Opinion
Civ. 4:22-CV-1396
01-19-2024
DANA ELROY SMITH, et al., Plaintiffs, v. JOHN D. DECKER, et al., Defendants.
Judge Munley
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
DARYL F. BLOOM, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. Statement of Facts and of the Case
This case comes before this Court for consideration of a motion to dismiss filed by Defendants Stefanie Salavantis, the Luzerne County District Attorney's Office, and Luzerne County. (Doc. 86). The plaintiffs, Dana Smith and William Matthews, brought this action against a host of defendants arising out of their 2019 state criminal prosecution for solicitation to commit criminal homicide and criminal conspiracy, charges that were ultimately dismissed. (Doc. 51).
The amended complaint alleges that Smith and Matthews were charged by a criminal complaint on or around December 30, 2019, with solicitation to commit criminal homicide and criminal conspiracy. (Doc. 51 ¶ 13). These charges were brought by the Pennsylvania State Police (“PSP”) through Defendants Decker, Williams, and Norton (“Trooper Defendants”). (Id. ¶ 14). The amended complaint avers that the Trooper Defendants, along with the DA's Office and Salavantis, who was the District Attorney at that time, continued to prosecute these charges knowing that they did not have a cooperating witness to testify against Smith and Matthews at a preliminary hearing. (Id. ¶¶ 15, 18, 41-42). The plaintiffs assert that Salavantis, as the District Attorney, was either personally responsible, or was responsible in a supervisory capacity, for the requests for continuances that resulted in the plaintiffs' continued incarceration. (Id. ¶¶ 23-26).
The Honorable Stefanie Salavantis is now a judge for the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County.
As to Luzerne County, the complaint appears to assert allegations of vicarious liability, claiming that the County is responsible for the actions of the District Attorney, as well as the actions of the individuals employed by the Luzerne County Correctional Facility. (Doc. 51 ¶ 28).
Salavantis, the District Attorney's Office, and the County have now filed the instant motion to dismiss, arguing that the claims against them fail as a matter of law. (Doc. 86). After consideration, we agree and recommend that the defendants' motion to dismiss be granted.
II. Discussion
A. Motion to Dismiss - Standard of Review
The defendants have filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 12(b)(6) permits the court to dismiss a complaint if the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Under federal pleading standards, a complaint must set forth a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2).
In determining whether a complaint states a claim for relief under this pleading standard, a court must accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), and accept “all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them after construing them in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.” Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court is not required to accept legal conclusions or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Id.; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice”).
As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has aptly summarized:
[A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Id. Second, a District Court must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” Id. at 1950. In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief. A complaint has to “show” such an entitlement with its facts. See Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234-35. As the Supreme Court instructed in Iqbal, “[w]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]'-‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.' ” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. This “plausibility” determination will be “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id.Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009).
Generally, when considering a motion to dismiss, a court relies on the complaint and its attached exhibits, as well as matters of public record. Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007). A court can also consider “undisputedly authentic document[s] that a defendant attached as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's claims are based on the [attached] documents.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Additionally, if the complaint relies on the contents of a document not physically attached to the complaint but whose authenticity is not in dispute, the court may consider such document in its determination. See Pryor v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002). However, the court may not rely on any other part of the record when deciding a motion to dismiss. Jordan, 20 F.3d at 1261.
B. The Motion to Dismiss should be Granted.
As we have explained, the plaintiffs assert their claims against Salavantis as the former District Attorney for Luzerne County, alleging that she continued to prosecute the criminal case and request continuances, resulting in the plaintiffs' continued incarceration. As to the County, the plaintiffs contend that the County, as a municipal entity, is liable for the actions of the District Attorney's Office and the alleged wrongs that occurred at the Luzerne County Correctional Facility. After consideration, we conclude that these claims fail as a matter of law and should be dismissed.
1. Salavantis is Entitled to Prosecutorial Immunity.
The claims against Salavantis arise out of her role, either personally or as a supervisor, in prosecuting the criminal case against the plaintiffs. The amended complaint alleges that Salavantis was responsible for the continuances that led to the plaintiffs' continued incarceration while the charges were pending.
It is well settled that prosecutors are entitled to immunity from civil liability for claims arising out of acts taken in their official capacities. Prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity from claims involving their activities that are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976). Here, the allegations in the amended complaint assert that Salavantis was acting in her role as District Attorney, and the conduct alleged- requesting continuances of a preliminary hearing-falls squarely within her duties as a prosecutor and is “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Id. Accordingly, the claims against Salavantis fail as a matter of law.
2. The Claims Against the County Should be Dismissed.
The amended complaint also asserts a claim against Luzerne County, alleging in a conclusory fashion that the County is responsible for the operation of the District Attorney's Office, as well as the Luzerne County Correctional Facility. At the outset, it is well established that municipal entities “are not vicariously liable under § 1983 for their employees' actions.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011). Rather, plaintiffs bringing a claim against a municipal entity must show that an “‘action pursuant to official municipal policy' caused their injury.” Id. (quoting Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)).
Considering the plaintiffs' claim against the County under a theory of Monell liability, this claim fails as a matter of law. A municipal entity may be liable for a constitutional violation under § 1983 if the violation was a direct result of the entity's policy, custom or practice. Monell, 436 U.S. at 695. However, an entity may not be held liable “solely because injuries were inflicted by its agents or employees.” Jiminez v. All American Rathskeller, Inc., 503 F.3d 247, 249 (3d Cir. 2007). Rather, a plaintiff must demonstrate a “direct causal link” between the alleged constitutional violation and the municipal policy or custom. City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989). A plaintiff may show that either an official policy of the municipality was the moving force behind the violation, or that the municipality had an informal custom such that it operated as the municipality's policy. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 (1986); Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. In either scenario, the plaintiff has the burden to show that the policy or custom was implemented or acquiesced in by a policymaker. Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469, 1480 (3d Cir. 1990).
Further, in cases where a plaintiff is alleging a failure to train officers, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the “municipality's failure to train police officers . . . amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact.” City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388. To establish such a claim, the plaintiff must demonstrate “contemporaneous knowledge of the offending incident or knowledge of a prior pattern of similar incidents,” coupled with “circumstances under which the supervisor's actions or inaction could be found to have communicated a message of approval to the offending subordinate.” Montgomery v. De Simone, 159 F.3d 120, 127 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing Bonenberger v. Plymouth Twp., 132 F.3d 20, 25 (3d Cir. 1997)).
In the instant case, the amended complaint fails to assert factual averments to support a Monell theory of liability against the County or the District Attorney's Office. There are no allegations in the amended complaint from which we could infer that the County had a policy or practice that resulted in a violation of the plaintiffs' rights, either through the District Attorney's office or the correctional facility. Nor does the amended complaint allege that a policymaker had knowledge of any alleged misconduct or of any prior pattern of similar conduct. Accordingly, any Monell claim against the County fails as a matter of law and should be dismissed.
Rather, we have concluded as to the Correctional Defendants that the plaintiffs have not sufficiently pleaded that these defendants violated their constitutional rights. (Doc. 96).
III. Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT the defendants' motion to dismiss the amended complaint (Doc. 86) be GRANTED.
The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.
Submitted this 19th day of January 2024.