge this ruling on appeal. We will identify the other significant deficiencies in the Smiths' briefing in the relevant portions of our discussion. A. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
1. Standard of Review
We begin our analysis with the standard of review for a motion for judgment on the pleadings: " 'A judgment on the pleadings in favor of the defendant is appropriate when the complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action. [Citation.] A motion for judgment on the pleadings is equivalent to a demurrer and is governed by the same de novo standard of review.' [Citation.] 'All properly pleaded, material facts are deemed true, but not contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law. . . .' [Citation.] Courts may consider judicially noticeable matters in the motion as well." (People ex rel. Harris v. Pac Anchor Transportation, Inc. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 772, 777.)
2. Res Judicata
As set forth above, the Smiths challenge the trial court's determination that res judicata barred their 2012 complaint. " 'Res judicata' describes the preclusive effect of a final judgment on the merits. Res judicata, or claim preclusion, prevents relitigation of the same cause of action in a second suit between the same parties or parties in privity with them. Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, 'precludes relitigation of issues argued and decided in prior proceedings.' [Citation.] Under the doctrine of res judicata, if a plaintiff prevails in an action, the cause is merged into the judgment and may not be asserted in a subsequent lawsuit . . . ." (Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 888, 896-897 (Mycogen).) "It is settled that the doctrine of res judicata applies to judgments on the merits in proceedings in mandamus." (Hollywood Circle, Inc. v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control (1961) 55 Cal.2d 728, 733.)
To determine whether a claim is precluded, California courts follow the primary right theory. (Mycogen, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 904.) " 'It provides that a "cause of action" is comprised of a "primary right" of the plaintiff, a corresponding "primary duty" of the defendant, and a wrongful act by the defendant constituting a breach of that duty. [Citation.] The most salient characteristic of a primary right is that it is indivisible: the violation of a single primary right gives rise to but a single cause of action. [Citation.] . . . [¶] []As far as its content is concerned, the primary right is simply the plaintiff's right to be free from the particular injury suffered. [Citation.] It must therefore be distinguished from the legal theory on which liability for that injury is premised: "Even where there are multiple legal theories upon which recovery might be predicated, one injury gives rise to only one claim for relief." [Citation.] The primary right must also be distinguished from the remedy sought: "The violation of one primary right constitutes a single cause of action, though it may entitle the injured party to many forms of relief, and the relief is not to be confounded with the cause of action, one not being determinative of the other." ' " (Ibid.) But "[i]f the second action is on a different cause of action, as where there are successive breaches of an obligation, or separate and distinct torts, or new rights accrued since the rendition of the former judgment, there is no merger." (7 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Judgments, § 404, p. 1038.)
On appeal, the Smiths do not assert their 2012 complaint involved a different primary right than the writ proceeding. Indeed, the term "primary right" never appears in their appellate briefing. Before the trial court, however, they argued "the primary right at issue in the Writ of Mandate was plaintiffs['] right to a hearing." The problem with this argument is that this was also the primary right the Smiths alleged in their 2012 complaint, and no other primary right was sufficiently alleged therein. The Smiths argued in the trial court that, "At the time of Plaintiffs' Complaint, DSS had been ordered to reinstate the license and had failed to do so. These claims cannot be res judicata as they did not exist on the date the Writ of Mandate was filed." But, as the trial court explained, their 2012 complaint made no allegations regarding a failure to reinstate or injuries therefrom. It only alleged DSS had been ordered to restore the license, not that it had failed to do so. In analyzing the res judicata effects of the prior mandate proceeding, the distinction between the primary right that the Smiths did allege in the complaint and the primary right they later argued they were alleging in the complaint is critical. We look to the facts actually alleged in the complaint to determine whether it states a cause of action. (See People ex rel. Harris v. Pac Anchor Transportation, Inc., supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 777.) Moreover, the court permitted the Smiths to amend their complaint to add the allegations regarding failure to reinstate that were not subject to res judicata. Under these circumstances, we find no error in the trial court's ruling.
Later in their briefing they explained the legal duty breached in their claim for general negligence as the requirement that DSS send notices to a particular address.
The Smiths assert the trial court erred because "other types of action, such as declaratory relief" could not have been presented alongside a petition for writ of administrative mandate under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, and damages are not available in administrative mandamus proceedings. They are incorrect. The Smiths cite State v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 237, for the proposition that a petition for administrative mandamus may not be joined with other types of action. In that case, the petitioner sought review of the denial of a permit pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. (State v. Superior Court, supra, at p. 245.) Contrary to the position taken by the Smiths, our Supreme Court held that demurrers to two other causes of action, including a separate claim for declaratory relief, were properly overruled and could proceed along with the administrative writ. (Id. at pp. 251-252, 255.) This is not the only case the Smiths rely on that actually undermines their argument. (See Logan v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 116, 123 ["Although Logan's third and fifth counts sound in contract, any cause of action that involves the substance of the hearing held by the [defendant], whether such cause of action sounds in tort or contract, must be tested under a section 1094.5 writ"].) Moreover, a petitioner may recover damages based on a petition for writ of mandate. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1095 ["If judgment be given for the applicant, the applicant may recover the damages which the applicant has sustained, as found by the jury, or as may be determined by the court or referee, upon a reference to be ordered, together with costs; and a peremptory mandate must also be awarded without delay"].) And merely "pursuing or adding a different remedy for the same injury does not create a new primary right." (Hi-Desert Medical Center v. Douglas (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 717, 734.) Thus, we are not persuaded that a subsequent claim for damages avoids the res judicata effect of the Smiths' mandate proceeding.
For the purposes of this discussion, we need not address whether the Smiths' claim was properly framed as a petition for administrative mandamus under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5.
The Smiths also contend that res judicata is not applicable because they "were required to exhaust administrative and judicial remedies to overturn the quasi-judicial action before pursuing their tort claims." "[The] exhaustion doctrine comes in two forms: administrative and judicial. Administrative exhaustion refers to the requirement that a party initiate, and complete, a particular administrative proceeding before being permitted to proceed in court. . . . [¶] Judicial exhaustion is slightly different. It may arise when a party initiates and takes to decision an administrative process—whether or not the party was required, as a matter of administrative exhaustion, to even begin the administrative process in the first place. Once a decision has been issued, provided that decision is of a sufficiently judicial character to support collateral estoppel, respect for the administrative decisionmaking process requires that the prospective plaintiff continue that process to completion, including exhausting any available judicial avenues for reversal of adverse findings. [Citation.] Failure to do so will result in any quasi-judicial administrative findings achieving binding, preclusive effect and may bar further relief on the same claims." (McDonald v. Antelope Valley Community College Dist. (2008) 45 Cal.4th 88, 113.) Neither form of the exhaustion doctrine has any direct application to the 2012 complaint. DSS's administrative decision was overturned in the writ proceeding and has no preclusive effect. The Smiths attempt to build on the concept of exhaustion to assert that their "causes of action accrued only after the Court held that [DSS] failed in its duty to give [n]otice to the Smiths' [sic] and that it abused its discretion." For this argument, the Smiths rely on cases deciding whether a claim was barred by the statute of limitations—not res judicata. But their argument fails on a more fundamental level because, as we discuss, their accrual argument relates only to primary rights that were not alleged in the original 2012 complaint.
The Smiths' accrual argument relies heavily on Olson v. County of Sacramento (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 958 (Olson), in which this court explained that when a statute of limitations begins to run or is tolled on the assertion of an independent legal right "depends on the interrelationship between the administrative proceeding and the independent cause of action." (Id. at p. 961.) The relationship discussed in Olson is distinguishable from the relationship between the Smiths' writ proceeding and subsequent complaint. In Olson, the county assessor had dismissed Olson from his civil service position for failure to report to work. (Id. at p. 959.) Olson appealed the dismissal to the civil service commission, and a referee sustained the assessor's action. (Ibid.) In a February 1972 decision reversing the denial of his petition for writ of mandate, this court "held that he had been discharged without just cause; that his dismissal should be annulled; that the action taken by the assessor was discriminatory and illegal; and that he should be restored to his former position, with 'such back salary as he may be entitled to by law.' " (Id. at pp. 959-960.) The plaintiff then filed a written claim for damages with the County of Sacramento alleging that his "June 1969 dismissal resulted from negligence and/or intentional acts whereby he was caused emotional distress, pain and suffering resulting in the impairment of his health." (Id. at p. 960.) In October 1972, he filed a new action based on the allegations set forth in his claim. (Ibid.) The county demurred to the complaint, and the trial court found it was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. (Ibid.) Recognizing the unique posture of Olson's civil service proceeding we concluded that without the exhaustion of administrative remedies and the writ of mandate proceedings, Olson's dismissal would have been a permanent bar to his assertion "of any rights flowing from his wrongful discharge." (Id. at p. 964, italics added.) We held Olson had to prove his wrongful dismissal before he could assert these claims, and it was not until the court's February 1972 decision became final that he could do so. (Id. at p. 965.) Relying on Olson, the Smiths argue that they could not have brought their claims flowing from the wrongful revocation of their license at the time of the writ proceeding. But this argument mistakenly assumes that their initial complaint framed claims addressing the wrongful revocation of their license. The Smiths' 2012 complaint did not plead a cause of action based on rights flowing from any allegedly wrongful license revocation or failure to reinstate the license. It was based on a wrongful failure to give notice of that revocation. As such, the complaint and the writ proceeding were not merely interrelated—the two actions sought to vindicate the same primary right—notice prior to revocation. For this reason, we find Olson has no application here.
DSS counters that the Smiths' case is more akin to Adler v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 280 (Adler). DSS has the better argument. In Adler, the plaintiff had resigned his teaching position, but before the resignation became effective, he sought an investigation and hearing into an unsatisfactory rating on a performance report pursuant to the school district's grievance and adjustment procedures. (Id. at p. 284.) The school district denied the demand primarily on the basis that Adler was no longer entitled to the procedures after his resignation. (Ibid.) Adler initiated a lawsuit that culminated in: (1) the issuance of an alternative writ of mandate directing the school district to replace the unsatisfactory rating (which it chose to do) or initiate grievance procedures, and (2) summary judgment in defendant's favor as to other causes of action. (Id. at p. 285.) On appeal, Adler argued his first cause of action for damages for breach of contract did not accrue until the judgment in mandamus was rendered in his favor, at which point he presented a claim to the district. (Id. at p. 286.) The court of appeal disagreed and distinguished Olson. (Id. at pp. 286-287.) It explained Adler did not need to establish judicially the wrongfulness of the district's denial to him of a grievance hearing before presenting to the district a claim for the monetary damages flowing therefrom. (Id. at p. 287.) Likewise, the Smiths did not need to demonstrate the wrongfulness of DSS's denial of notice before asserting their claim for monetary damages flowing therefrom.
The Smiths have failed to demonstrate the trial court erred in granting DSS's motion for judgment on the pleadings with leave to amend. Their arguments are unpersuasive because they apply to allegations that DSS failed to reinstate their license, which were added in the first amended complaint and were not in the complaint the trial court ruled was barred by res judicata. And, as we discuss next, the first amended complaint failed for different reasons. B. Motion for Summary Judgment
1. Standard of Review
"A trial court properly grants summary judgment where no triable issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (Merrill v. Navegar, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 465, 476; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) A defendant moving for summary judgment "bears the burden of persuasion that 'one or more elements of' the 'cause of action' in question 'cannot be established,' or that 'there is a complete defense' thereto." (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) The defendant "bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact." (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., supra, at p. 850.) Once the defendant meets its initial burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of material fact. (Ibid.)
On appeal, we review the record and the trial court's decision de novo. (Kahn v. East Side Union High School Dist. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 990, 1003.)
2. Immunity
The Smiths do not challenge the trial court's conclusion that their breach of contract claim failed for lack of a contract. This leaves only their negligent infliction of emotional distress claim—which is actually one for negligence—at issue in our review of the trial court's summary judgment ruling. As we previously noted, the other claims were eliminated when the trial court granted DSS's motion to strike. The trial court held the negligence claim was barred by section 815. Section 815, subdivision (a) establishes the general principle that, except as a statute otherwise provides, "[a] public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person." The Smiths' opening brief does not address the issue of governmental immunity. In their reply brief, the Smiths assert for the first time on appeal that section 815.6, which creates liability for injuries flowing from the failure to satisfy certain mandatory duties, would allow their action. Section 815.6 provides: "Where a public entity is under a mandatory duty imposed by an enactment that is designed to protect against the risk of a particular kind of injury, the public entity is liable for an injury of that kind proximately caused by its failure to discharge the duty unless the public entity establishes that it exercised reasonable diligence to discharge the duty." The Smiths argue on reply that DSS's failure to comply with the notice requirements in section 11505 authorized a complaint for damages under 815.6. It is axiomatic that "we do not consider points raised for the first time in the reply brief absent a showing of good cause for the failure to present them earlier. [Citations.] This rule is based on considerations of fairness—withholding a point until the closing brief deprives the opposing party of the opportunity to file a written response unless supplemental briefing is ordered." (Allen v. City of Sacramento (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 41, 52.) Even on reply, the Smiths fail to address the trial court's ruling that their claim failed because of a defect in their complaint. (See Searcy v. Hemet Unified School Dist. (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 792, 802 ["Since the duty of a governmental agency can only be created by statute or 'enactment,' the statute or 'enactment' claimed to establish the duty must at the very least be identified"].) Thus, we will affirm the trial court's granting of DSS's motion for summary judgment.
Under California law, there is "no independent tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress. [Citation.] The tort is negligence . . . ." (Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 965, 984.)
3. Evidentiary Rulings
As set forth above, the trial court's summary judgment ruling explained it was overruling the Smiths' written objections to evidence and sustaining all but one of DSS's written objections. The Smiths contend sustaining objections to their evidence was in error because their "documents were identified by . . . Mill[i]e Smith who had first hand [sic] knowledge and laid an appropriate foundation. Millie Smith verified documents that she had signed and been involved in the creation of and received . . . ." The Smiths also claim overruling their objections to DSS's evidence was in error because DSS submitted "unsigned, unverified interrogatories and . . . declarations by individuals who had no foundation, personal knowledge or historical knowledge of the facts of the case." "It is the responsibility of the appellant, here plaintiffs, to support claims of error with meaningful argument and citation to authority." (Allen v. City of Sacramento, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 52.) The Smiths have done neither. They cite neither DSS's objections to evidence in the trial court nor the evidence to which either side objected. "If a party fails to support an argument with the necessary citations to the record, that portion of the brief may be stricken and the argument deemed to have been waived." (Duarte v. Chino Community Hospital (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 849, 856.) They also cite no legal authority for their claim that the trial court's rulings were in error. "When legal argument with citation to authority is not furnished on a particular point, we may treat the point as forfeited and pass it without consideration." (Allen v. City of Sacramento, supra, at p. 52.) Accordingly, the Smiths have waived any claimed error with respect to the trial court's evidentiary rulings.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. DSS shall recover its costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1) & (2).)
/S/_________
RENNER, J.
We concur:
/S/_________
BUTZ, Acting P. J.
/S/_________
DUARTE, J.