It is error for the trial court to ignore the mandate of Code Ann. § 81A-116 (Ga. L. 1966, pp. 609, 628; 1967, pp. 226, 231; 1968, pp. 1104, 1106) requiring a pre-trial conference upon timely motion. See Smith v. Davis, 121 Ga. App. 704, 706 ( 175 S.E.2d 28); State Hwy. Dept. v. Peters, 121 Ga. App. 167 ( 173 S.E.2d 253); Malcolm v. Cotton, 128 Ga. App. 699, 701 (6) ( 197 S.E.2d 760). However, we find no direct ruling on the motion or that such a ruling was ever requested, although a motion was filed.

6. It was error for the trial judge to fail and refuse to enter a pre-trial order pursuant to the provisions of Code Ann. § 81A-116 (Ga. L. 1966, pp. 609, 628; 1967, pp. 226, 231; 1968, pp. 1104, 1106), which was mandatory upon the defendant's timely motion therefor. Smith v. Davis, 121 Ga. App. 704, 705 ( 175 S.E.2d 28), citing State Hwy. Dept. v. Peters, 121 Ga. App. 167 ( 173 S.E.2d 253). The necessity for such order was not eliminated by the fact that counsel for both parties filed pre-trial memorandums, since such memorandums, even if they were voluntarily followed by both counsel in the trial of the case, did not resolve all of the issues which arose during the trial and they lacked the authoritative and binding effect which only the judge's order could have, providing an advance ruling on the admissibility of certain evidence, without which, "the trial can become a ship without a rudder." See the concurring opinion in Berger v. Plantation Pipeline Co., 121 Ga. App. 362, 366 ( 173 S.E.2d 741).

Brown v. City of Atlanta, 66 Ga. 71, 76 (1880). Compare Jones v. Scarborough, 194 Ga. App. 468, 470 ( 390 S.E.2d 674) (1990), with Smith v. Davis, 121 Ga. App. 704, 705 (2) ( 175 S.E.2d 28) (1970). 4. The record does not support Womack's assertion that the receiver assumed the role of a "special prosecutor" and that the court failed to restrain him. Womack has failed to rebut the presumption that the court and receiver have faithfully discharged their duties.

While we do not approve of the eight-year delay that occurred between filing the petition and the amendment, we cannot accept the state's implication that Nelson is solely responsible for the delay. Moreover, delay in and of itself is not a justification for refusing to consider an amendment to a petition, so long as it precedes both the hearing on the issues and the entry of a pretrial order, which either party may insist on. See Smith v. Davis, 121 Ga. App. 704 ( 175 S.E.2d 28) (1970), and OCGA § 9-11-16 (pretrial conference and order mandatory if sought by either party). The habeas court erred by refusing to consider Nelson's amended petition.

As always, prejudice (harm) must be shown. See Dawkins v. Thomas Hair c. Corp., 145 Ga. App. 568 ( 244 S.E.2d 88) (1978); Yeomans v. Smith, 130 Ga. App. 574 ( 203 S.E.2d 926) (1974); Smith v. Davis, 121 Ga. App. 704 ( 175 S.E.2d 28) (1970). All the purposes of an objection have already been fulfilled by the proceedings on the motion in limine.

As always, prejudice (harm) must be shown. See Dawkins v. Thomas Hair c. Corp., 145 Ga. App. 568 ( 244 S.E.2d 88) (1978); Yeomans v. Smith, 130 Ga. App. 574 ( 203 S.E.2d 926) (1974); Smith v. Davis, 121 Ga. App. 704 ( 175 S.E.2d 28) (1970). All the purposes of an objection have already been fulfilled by the proceedings on the motion in limine.

In their first enumeration of error, Gilco, Cook, Palmer, and Giles contend that the trial court erred in denying their motion for continuance to allow for the depositions of Stafford's employees. We have held that "[t]he grant or denial of a continuance is a matter within the discretion of the trial judge and unless clearly abused will not be interfered with. Smith v. Davis, 121 Ga. App. 704, 705 ( 175 SE2d 28) [(1970)]. This applies in summary judgment proceedings.

Since there was no priot inconsistent statement, then the statement of the Association's contention in the pre-trial order was not impeaching. "It is the duty of the [trial] court, to the extent practicable and possible, to separate the wheat from the chaff; to eliminate uncontroversial issues and formulate the remaining issues to show the real contentions of the parties." Smith v. Davis, 121 Ga. App. 704, 706(2) ( 175 S.E.2d 28) (1970). By accepting the stipulation made in open court by the parties, the trial court exercised his discretion and modified the pre-trial order to conform to the stipulation and evidence at trial, i.e., the pre-trial order was automatically amended by the stipulation being accepted by the trial court.

Assuming that even in the absence of a request, the trial court's failure to enter a pre-trial order constituted error, the question is whether the error was harmful. Smith v. Davis, 121 Ga. App. 704, 705-706 (2) ( 175 S.E.2d 28) (1970) (physical precedent only); see Sheet Metal Workers c. v. Carter, 144 Ga. App. 48, 51 (5) ( 240 S.E.2d 569) (1977), rev'd on other grounds, 241 Ga. 220 ( 244 S.E.2d 860) (1978); OCGA § 9-11-16 (b). Upon a review of the record, we find no harmful error requiring reversal. See generally State Highway Dept. v. Peters, 121 Ga. App. 167, 171 (5) ( 244 S.E.2d 86) (1970).

In Carter v. Graves, 206 Ga. 234 ( 56 S.E.2d 917) (1949), the Supreme Court held that the Pacific Reporter was not shown to be such a publication as is published by authority so as to authorize the trial court to take judicial notice of California court decisions contained therein. However, in Smith v. Davis, 121 Ga. App. 704, 707 (3) ( 175 S.E.2d 28) (1970), this court found that Carter had been superseded by the 1968 enactment of Code Ann. § 81A-143 (c) (now OCGA § 9-11-43 (c)), and held that "the trial court was authorized to consider the reports of Florida cases appearing in the Southern Reporter as a relevant source of Florida law to determine the substantive law applicable. . . ." In further considering the applications of OCGA §§ 24-1-4 and 9-11-43 (c) in Swafford v. Globe American Cas. Co., 187 Ga. App. 730 ( 371 S.E.2d 180) (1988), this court noted that the historic basis for requiring proof or authentication of foreign law, i.e., the inaccessibility of published authority of such foreign law, no longer existed.