Opinion
Civ. 4:22-CV-1396
01-17-2024
DANA ELROY SMITH, et al., Plaintiffs, v. JOHN D. DECKER, et al., Defendants.
Munley, Judge.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Daryl F. Bloom, United States Magistrate Judge.
I. Statement of Facts and of the Case
This case comes before this Court for consideration of a motion to dismiss filed by one of the defendants, Mark Rockovich. (Doc. 60). The plaintiffs, Dana Smith and William Matthews, brought this action against Rockovich and a host of other defendants arising out of their 2019 state criminal prosecution for solicitation to commit criminal homicide and criminal conspiracy, charges that were ultimately dismissed. (Doc. 51). As it relates to Defendant Rockovich, who was the warden of the Luzerne County Correctional Facility at the time Smith was incarcerated there, the amended complaint asserts that Rockovich is responsible for the harassment and assault that Smith allegedly endured while housed at LCCF. (Doc. 51 ¶¶ 44-45).
We note that this motion also includes C.O. Wilk, who appears to have been terminated as a defendant on the docket in this case. In fact, it appears that Wilk was not named in the caption or as a named defendant listed within the amended complaint, and he appears in only one paragraph of the amended complaint. (Doc. 51 ¶ 46). Out of an abundance of caution, we will address Plaintiff Smith's claim against Wilk in this Report and Recommendation.
The claims against Rockovich and Wilk only appear to relate to Plaintiff Smith, as there are no allegations that Plaintiff Matthews was ever incarcerated at LCCF.
The amended complaint alleges that Smith and Matthews were charged by a criminal complaint on or around December 30, 2019, with solicitation to commit criminal homicide and criminal conspiracy. (Doc. 51 ¶ 13). These charges were brought by the Pennsylvania State Police (“PSP”) through Defendants Decker, Williams, and Norton. (Id. ¶ 14). During the pendency of these state criminal proceedings, which were continued for nine and a half months, Smith was held at LCCF without bail. (Id. ¶¶ 16-17).
Smith alleges that while he was incarcerated at LCCF, he was “assaulted, threatened to be assaulted, and generally mistreated by other inmates and guards” due to Wilk's “harassing actions and remarks against Plaintiff Smith.” (Doc. 51 ¶ 46). He further alleges that as the warden, Defendant Rockovich is liable for the actions of his employees and the conduct of his guards. (Id. ¶ 45).
Defendant Rockovich has now filed the instant motion to dismiss (Doc. 60), arguing that Smith's claims fail as a matter of law. This motion is fully briefed and ripe for resolution. For the following reasons, we recommend that the defendant's motion to dismiss be granted.
The other remaining defendants have also filed motions to dismiss, which we will address separately. (Docs. 61, 64, 86).
II. Discussion
A. Motion to Dismiss - Standard of Review
The defendant has filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 12(b)(6) permits the court to dismiss a complaint if the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Under federal pleading standards, a complaint must set forth a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2).
In determining whether a complaint states a claim for relief under this pleading standard, a court must accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), and accept “all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them after construing them in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.” Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court is not required to accept legal conclusions or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Id.; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice”).
As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has aptly summarized:
[A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Id. Second, a District Court must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” Id. at 1950. In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief. A complaint has to “show” such an entitlement with its facts. See Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234-35. As the Supreme Court instructed in Iqbal, “[w]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]'-‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.' ” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. This “plausibility” determination will be “a context-specific task that requires
the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009).
Generally, when considering a motion to dismiss, a court relies on the complaint and its attached exhibits, as well as matters of public record. Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007). A court can also consider “undisputedly authentic document[s] that a defendant attached as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's claims are based on the [attached] documents.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Additionally, if the complaint relies on the contents of a document not physically attached to the complaint but whose authenticity is not in dispute, the court may consider such document in its determination. See Pryor v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002). However, the court may not rely on any other part of the record when deciding a motion to dismiss. Jordan, 20 F.3d at 1261.
B. The Motion to Dismiss should be Granted.
As we have explained, Smith asserts his claims against Rockovich arising out of his detention at LCCF while his state criminal proceedings were pending. He alleges that Rockovich, as warden of LCCF, is responsible for the harassment and assault he endured at LCCF at the hands of other inmates and guards. Smith also vaguely asserts that C.O. Wilk was one of the guards who harassed him. He brings his claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his constitutional rights. After consideration, we conclude that these claims fail as a matter of law and should be dismissed.
Smith's claims appear to assert violations of the Eighth Amendment's, which protects inmates from “cruel and unusual punishment.” U.S. Const. amend. XIII. Prison officials have a duty to provide inmates with “adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must ‘take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.'” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984)). To be liable for an Eighth Amendment violation, prison officials must have “a sufficiently culpable state of mind,” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, which, in the prison context, is one of “‘deliberate indifference' to inmate health and safety.” Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 125 (3d Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).
Smith's claims against Rockovich are based on a theory of supervisory liability; that is, because Rockovich was the warden of LCCF, he is responsible for the actions of the guards that allegedly led to Rockovich's injuries. First, and fundamentally, a plaintiff may not bring a § 1983 claim based solely on the theory of respondeat superior; rather, he must allege the defendant's personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violations. Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). Second, to state a claim for supervisory liability in this context, Smith must allege that Rockovich's conduct was either the “moving force [behind] the constitutional violation” or amounted to “deliberate indifference to the plight of the person deprived.” Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1118 (3d Cir. 1989).
In this case, the amended complaint fails to assert allegations against Rockovich that amount to Eighth Amendment liability. Instead, the amended complaint generally asserts that Rockovich was the warden of the facility, and as the warden, he is responsible for the conduct of his employees. While the plaintiffs' brief in opposition to the motion to dismiss asserts that he is proceeding under a theory of failure-to-train, there are no allegations in the complaint from which we could infer that Rockovich failed to properly train his employees such that a lack of training amounted to an Eighth Amendment violation. “To demonstrate deliberate indifference where a plaintiff claims failure to train or supervise, the plaintiff must ordinarily show a ‘pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees.'” See Thomas v. Cumberland County, 749 F.3d 217, 223 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62 (2011)). Here, the amended complaint makes so such allegations. Accordingly, we conclude that Smith's claims against Rockovich fail as a matter of law.
Further, and acting out of an abundance of caution, we note that the complaint appears to assert an Eighth Amendment claim against C.O. Wilk, alleging that Wilk made harassing statements to Smith. (Doc. 51 ¶ 46). However, it is well settled that “verbal harassment of a prisoner, although deplorable, does not violate the Eighth Amendment.” Robinson v. Taylor, 204 Fed.Appx. 155, 156 (3d Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). Thus, to the extent that Wilk remains a defendant in this case, the Eighth Amendment claim fails as a matter of law and should be dismissed.
Because we have concluded that Smith's claims against these defendants fail on their merits, we decline to address the defendants' argument concerning qualified immunity.
III. Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT the defendant's motion to dismiss the amended complaint (Doc. 60) be GRANTED.
The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.