[Cits.]" Smith v. Curtis, 226 Ga. App. 470, 471(1) ( 486 S.E.2d 699) (1997); see OCGA § 5-5-24(a). Objections at charge conferences are insufficient to preserve a matter for appellate review.
According to Palmer, he preserved this issue by expressing a reservation of objections at the charge conference, but this reservation could not encompass objections to the charge as subsequently given. See Wilson v. State, 259 Ga. 55, 58(6) ( 376 S.E.2d 676) (1989); Smith v. Curtis, 226 Ga. App. 470, 471(1) ( 486 S.E.2d 699) (1997). At the conclusion of the jury instructions, the trial court affirmatively inquired whether Palmer had any objections to the charges "at this time."
See Brooks v. State, 190 Ga.App. 430, 432(2), 379 S.E.2d 228 (1989) (following a clarification to a jury instruction, “[a] litigant cannot submit to a ruling, acquiesce in the ruling, and still complain of same”). See also Smith v. Curtis, 226 Ga.App. 470, 471(1), 486 S.E.2d 699 (1997); Morrill v. State, 216 Ga.App. 468, 474(9), 454 S.E.2d 796 (1995) (“When an appellant could have tendered a timely motion for mistrial or requested additional limiting or curative instruction but declined to do so, we generally will not grant more appellate relief than that actually prayed for at trial.”); Central of Ga. R. Co. v. Sellers, 129 Ga.App. 811, 816(6), 201 S.E.2d 485 (1973) (physical precedent only).
See Brooks v. State, 190 Ga. App. 430, 432 (2) ( 379 SE2d 228) (1989) (following a clarification to a jury instruction, "[a] litigant cannot submit to a ruling, acquiesce in the ruling, and still complain of same."). See also Smith v. Curtis, 226 Ga. App. 470, 471 (1) ( 486 SE2d 699) (1997); Morrill v. State, 216 Ga. App. 468, 474 (9) ( 454 SE2d 796) (1995) ("When an appellant could have tendered a timely motion for mistrial or requested additional limiting or curative instruction but declined to do so, we generally will not grant more appellate relief than that actually prayed for at trial."); Central of Ga. R. Co. v. Sellers, 129 Ga. App. 811, 816 (6) ( 201 SE2d 485) (1973) (physical precedent only).
Duke made no objection concerning any of these matters at trial, however, and also failed to raise any such arguments in his motions for new trial. Thus there is nothing for us to review on appeal. See T.C. Property Mgmt. v. Tsai, 267 Ga. App. 740, 741 ( 600 SE2d 770) (2004) (failure to raise issue by objection or in motion for new trial waives argument on appeal); see also Smith v. Curtis, 226 Ga. App. 470-471 (1) ( 486 SE2d 699) (1997) (failure to object to omission of requested charge); Sims v. Majors, 178 Ga. App. 679, 681 (3) ( 344 SE2d 501) (1986) (failure to object to irregularities concerning jury view during trial). Judgment affirmed. Blackburn, P.J., and Bernes, J., concur.
supra. Accord Smith v. Curtis, 226 Ga. App. 470, 472(2) ( 486 S.E.2d 699) (1997) (two separate accidents occurring a year apart are not sufficiently connected to constitute a series of occurrences, and the allegedly negligent drivers are not joint tortfeasors and do not bear the burden of proving apportionment of damages). 2.
By failing to object to this charge, Volkswagen failed to preserve the issue for appellate review. Smith v. Curtis, 226 Ga. App. 470, 471(1) ( 486 S.E.2d 699) (1997). (f) We find no merit in Volkswagen's remaining objection to the jury charge on the ground that it improperly injected the issue of insurance into the trial.
However, because no application is required for the appeal of a "zero" award, the judgment with respect to Mr. McCormick is directly appealable. Smith v. Curtis, 226 Ga. App. 470 ( 486 S.E.2d 699) (1997). "As a consequence, the judgment entered in favor of [Mrs. McCormick] is also directly appealable."
See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rider.Smith v. Curtis, 226 Ga. App. 470, 471 (1) ( 486 S.E.2d 699) (1997).Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rider, 168 Ga. App. 136, 139 (3) ( 308 S.E.2d 378) (1983).
Such conduct was not in conformity with the contract. See Smith v. Curtis, 226 Ga. App. 470 (1) ( 486 S.E.2d 699) (1997). See Diaz v. State, 239 Ga. App. 795, 796 (2) ( 522 S.E.2d 242) (1999).